496 U.S. 72 (1990)
Vera M. English worked as a laboratory technician at General Electric Company’s nuclear-fuels production facility in Wilmington, North Carolina, from 1972 until 1984.1 In February 1984, English complained to GE management and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about perceived violations of nuclear-safety standards at the facility, including the failure of her co-workers to clean up radioactive material spills.2
Frustrated by the company’s failure to address her concerns, English deliberately failed to clean a work table contaminated with a uranium solution during a preceding shift and instead outlined the contaminated areas with red tape.3 A few days later she called her supervisor’s attention to the marked-off areas, which still had not been cleaned, resulting in work being halted while the laboratory was inspected and cleaned.4
Shortly after this episode GE charged English with a knowing failure to clean up radioactive contamination and temporarily assigned her to other work.5 On April 30, 1984, GE’s management informed her that she would be laid off unless within 90 days she successfully bid for a position in an area of the facility where she would not be exposed to nuclear materials.6 On May 15 the company notified her of its final decision affirming the disciplinary action, and when she had not found another position by July 30 her employment was terminated.7
In August 1984 English filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor charging GE with violating section 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act by retaliating against her for nuclear-safety complaints.8 An administrative law judge found that GE had violated the section when it transferred and then discharged her.9 The Secretary dismissed the complaint as untimely because it had not been filed within 30 days after the May 15 notice.10
In March 1987 English filed a diversity action against GE in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.11 In four counts she raised claims for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that she suffered severe depression and emotional harm as a result of GE’s extreme and outrageous conduct that included removing her from the laboratory under guard as if she were a criminal, assigning her degrading make-work, deriding her as paranoid, barring her from controlled areas, placing her under constant surveillance, isolating her from co-workers, and conspiring to charge her fraudulently with violations of safety and criminal laws; she sought punitive as well as compensatory damages.12
The District Court concluded that English had stated a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina law yet granted GE’s motion to dismiss on preemption grounds.13 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the basis of the District Court’s reasoning.14 Because of an apparent conflict with a decision of the First Circuit the Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether the Federal Government has pre-empted petitioner’s state-law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?16
State law is pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause in three circumstances. First, Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law.17 Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively.18 Such an intent may be inferred from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.19 Such an intent may also be inferred where an Act of Congress touches a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.20 Third, state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.21 This occurs either because it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.22
No. Vera M. English worked as a laboratory technician at General Electric Company’s nuclear-fuels production facility in Wilmington, North Carolina, from 1972 until 1984. In February 1984, English complained to GE management and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission about perceived violations of nuclear-safety standards at the facility, including the failure of her co-workers to clean up radioactive material spills. Frustrated by the company’s failure to address her concerns, English deliberately failed to clean a work table contaminated with a uranium solution during a preceding shift and instead outlined the contaminated areas with red tape.
A few days later she called her supervisor’s attention to the marked-off areas, which still had not been cleaned, resulting in work being halted while the laboratory was inspected and cleaned. Shortly after this episode GE charged English with a knowing failure to clean up radioactive contamination and temporarily assigned her to other work. On April 30, 1984, GE’s management informed her that she would be laid off unless within 90 days she successfully bid for a position in an area of the facility where she would not be exposed to nuclear materials. On May 15 the company notified her of its final decision affirming the disciplinary action, and when she had not found another position by July 30 her employment was terminated.
In August 1984 English filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor charging GE with violating section 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act by retaliating against her for nuclear-safety complaints. An administrative law judge found that GE had violated the section when it transferred and then discharged her. The Secretary dismissed the complaint as untimely because it had not been filed within 30 days after the May 15 notice. In March 1987 English filed a diversity action against GE in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina raising claims for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that she suffered severe depression and emotional harm as a result of GE’s extreme and outrageous conduct that included removing her from the laboratory under guard as if she were a criminal, assigning her degrading make-work, deriding her as paranoid, barring her from controlled areas, placing her under constant surveillance, isolating her from co-workers, and conspiring to charge her fraudulently with violations of safety and criminal laws; she sought punitive as well as compensatory damages. The District Court concluded that English had stated a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina law yet granted GE’s motion to dismiss on preemption grounds. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Applying the preemption framework to these facts shows no explicit statutory language preempting the tort claim.23 No occupation of the entire field exists because the claim rests on a nonsafety rationale of protecting citizens from outrageous employer conduct and has no direct and substantial effect on radiological safety decisions.24 No actual conflict with section 210 exists because the section’s limitations on remedies and timing do not bar state tort recovery for an employee who did not deliberately violate safety requirements.25
The Federal Government has not pre-empted petitioner’s state-law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.26
Whether petitioner’s tort claim falls within the pre-empted field of nuclear safety?27
The Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States. Only the Federal Government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant.28 For a state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, it must have some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels.29 Not every state law that in some remote way may affect nuclear safety decisions falls within the field.30
No. The facts establish that English’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arises from employer retaliation after her safety complaints.31 The claim is supported by the State’s interest in protecting citizens from outrageous conduct rather than by any safety rationale.32 The claim may have some tangential effect on resource allocation or safety policies because liability will attach additional consequences to retaliatory conduct.33 Yet this effect is neither direct nor substantial enough to place the claim in the pre-empted field, as illustrated by the contrast with claims that attach consequences directly to safety violations themselves.34
The claim therefore does not fall within the pre-empted field of nuclear safety.35
Petitioner’s tort claim does not fall within the pre-empted field of nuclear safety.36
Whether petitioner’s claim conflicts with particular aspects of section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act?37
Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act grants a federal administrative remedy to employees in the nuclear industry against retaliation for whistle-blowing, including a bar on recovery for employees who deliberately cause a safety violation, time limits for filing complaints, and authorization for compensatory but not general punitive damages.38 The mere existence of this detailed federal scheme does not by itself imply preemption of state remedies absent special features creating an actual conflict with federal law.39
No. The facts show that an administrative law judge found English had not deliberately committed a safety violation within the meaning of section 210(g).40 Any federal interest in denying relief to deliberate violators is not implicated by allowing her state claim.41 The absence of general authorization for exemplary damages in section 210 does not bar state actions permitting such awards because state causes of action are not preempted solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal law.42 The expeditious time frames in section 210 likewise create no actual conflict because many retaliatory incidents are already known to federal agencies through the original safety complaints.43
The possibility that employees might forgo the federal remedy is too speculative to support preemption.44
Petitioner’s claim does not conflict with particular aspects of section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act.45