820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1991)
appellate court to question the pragmatic wisdom of the death penalty in our so-called modern society. Greenberg,
Capital Punishment as a System,
91 Yale L.J. 908
(1982). Furthermore, under the United States Constitution and for this case, that decision has previously been rendered by the Wyoming Supreme Court under the Wyoming Constitution in
Hopkinson v. State,
664 P.2d 43
(Wyo.),
cert. denied
464 U.S. 908
,
104 S.Ct. 262
,
78 L.Ed.2d 246
(1983) and
Engberg I.
The volume of critical literature is overwhelming
[38]
with converse justification for litigative action based upon public opinion as almost completely limited in modern democracy to this nation. Levit,
Expediting Death: Repressive Tolerance and Post-Conviction Due Process Jurisprudence in Capital Cases,
59 UMKC L.Rev. 55 (1990).
Cf.
Bigel,
William
*155
H. Rehnquist on Capital Punishment,
XVII Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 729 (1991).
Given the system and the apparent societal circumference articulated in controlling cases of the United States Supreme Court for federal law, it remains incumbent upon the state tribunal to honor the prerequisites of the state constitution. In attempting to define a fair, evenhanded and reasonably applied death penalty, see
Hopkinson,
664 P.2d 43
and
Engberg I,
686 P.2d 541
, Rose, J., dissenting. My conviction against the entire process, issue analysis and decision in this case is examined as a result lacking either fairness, equal protection or any rational justification in simple criminal law for what occurred in this, the Engberg case.
[39]
The indeterminate future, definable once in accurate anticipation of total confusion by a law journal writer, is discernable in analysis by Professor Rosen,
The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases The Standardless Standard,
64 N.C.L.Rev. 941 (1986).
See
Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356
,
108 S.Ct. 1853
,
100 L.Ed.2d 372
(1988), but then consider
Johnson v. Mississippi,
486 U.S. 578
,
108 S.Ct. 1981
,
100 L.Ed.2d 575
(1988). What really exists is best recognized by Bright,
Death by Lottery Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants,
92 W.Va.L.Rev. 679, 695 (1990), where the author concludes, following advocacy of continued federal review, that "[o]therwise, the death penalty will too often be punishment not for committing the worst crime, but for being assigned the worst lawyer."
See Death Penalty Litigation in the '90's-A Forum
(ABA 1990); I. Robbins,
Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases
(ABA 1990); and Fogel,
A Fair Death: Arbitrariness, the Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1972-1989,
16 New Eng.J.Crim. & Civ. Confinement 1 (1990).
Cf.
Arkin,
The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane,
69 N.C.L.Rev. 371 (1991).
See also Project, The Death Penalty: Personal Perspectives,
22 Loy.U.Chi. L.J. 1, 1 (1990), initially quoting Plato's
Apology of Socrates:
"But now it is time to go away, I to die and you to live. Which of us goes to a better thing is unclear to everyone except to the god." For additional analysis, see Ledewitz,
The Morality of Capital Punishment: An Exchange,
29 Duq.L.Rev. 719 (1991) compared with Comment,
*156
Barbarism in the Plastic Bubble: An Application of Existentialist Theory to Capital Punishment in the United States,
1990 Det.C.L.Rev. 1011 (1990).
In the American justice system, constituting a disparate capital criminal adaptation, there are two paths to the death penalty. The first is the typical intent-driven premeditated killing. Note,
Should Courts Use Principles of Justification and Excuse to Impose Felony-Murder Liability?,
19 Rutgers L.J. 451
(1988). The second is the dysfunctional category of felony murder where the malice or intent to kill is unnecessary to reach the death penalty plateau.
People v. Hamilton,
46 Cal.3d 123
,
249 Cal. Rptr. 320
,
756 P.2d 1348
(1988),
cert. denied
489 U.S. 1040
,
109 S.Ct. 1176
,
103 L.Ed.2d 238
(1989);
King v. Com.,
6 Va. App. 351
,
368 S.E.2d 704
(1988). In the trial of Engberg, the prosecution started down both paths and then stepped back before jury submission to have the trial court instruct only on felony murder so that intent to kill was never considered by the jury.
Cf.
Price v. State,
807 P.2d 909
(Wyo. 1991). The dysfunction develops in result, since in most intentional death penalty cases, the factual events include both the intent and a corollary and separate non-homicide felony, while "pure" felony murder reaches a death penalty with only the felony and not the intent. Rosen,
Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death,
31 B.C.L.Rev. 1103 (1990).
Actually, in the vast majority of reported death penalty cases whether characterized as felony murder or intentional, the homicide was factually established as intentional.
Cf.
Com. ex rel. Smith v. Myers,
438 Pa. 218
,
261 A.2d 550
(1970). An
Engberg
type felony murder when intent to kill is not established comes within a minority of the thousands of reported death penalty cases, but within a vast array of potential candidates if this kind of felony murder is to be indefinitely extended to its full potential. Death penalty vulnerability if every felony homicide creates the death-prone status could, nationwide, annually number, if including driving violations,
in excess of forty thousand per year.
[40]
Non-vehicular
*157
homicides now number around twenty-three thousand per year. Casper Star-Tribune (Casper, WY), March 25, 1991. To provide the death penalty for this number annually would require about three and one-half executions every hour, day and night somewhere in this country. It could become the greatest growth industry in the country and particularly since the federal government wants to join in the killing campaign.
See
Finkel,
Capital Felony-Murder, Objective Indicia, and Community Sentiment,
32 Ariz.L.Rev. 819 (1990).
See also
Comment,
The Cost of Killing Criminals,
18 N.Ky.L.Rev. 61 (1990).
Realistically, only a small percentage of killings are not attended by some associative felony, whether involving financial gain or behavioral satisfaction. Excluding the vicarious thrill killer, perhaps the ego killers involving husband-wife-boyfriend, etc. stand as the only general exceptions to the included felony predominance in crime. Yet, in either of these exceptional circumstances, another felony offense may occur as often even a lesser included incident, such as breaking-and-entering, assault, fire arms violation, and so forth. The burden of this analysis is to perceive that the felony murder death case as here presented is an incongruity in most cases, since only pursued to eliminate a prosecutorial burden of proving malice and intent by substitution of the conclusive presumption for the death penalty exposure from associative conduct. It is also apparent that the legislature recognized this problem by almost completely changing statutory provisions for imposition of the death penalty by passage of Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171 (1989).
[41]
In application of the Wyoming Constitution and analysis of the realistic posture of the thousands of present death cases since
Furman
,
I would deny death penalty exposure, unless in felony murder the killing was found by the jury to be intentional or at least achieve
Tison
compliance if the actor was not an accessory or co-actor.
Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137
,
107 S.Ct. 1676
,
95 L.Ed.2d 127
,
reh'g denied
482 U.S. 921
,
107 S.Ct. 3201
,
96 L.Ed.2d 688
(1987). In the present case, when the prosecution chose not to proceed to the jury with intent to kill, the State should have waived death penalty exposure for Engberg.
[42]
See
Rosen,
supra,
31 B.C.L.Rev. at 1169.
*158
The subject of felony murder as an American legal system phenomenon is not without criticism, analysis and comment.
See
1 Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 210.2 at 29 (1980), providing that felony homicide should only constitute death penalty murder if committed purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting indifference to the value of human life; and Note,
A Reasoned Moral Response: Rethinking Texas's Capital Sentencing After Penry v. Lynaugh,
69 Tex.L.Rev. 407 (1990). The further question, as earlier discussed by the majority death penalty opinion in conjunction with the doubling up factor,
State v. Davis,
325 N.C. 607
,
386 S.E.2d 418
(1989),
cert. denied
___ U.S. ___,
110 S.Ct. 2587
,
110 L.Ed.2d 268
(1990), is that the constituent felony by-passes intent to achieve felony murder and then proceeds automatically, as applied by single or dual aggravating factors, to the death penalty determination.
Thus, society can achieve a death penalty for an offense which otherwise may not have been more than a voluntary or involuntary homicide in committing a major felony.
Cf.
DeShields v. State,
534 A.2d 630
(Del.Super. 1987),
cert. denied
486 U.S. 1017
,
108 S.Ct. 1754
,
100 L.Ed.2d 217
(1988), found by the appellate court to be an execution-type slaying of a helpless victim in cold blood. Consider also the predecessor cases of
Deputy v. State,
500 A.2d 581
(Del.Super. 1985),
cert. denied
480 U.S. 940
,
107 S.Ct. 1589
,
94 L.Ed.2d 778
(1987), where seventy-nine separate stab wounds in one victim and sixty-six in another were incompatible with accidental occurrence or unintended death as invoking a culpable mental state;
Whalen v. State,
492 A.2d 552
(Del.Super. 1985);
Flamer v. State,
490 A.2d 104
(Del.Super.),
cert. denied
464 U.S. 865
,
104 S.Ct. 198
,
78 L.Ed.2d 173
(1983),
cert. denied
474 U.S. 865
,
106 S.Ct. 185
,
88 L.Ed.2d 154
(1985); and
People v. King,
109 Ill.2d 514
,
94 Ill.Dec. 702
,
488 N.E.2d 949
,
cert. denied
479 U.S. 872
,
107 S.Ct. 249
,
93 L.Ed.2d 173
,
reh'g denied
479 U.S. 956
,
107 S.Ct. 449
,
93 L.Ed.2d 396
(1986), where felony murderer acted intentionally or knowingly in killing.
See
1 Model Penal Code & Commentaries,
supra,
§ 210.6.
The basic thrust is demonstrated by Zimring & Hawkins,
Murder, The Model Code, and the Multiple Agendas of Reform,
19 Rutgers L.J. 773
, 783 (1988), where the authors believe that the model code mens rea doctrine is "the very feature that makes the felony-murder rule attractive to prosecutors * * *." Elimination of the requirement to prove intent improves and simplifies homicide proof for murder status.
Cf.
People v. Land,
169 Ill. App.3d 342
,
119 Ill.Dec. 955
,
523 N.E.2d 711
(1988) (intent in the underlying felony); and
Jones v. State,
523 N.E.2d 750
(Ind. 1988).
The felony murder rule, as in part embraced in the preclusive death penalty case law and discussion, has separately engendered substantial critique in law journals. As we find in Roth & Sundby,
The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads,
70 Cornell L.Rev. 446, 446-48 (1985) (footnotes omitted and quoting 3 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 57, 65 (1883);
State v. Harrison,
90 N.M. 439, 442
,
564 P.2d 1321, 1324
(1977); Packer,
Criminal Code Revision,
23 U. Toronto L.J. 1
, 4 (1973);
People v. Aaron,
409 Mich. 672, 689
,
299 N.W.2d 304, 307
(1980); and Jeffries & Stephan,
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law,
88 Yale L.J. 1325
, 1383 (1979)):
Few legal doctrines have been as maligned and yet have shown as great a resiliency as the felony-murder rule. Criticism of the rule constitutes a lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal doctrine: it has been described as "astonishing" and "monstrous," an unsupportable "legal fiction," "an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal law," and as an "anachronistic remnant" that has "`no logical or practical basis for existence in modern law.'" Perhaps the most that can be said for the rule is that it provides commentators with an extreme example that makes it easy to illustrate the injustice of various legal propositions.
Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. * * * The United
*159
States thus remains virtually the only western country still recognizing a rule which makes it possible "that the most serious sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental homicide."
That article examines two constitutional concepts as challenging the Eighth Amendment and Due Process: a presumptive device in criminal conviction (
Sandstrom
), or a form of criminal strict liability (
Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782
,
102 S.Ct. 3368
,
73 L.Ed.2d 1140
(1982) and
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422
,
98 S.Ct. 2864
,
57 L.Ed.2d 854
,
aff'd
438 U.S. 422
,
98 S.Ct. 2864
,
57 L.Ed.2d 854
(1978),
cert. denied
444 U.S. 884
,
100 S.Ct. 175
,
62 L.Ed.2d 114
(1979)), and in summary, states:
The felony-murder rule arose from obscure historical origins and has developed haphazardly into a harsh and unjust legal doctrine. It is perhaps fitting, therefore, that two separate lines of constitutional doctrines, developing independently, have come together in such a way that it is impossible to conceptualize felony murder in a manner that does not run afoul of constitutional guarantees. Courts and commentators have extensively documented the rule's weak policy justifications. This Article has demonstrated that the rule's infirmities have finally reached constitutional stature.
Roth & Sundby,
supra,
70 Cornell L. Rev. at 492.
[43]
The confusion of philosophy engendered by the relatively few death cases of the nature of Engberg where the felony engineers the felony murder and then aggravates the offense to a capital status, provides the question whether the homicide was intentional, inopportune or accidental. The type normally reflected as intended homicide is evidenced by numerous cases.
[44]
The same persuasion was once adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Carlos v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
35 Cal.3d 131
,
197 Cal. Rptr. 79
,
672 P.2d 862
(1983), but with jurist changes following an election campaign in 1986, was reversed in
People v. Anderson,
43 Cal.3d 1104
,
240 Cal. Rptr. 585
,
742 P.2d 1306
(1987). As adopted for that state, intent to kill is not a necessary element of the felony murder special circumstance which only differentiates prosecutorial requirements from factual components.
[45]
*160
The principal result of the intent rejection answer of
Tison
is that the available death penalty class is so numerically expanded that in result, it may lead to the total collapse of the Eighth Amendment limitation standard. Note,
Reckless Indifference as Intent to Kill: The Disproportionality of Punishment After Tison v. Arizona,
20 Conn.L.Rev. 723 (1988). It is rationally anticipated that neither American society nor the judicial system at its worst can accommodate more than a limited number of death penalty executions and certainly not the number that will result from the intrusion of the non-intent felony murder upon the Eighth Amendment and Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 14 and 15.
Significantly increasing the class of death penalty exposed miscreants will serve either or both to accelerate total abolition or limitation to offenses that are intent-defined to be death penalty justified. Perhaps the content of deleted intent for death penalty can be extracted from Lipkin,
The Moral Good Theory of Punishment,
40 U.Fla.L.Rev. 17 (1988). Harm happened, so punishment should be self-imposed by voluntary formulation. This could achieve a procedure so that if death is caused, another should die to balance the scales, and whether for retribution, deterrence, or rehabilitation, we need not inquire. If to be applied to motor vehicle usage, the standard could both serve to limit population increase and provide a new growth category of industry executions.
For Engberg, I specially concur for reversal with a conclusion that felony constituents should not be recognized for aggravation circumstances in death penalty infliction unless intent to kill is proven. Engberg's prosecution failed to meet this standard. Specific and compelling authority is provided by the most recent case of
State v. Ortega,
___ N.M. ___,
817 P.2d 1196
(N.M. 1991). Its decisive reasoning should now be adopted for Wyoming.
By the 1989 Wyoming legislature's comprehensive change of the Wyoming death penalty provisions, the weighing and burden of proof issues which are pervasive in this appeal no longer occur under the replacement provisions. A difficult instruction problem for capital penalty that existed in the old statute has been removed by the new text. Upon retrial, if Engberg is again prosecuted for capital murder, assessment of death penalty will be under the current statutes instead of the prior provisions which supplied the significant question of erroneous instructions addressed in the present appeal.
There are two particularly relevant Wyoming death penalty statutes. W.S. 6-2-101 states:
[46]
(a) Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest or kidnapping, or by administering poison or causing the same to be done, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree.
(b) A person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or life imprisonment according to law,
except that no person shall be subject to the penalty of death for any murder committed before the defendant attained the age of sixteen (16) years.
W.S. 6-2-101 (1991 Cum.Supp.) (1989 statute). W.S. 6-2-102 states:
(d) Upon conclusion of the evidence and arguments the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions, including instructions as to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, as defined in subsections (h) and (j) of this section, or proceed as provided by paragraph
(iii)
of this subsection:
(i) After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render a recommendation of sentence to the judge, based upon the following:
(A) Whether one (1) or more sufficient aggravating circumstances exist
*161
beyond a reasonable doubt
as set forth in subsection (h) of this section;
(B) Whether,
by a preponderance of the evidence,
sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as set forth in subsection (j) of this section which out weigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and
(C) The mere number of aggravating or mitigating circumstances found shall have no independent significance.
(C)
(ii)
Based upon these
the
considerations
in paragraph (i) of this subsection, the jury shall unanimously determine
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
The jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances unanimously found to exist, and each individual juror may also consider any mitigating circumstances found by that juror to exist.
[See, however,
McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433
,
110 S.Ct. 1227
,
108 L.Ed.2d 369
(1990) and
Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367
,
108 S.Ct. 1860
,
100 L.Ed.2d 384
(1988).]
(ii)
(iii)
In nonjury cases, the judge shall determine if any aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist and impose sentence within the limits prescribed by law, based upon the considerations enumerated in subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) of paragraph (i) of this subsection.
(e) The death penalty shall not be imposed unless at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (h) of this section is found.
In nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree on the punishment to be imposed, the judge shall impose a life sentence.
The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation
sentence
of death, shall designate in writing signed by the foreman of the jury:
(i)
The aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it
unanimously
found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree on to punishment to be imposed, the judge shall impose a life sentence.;
(ii) The mitigating circumstance or circumstances which it unanimously found by a preponderance of the evidence; and
(iii) The mitigating circumstance or circumstances which any individual juror found by a preponderance of the evidence.
(h) Aggravating circumstances are limited to the following:
(i) The murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment:
(A) Confined in a jail or correctional facility;
(B) On parole or on probation for a felony;
(C) After escaping detention or incarceration; or
(D) Released on bail pending appeal of his conviction.
(iv) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;
(v) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody;
(vi) The murder was committed for
compensation, the collection of insurance benefits or other similar
pecuniary gain;
(vii) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,
being unnecessarily torturous to the victim;
(viii) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney, former district attorney, or former
*162
county and prosecuting attorney,
defending attorney, peace officer, juror or witness,
during or because of the exercise of his official duty;
(ix) The defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was less than seventeen (17) years of age or older than sixty-five (65) years of age;
(x) The defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was especially vulnerable due to significant mental or physical disability;
(xi) The defendant poses a substantial and continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts of criminal violence;
(xii) The defendant killed another human being purposely and with premeditated malice and while engaged in, or as an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping.
(j) Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:
(vii) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(viii) Any other fact or circumstance of the defendant's character or prior record or matter surrounding his offense which serves to mitigate his culpability.
W.S. 6-2-102 (1991 Cum.Supp.) (1989 statute).
In the current Wyoming Criminal Code which was enacted in 1982 and 1983, a continuity provision was inserted to retain effectiveness of prior law for the determination of the existence of a criminal offense and to separately establish penalty assessment if less onerous in the new law. The saving clause, having first retained prior statutes to govern prosecutions for crimes occurring prior to the effective date of the act, then provided for penalty: "In a case pending on or after the effective date of this act, involving a crime committed prior to the effective date, if the penalty under this act for the crime is different from the penalty under prior law, the court shall impose the lesser sentence." W.S. 6-1-101(b) and (c). This application of the new code, if the changed penalty was favorable to the convicted person, was confirmed in
Attletweedt v. State,
684 P.2d 812
(Wyo. 1984).
Legislative enactment of Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171 (1989) relating to assessment of the death penalty following conviction of murder in the first degree now provides a more modern death penalty procedure. The new statute, in generally amending and re-enacting, included no reference to offenses committed prior to passage or for guilt determination thereafter except in Section 3: "This act is effective immediately upon completion of all acts necessary for a bill to become law as provided by Article 4, Section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution." Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171, § 3 (1989). Consequently, with approval March 6, 1989, the law became effective on passage. I conclude that the present law determines any future death penalty assessment procedure which would include a penalty retrial for Engberg.
[47]
Jones v. State,
771 P.2d 368
*163
(Wyo. 1989);
Reynoldson v. State,
737 P.2d 1331
(Wyo. 1987);
Miller v. State,
732 P.2d 1054
(Wyo. 1987);
Attletweedt,
684 P.2d 812
.
The shifting standards for assessing the death penalty in modern American jurisprudence can be explained by the deviousness of philosophic differences within the great case volumes and the narrowness of the precepts by which it is determined that the defendant is or is not to be executed. By current Wyoming statutory changes, there have been contentious problems removed including the weighing and burden of persuasion conflicts.
See
Pulley v. Harris,
465 U.S. 37
,
104 S.Ct. 871
,
79 L.Ed.2d 29
(1984);
People v. Johnson,
47 Cal.3d 1194
,
255 Cal. Rptr. 569
,
767 P.2d 1047
(1989),
cert. denied
494 U.S. 1038
,
110 S.Ct. 1501
,
108 L.Ed.2d 636
,
reh'g denied
___ U.S. ___,
110 S.Ct. 2196
,
109 L.Ed.2d 524
(1990); and
People v. Brown,
40 Cal.3d 512
,
230 Cal. Rptr. 834
,
726 P.2d 516
(1985),
cert. granted in part
476 U.S. 1157
,
106 S.Ct. 2274
,
90 L.Ed.2d 717
(1986),
judgment rev'd
479 U.S. 538
,
107 S.Ct. 837
,
93 L.Ed.2d 934
(1987). Demonstrating this clash of problems in its jurisprudence, California, as one of the major participants in present death penalty litigation, is illustrated by the majority and dissenting opinions in
People v. Lang,
49 Cal.3d 991
,
264 Cal. Rptr. 386
,
782 P.2d 627
(1989),
cert. denied
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 224
,
112 L.Ed.2d 178
(1990) when compared to the unanimous decision published the same date of
People v. Hunter,
49 Cal.3d 957
,
264 Cal. Rptr. 367
,
782 P.2d 608
(1989),
cert. denied
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 222
,
112 L.Ed.2d 190
(1990).
See also
State v. Deboue,
552 So.2d 355
(La. 1989),
cert. denied
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 215
,
112 L.Ed.2d 174
,
reh'g denied
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 541
,
112 L.Ed.2d 550
(1990). The complexity is illustrated in the current appellate proceedings of
Stano v. Dugger,
889 F.2d 962
(1989),
reh'g granted and opinion vacated
897 F.2d 1067
(11th Cir.1990).
[48]
Retrial application of the present Wyoming statute may avoid some of the
*164
*165
major issues argued in complex detail by Engberg in this proceeding as his death penalty issues.
[49]
Althouse,
Essay. Standing, In Fluffy Slippers,
77 Va.L.Rev. 1177 (1991).
With some deference to Engberg's 212-page brief, some major and not so minor death penalty issues remain for this post-conviction-relief review. Upon retrial, if death penalty imposition is again undertaken, most of these peculiar
Engberg-Hopkinson
type of issues should disappear with a new trial and a changed statute. Only a brief mention will now be made of those issues to avoid further extension of this presently overlong writing.
110 S.Ct. 1227
;
Smith v. McCormick,
914 F.2d 1153
(9th Cir.1990);
State v. Smith,
328 N.C. 99
,
400 S.E.2d 712
(1991);
State v. Jones,
327 N.C. 439
,
396 S.E.2d 309
(1990);
State v. Landrum,
53 Ohio St.3d 107
,
559 N.E.2d 710
,
reh'g denied
54 Ohio St.3d 710
,
561 N.E.2d 945
(1990),
cert. denied
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 1092
,
112 L.Ed.2d 1196
(1991);
State v. Stevens,
311 Or. 119
,
806 P.2d 92
(1991).
Cf.
Parker v. Dugger,
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 731
,
112 L.Ed.2d 812
(1991). See also the cases cited in n. 48,
supra
and Sundby,
The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing,
38 UCLA L.Rev. 1147 (1991).
110 S.Ct. 1227
;
Mills,
486 U.S. 367
,
108 S.Ct. 1860
;
Landrum,
559 N.E.2d 710
. Compare
People v. Bean,
137 Ill.2d 65
,
147 Ill.Dec. 891
,
560 N.E.2d 258
(1990),
cert. denied
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 1338
,
113 L.Ed.2d 270
(1991) with
State v. McDougald,
120 N.J. 523
,
577 A.2d 419
(1990);
State v. Sanderson,
327 N.C. 397
,
394 S.E.2d 803
(1990); and
State v. Wagner,
309 Or. 5
,
786 P.2d 93
,
cert. denied
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 212
,
112 L.Ed.2d 171
(1990). Perhaps two cases most interesting in touching questions about the prior and the present Wyoming statute and the way the jury was actually instructed in Engberg (both ways) are
People v. Tenneson,
788 P.2d 786
(Colo. 1990), addressing a prior Colorado statute, and the present statute declared to be unconstitutional in
People v. Young,
814 P.2d 834
(Colo. 1991).
472 U.S. 320
,
105 S.Ct. 2633
,
86 L.Ed.2d 231
(1985).
CONCLUSION
Given the serious nature of the death penalty and the heightened reliability most courts have consistently required in death sentencing procedures,
People v. Davis,
794 P.2d 159, 230
(Colo. 1990),
cert. denied
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 662
,
112 L.Ed.2d 656
(1991), Lohr, J., dissenting, I would find significant error in both guilt and penalty assessment which "sufficiently undermines the fairness and certainty of the death sentence returned in this case to require reversal." Although I would reverse the conviction of guilt for the clear trial errors defined within this record and dissent in that regard, I concur in reversal of the death penalty and agree that the case should be remanded for another trial on punishment if the prosecution elects to continue the litigation beyond the life sentence otherwise applied.
Despite the sincere attempt of the American Bar Association over the years to establish as the slogan or motto of the legal community that we enjoy "[a] government of laws, and not of men * * *," (
Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137, 163
,
5 U.S. 137
,
2 L.Ed. 60
(1803)), and without regard to the support of the bench and the bar for that concept, the precise converse must be accepted as true in Wyoming the instant this decision is filed. I have searched, in vain, for something different in this case with respect to the validity of the capital sentence imposed in
Engberg v. State,
686 P.2d 541
(Wyo. 1984),
cert. denied
469 U.S. 1077
,
105 S.Ct. 577
,
83 L.Ed.2d 516
(1984). Nothing has changed about the case. The only discernible difference is that there are two new members on this court who apparently would espouse the views of the dissent in the first
Engberg
case and one
*167
member of the court who earlier had voted with the majority but has now had a change of heart.
Why then do I claim that Wyoming enjoys a government of men, not laws? First, because the majority opinion on the issue of capital punishment reaches out to capture a question that is not part of the
Engberg
case for the purpose of overruling the most recent affirmance of the sentence to death by this court in the Mark Hopkinson case.
Hopkinson v. State,
798 P.2d 1186
(Wyo. 1990). Second, because the disposition of the sentence to death in the majority opinion on that issue is made in complete disregard of the doctrine of
res judicata.
Third, I cannot overlook the fact that one of the justices, who has assiduously recused himself from every case or matter involving Hopkinson since joining the court (I understand because of some contact with one of the parties while the justice still was in private practice), now joins a majority opinion that has no effect in this case but effectively overrules the prior decision of this court in
Hopkinson,
798 P.2d 1186
. After eschewing the front entrance to the Hopkinson case, it now seems that the justice is willing, even if unwittingly, to enter through the Engberg portal.
There are those who advocate the repeal of capital punishment statutes. If the judicial department is so philosophically opposed to capital punishment that it will find a reason in every case to set the death sentence aside, there may be merit in the repeal of the capital punishment statute. When that occurs, however, there is some justification for the suggestion that we indeed have an imperial judiciary that insists upon imposing its philosophy as to that question without regard for the majority will apparently articulated by a valid legislative adoption of capital punishment. As a member of the minority of the court on this question, I cannot change that result, but I can call attention to the event and its implications and, on behalf of the citizens, protest the resolution.
It is necessary to quote at length from the majority opinion on the issue of the death sentence to avoid taking the matter out of context. The majority opinion first quotes from an amendment to the Wyoming capital murder statute that was adopted some
seven years
after Engberg killed Vernon Rogers and some
four years
after his sentence to death became final after full appellate review. Then the majority says:
"The change reflects the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367
,
108 S.Ct. 1860
,
100 L.Ed.2d 384
(1988), a decision made while this petition was still pending before this court. In
Mills
,
the Court held that the trial court in a death sentence case must clearly instruct the jury that each individual juror may consider any mitigating circumstance he or she finds to exist in making a sentencing determination regardless of whether the jury unanimously found that mitigating circumstance to exist. 486 U.S. at 377-80, 108 S.Ct. at 1867-68. Reversal is required unless a `substantial possibility' that this occurred can be ruled out.
"The sentencing phase instructions in this case required that the jury find an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of evidence. The instruction for weighing the factors against each other did not indicate whether the mitigating factors must be found unanimously. Another instruction told the jury that it must unanimously agree on a verdict of death, and if it is unable to do so, the court will impose a sentence of life. The verdict form gave the jury two choices. The jury could either find the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances and sentence Engberg to life, or that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances and sentence him to death. Nowhere in the instructions or verdict form was the jury told that the mitigating circumstances need not be found unanimously by the jury but that the mitigating circumstances may be found by individual jurors and weighed by them individually in deciding the life or death question.
*168
"
Because W.S. 6-2-102 (1991 Cum. Supp.) will govern retrial of the sentencing phase of this case, we need not decide whether to extend the Mills decision to Engberg in a retroactive manner. See
Sawyer v. Smith,
___ U.S. ___,
110 S.Ct. 2822
,
111 L.Ed.2d 193
(1990);
Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288
,
109 S.Ct. 1060
,
103 L.Ed.2d 334
(1989);
Flores v. State,
572 P.2d 746
(Wyo. 1977).
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that our law has always been `that matters which convict require unanimity, and failure to convict can result from the vote of one juror and that aggravating and mitigating circumstances should be dealt with in the same way.'
Hopkinson v. State,
798 P.2d 1186, 1190
(Wyo. 1990) (Cardine, J., dissenting). The right to a unanimous verdict is beyond dispute.
Taylor v. State,
612 P.2d 851, 853
(Wyo. 1980);
see
Wyo.Const. Art. I, § 9. It is essential that Engberg be accorded the proper instructions on finding and considering mitigating circumstances in a retrial of the penalty phase of his felony murder conviction." Majority opinion on the issues affecting imposition of the capital sentence, at 11 (emphasis added).
I must respectfully remind the majority that the Wyoming law is not settled by what is articulated in a dissenting opinion in
Hopkinson,
798 P.2d 1186
, or any other case or matter. On that issue, the majority opinion in
Hopkinson,
798 P.2d at 1187
, states:
"6. The Petitioner's earnest arguments that error occurred in the second penalty trial because of the instructions to the jury relating to mitigating circumstances in the light of
Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367
,
108 S.Ct. 1860
,
100 L.Ed.2d 384
(1988), and
McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433
,
110 S.Ct. 1227
,
108 L.Ed.2d 369
(1990), fail of persuasion because the record in this case would not have justified reversal based upon the legal principle articulated in those cases, the cases are distinguishable and, under the circumstances, the court is not required to, nor would it be appropriate, to apply those cases retrospectively. The issue of the instructions relating to mitigating circumstances has been before this court,
Hopkinson v. State,
664 P.2d 43
(Wyo. 1983),
cert. denied
464 U.S. 908
,
104 S.Ct. 262
,
78 L.Ed.2d 246
(1983), and the United States District Court,
Hopkinson v. Shillinger,
645 F. Supp. 374
(D.Wyo. 1986),
reh. denied
648 F. Supp. 141
(D.Wyo. 1986), and the instructions were approved."
While one must grudgingly admire the assiduity and tenacity of the majority in the effort to eliminate capital punishment in Wyoming, attempting to do that by articulating dictum in a case in which, by the majority's own admission, "we need not decide" the issue and relying upon a dissenting opinion, the quotation from which is itself taken out of context, for the authority to justify the dictum falls short of my perception of intellectual honesty.
The only possible purpose for this aspect of the majority opinion is to furnish support to the federal court, in which the Hopkinson case is pending on a petition for post conviction relief, to set aside the sentence to death in the Hopkinson case. That effort would have the effect of eliminating the death sentence in the only two remaining cases in Wyoming in which it was imposed by the jury. Already, there is evidence of the fact that prosecutors are not seeking the death penalty in cases in which a sentence to death well might be appropriate because they do not believe that the judiciary will permit the execution. I rest my case on this aspect of the evidence that Wyoming now enjoys a government of men, not laws.
I turn to my second concern about the resolution of this case. One of the most revered doctrines in our jurisprudence is that of
res judicata.
Those matters that have been adjudicated between the same parties are accorded finality. Nothing could be more clear than the fact that these identical issues were before this court in the prior case and decided contrary to this decision. Were this not the same case, but a different one, the doctrine of
stare decisis
*169
would suggest the same result. As Justice Cardine said:
"Perhaps only a Cassandra will be heard to mourn the neglected rule of
stare decisis,
but it is a sad day indeed when our declarations within the same case are subject to judicial revision. If we are unwilling to take seriously what we write, how can we expect others to take us seriously?"
Jones v. State,
798 P.2d 1206, 1208
(Wyo. 1990), Cardine, J., dissenting.
With respect to the death sentence in this case, we have done the very thing that was so vigorously protested in
Jones.
Furthermore, the majority has reached that result in a way that is particularly troublesome. Instead of applying settled law in the same case under either doctrine,
res judicata
or
stare decisis,
the majority has selected a rule adopted by judges in other places who have no commitment to serving the people of the State of Wyoming and has preferred that rule over the one previously adopted by Wyoming justices on this Court. This is done despite the fact that the decision of the Court was scrutinized by the United States Supreme Court for error under the Constitution of the United States and then not subjected to federal review. What we have then is an adaptation of a rule under another state constitution, adopted by judges in the different state, that has been imported to be substituted for solid Wyoming law. Is there any question that I must protest this result by dissenting from the majority opinion on the validity of the death sentence?
Perhaps the real justification for the majority position is best captured in the following:
"Few of us have directly faced the awesome task of deciding whether a fellow human being should, three days hence, be killed by execution. I face that immediate decision, alone for the first time, as another of life's sobering experiences by which we find out more about who we are and how we feel about life and death, our relationships with others, power, justice, and the law. The legislative branch has decided as a matter of policy that the penalty for first degree murder in the State of Wyoming should be death. Statutes have been enacted specifying death by lethal injection as punishment.
I am convinced now that this is an unwise policy.
"* * * To arrive at a rational decision, our focus ought to be on the death penalty itself. Every person who ever walked or will ever walk on the face of this earth is unique. There will never be another like that person. Life is precious. It is a gift that is so unique and wonderful that no mortal man should cheapen it by taking it from another. It has been said that killing begets killing. The more we kill, the more conditioned we become to killing until we are so conditioned that no one cares anymore. Someday every court in our land will recognize punishment by killing as cruel and unusual, but today we are not prepared to accept what someday will come to pass."
Hopkinson,
798 P.2d at 1188
and 1192, Cardine, J., dissenting (emphasis added).
These are noble words. Would they had been uttered to memorialize a torture victim, a family literally blown apart, or an innocent victim of an armed robbery rather than in support of convicted, cold-blooded killers. The court should not lose the fact that when he killed Vernon Rogers, Engberg was an escapee from the Missouri Department of Corrections minimum security facility, where he was serving a life sentence for murder in the first degree after the killing of a night watchman in connection with an armed robbery. I submit that noble words do not justify the result here and, instead of seizing upon justification from other jurisdictions, the rule of
res judicata
should control, and the capital sentence should be affirmed. I regret that the drafter of the majority opinion on the sentencing phase feels that there has been unfair and personal criticism in this dissenting opinion. I do, indeed, endeavor to be attentive to the feelings of my brothers on the court. On the other hand, there are situations in which candor is essential.
*170
I perceive this as one of those situations.
There is no justification for the drafter of the majority opinion to accept criticism as personal. A majority opinion is the product of a collegiate court and, when circulated for consideration by the other members of the court, or, at least, when filed, it no longer retains any proprietary aspect so far as the drafter is concerned. It becomes an institutional product that is owned only by the court. The opinion is the product of an institution that has no personality, but instead is a corporate identity. Certainly, this institutional identity encompasses one of the difficulties in serving on an appellate and collegiate court. The effort to articulate a committee decision in a way that is acceptable to all members of the committee is difficult and stressful.
Turning then to the reference to omitted material from the dissent in
Hopkinson
the full text of that material reads:
"Few of us have directly faced the awesome task of deciding whether a fellow human being should, three days hence, be killed by execution. I face that immediate decision, alone for the first time, as another of life's sobering experiences by which we find out more about who we are and how we feel about life and death, our relationships with others, power, justice, and the law. The legislative branch has decided as a matter of policy that the penalty for first degree murder in the State of Wyoming should be death. Statutes have been enacted specifying death by lethal injection as punishment. I am convinced now that this is an unwise policy. I am convinced also that, at this time in our history, these statutes are constitutional and, therefore, the law. I have taken an oath to support, obey and defend the constitution and will honor that oath. So, on to the law."
Hopkinson,
798 P.2d at 1188
.
I was aware of the full text when this dissenting opinion was prepared initially. I also am aware that, in becoming attuned to what we colloquially call the "bottom line," the citizens in our society, indeed, pay attention to what we do as well as what we say.
Mature reflection demands acceptance of the proposition that, in many instances, actions speak more voluminously and more eloquently than any words that can be used to describe them. Consequently, I opted to omit the complete quotation from
Hopkinson
because the next to the last sentence seems to me to have a hollow ring in light of the impact of this decision upon the death penalty in Wyoming. Lip service to the constitutionality of the death penalty has no meaning so long as this court will reach and stretch to find technical justification for avoiding its implementation. In my view, that reaching and stretching is present here and, to the extent that the court now redecides the
Hopkinson
case, it is present there.
I add to what has been said the proposition that it is clear that at least one member of the court's majority now has read the dissenting opinion. There can be no question that the revisiting of
Hopkinson
to decide it in a different way is indeed intentional and not accidental. I would like to offer a solution to the abrogation of the capital sentencing statute in Wyoming but, as the saying goes, "When you have the votes, vote!" The majority have the votes; they have voted; and capital punishment is abolished in the State of Wyoming. That result is not required by the law, but instead it is reached as a choice of policy, a policy that is contrary to the one chosen by the legislature.
An affirmance of the capital sentence can clearly be justified by proper reasoning and authority. In most situations, Engberg's sixteenth issue, the impropriety of invoking as aggravating circumstances the commission of the murder by Engberg for pecuniary gain and while engaged in the commission of the robbery, after relying on the robbery to invoke the first degree murder statute, would be controlled by the doctrine of
res judicata
and the concept of waiver. Engberg's argument that his sentence was determined in a manner which violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
*171
States is a combination of an argument rejected by this court on his direct appeal, together with an issue which he did not raise, but which was addressed by a dissenting justice in
Engberg,
686 P.2d 541
. Engberg was encouraged to raise that issue in his petition for rehearing, and the court's order denying the petition stated:
"This case came on before the court upon the Petition for Rehearing filed herein by the appellant, Roy Lee Engberg, and the court, having carefully considered the Petition for Rehearing and being fully advised, finds that the petition does not encompass any question or matter necessary to correct a decision which has been overlooked by the court;
seeks to present a point for the first time in the case
; does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the court arrived at an erroneous conclusion; and that the Petition for Rehearing should be denied; and it therefore is * * *."
Engberg,
686 P.2d at 563
(emphasis added).
I am persuaded that cause exists to avoid procedural waiver because of recent cases dealing with this issue.
State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, Teton County,
696 P.2d 54
(Wyo. 1985),
cert. denied
474 U.S. 865
,
106 S.Ct. 187
,
88 L.Ed.2d 155
(1985).
See also
Perry v. Lockhart,
656 F. Supp. 46, 48
(E.D.Ark. 1986) ("the novelty' of the pecuniary gain argument at the time of Perry's trial was sufficient to provide cause' for his failure to raise this question");
Reed v. Ross,
468 U.S. 1
,
104 S.Ct. 2901
,
82 L.Ed.2d 1
(1984).
Subsequent to the decision of the court in
Engberg
,
a division developed in the federal courts on the question of whether an element of the underlying felony could be used as an aggravating circumstance without infringing upon the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
See
Collins v. Lockhart,
754 F.2d 258
(8th Cir.),
cert. denied
474 U.S. 1013
,
106 S.Ct. 546
,
88 L.Ed.2d 475
(1985);
Wilson v. Butler,
813 F.2d 664
(5th Cir.1987),
cert. denied
484 U.S. 1079
,
108 S.Ct. 1059
,
98 L.Ed.2d 1021
,
reh'g denied
485 U.S. 1015
,
108 S.Ct. 1491
,
99 L.Ed.2d 719
(1988), following
Welcome v. Blackburn,
793 F.2d 672
(5th Cir.1986),
cert. denied
481 U.S. 1042
,
107 S.Ct. 1985
,
95 L.Ed.2d 825
,
reh'g denied
483 U.S. 1012
,
107 S.Ct. 3245
,
97 L.Ed.2d 750
(1987). In addition, several decisions in the highest courts of the states, most notably the recent decision by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in
State v. Quesinberry,
319 N.C. 228
,
354 S.E.2d 446
(1987),
appeal after remand
325 N.C. 125
,
381 S.E.2d 681
(1989),
cert. granted and judgment vacated
___ U.S. ___,
110 S.Ct. 1465
,
108 L.Ed.2d 603
(1990),
on remand
327 N.C. 480
,
397 S.E.2d 233
(1990),
on remand
328 N.C. 288
,
401 S.E.2d 632
(1991), have held that it is improper to submit statutorily overlapping aggravating circumstances to a jury in the sentencing phase of a capital case. We relied upon the rationale of the Supreme Court of North Carolina found in
State v. Oliver,
302 N.C. 28
,
274 S.E.2d 183
(1981), in deciding
Engberg,
686 P.2d 541
, specifically rejecting the view of the Supreme Court of Florida. Since the Supreme Court of North Carolina now has ruled in a definitive way contrary to the holding which we adopted previously, I would address the merits of Engberg's sixteenth issue only to determine whether our prior conclusion should be changed or modified.
A constitutionally satisfactory procedure for imposing the death penalty requires assurance that the jury has made a specific determination that capital punishment is appropriate on the basis of the character of the individual defendant and the circumstances of that particular crime.
Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496
,
107 S.Ct. 2529
,
96 L.Ed.2d 440
,
reh'g denied
483 U.S. 1056
,
108 S.Ct. 31
,
97 L.Ed.2d 820
(1987);
Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137
,
107 S.Ct. 1676
,
95 L.Ed.2d 127
,
reh'g denied
482 U.S. 921
,
107 S.Ct. 3201
,
96 L.Ed.2d 688
(1987);
Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862
,
103 S.Ct. 2733
,
77 L.Ed.2d 235
(1983). The legislature's selection of aggravating circumstances has been accepted by the United States Supreme Court as properly limiting the jury's discretion if they circumscribe the class of persons upon whom capital punishment may be imposed.
Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153
,
96 S.Ct. 2909
,
49 L.Ed.2d 859
(1976),
reh'g denied
429 U.S. 875
,
97 S.Ct. 197
, 50
*172
L.Ed.2d 158 (1976).
See
Hopkinson,
632 P.2d 79
.
"* * * [A] jury's discretion to impose the death sentence must be `suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly, arbitrary and capricious action.'
Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 189
[
96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932
,
49 L.Ed.2d 859
] (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.); * * *."
Booth,
482 U.S. at 502
,
107 S.Ct. at 2532
.
The provisions of the Constitution of the United States do not prohibit a state from imposing capital punishment on an individual defendant on the basis of a single aggravating circumstance, so long as the circumstance is not unconstitutionally vague.
[1]
Even though an aggravating circumstance may meet the constitutional standard under this test, if the circumstance is so construed that it is vague as applied, the imposition of capital punishment will be set aside.
"Thus the validity of the petitioner's death sentences turns on whether, in light of the facts and circumstances of the murders that he was convicted of committing, the Georgia Supreme Court can be said to have applied a constitutional construction of the phrase outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that [they] involved * * * depravity of mind * * *.' We conclude that the answer must be no. The petitioner's crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder. His victims were killed instantaneously. They were members of his family who were causing him extreme emotional trauma. Shortly after the killings, he acknowledged his responsibility and the heinous nature of his crimes. These factors certainly did not remove the criminality from the petitioner's acts. But, as was said in
Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349, 358
,
97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204
,
51 L.Ed.2d 393
[(1977)], it `is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason, rather than caprice or emotion.'
"That cannot be said here. There is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not."
Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 432-33
,
100 S.Ct. 1759
,
64 L.Ed.2d 398
(1980),
cert. denied
456 U.S. 919
,
102 S.Ct. 1778
,
72 L.Ed.2d 180
,
reh'g denied
456 U.S. 1001
,
102 S.Ct. 2286
,
73 L.Ed.2d 1296
(1982) (footnotes omitted).
The requisite narrowing also may be accomplished by defining the elements of the crime. The Supreme Court of the United States said in
Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262, 270-71
,
96 S.Ct. 2950, 2955-56
,
49 L.Ed.2d 929
(1976),
reh'g denied
429 U.S. 875
,
97 S.Ct. 198
,
50 L.Ed.2d 158
(1976):
"While Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating circumstances the existence of which can justify the imposition of the death penalty as have Georgia and Florida, its action in narrowing the categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed serves much the same purpose. See
McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183
, 206 n. 16,
91 S.Ct. 1454
, 1466 n. 16,
28 L.Ed.2d 711
(1971); Model Penal Code § 201.6, Comment 3, pp. 71-72 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). In fact, each of the five classes of murders made capital by the Texas statute is encompassed in Georgia and Florida by one or more of their statutory
*173
aggravating circumstances. For example, the Texas statute requires the jury at the guilt determining stage to consider whether the crime was committed in the course of a particular felony, whether it was committed for hire, or whether the defendant was an inmate of a penal institution at the time of its commission. Cf.
Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. at 165-166, n. 9, 96 S.Ct. at 2921 n. 9;
Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. [242] at 248-249, n. 6, 96 S.Ct. [2960] at 2965, n. 6 [
49 L.Ed.2d 913
(1976)]. Thus, in essence, the Texas statute requires that the jury find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance before the death penalty may be imposed. So far as consideration of aggravating circumstances is concerned, therefore, the principal difference between Texas and the other two States is that the death penalty is an available sentencing option even potentially for a smaller class of murders in Texas. Otherwise, the statutes are similar. Each requires the sentencing authority to focus on the particularized nature of the crime."
In achieving this narrowing, however, the state may not remove the jury's discretion as to whether capital punishment should be imposed by a mandatory infliction of capital punishment even in narrowly circumscribed situations.
Sumner v. Shuman,
483 U.S. 66
,
107 S.Ct. 2716
,
97 L.Ed.2d 56
(1987).
[2]
My further reflection upon the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States persuades me that an element of the underlying felony may be considered as an aggravating circumstance in a capital case. I conclude that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adequately captured the justification for our position in
Welcome,
793 F.2d 672
, relied upon in
Wilson,
813 F.2d 664
, in which it said:
"Louisiana's inclusion as an element of the crime of first degree murder of the aggravating circumstance of committing multiple murders in a single consecutive course of conduct serves to cull out of the class of all murders, a small group which the State makes eligible for the death penalty. But finding that circumstance present in the course of determining guilt does not fix punishment. It only serves to permissibly advance the sentencing jury to the stage of weighing mitigating as well as aggravating circumstances in order to make an individualized determination of life or death based on the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.
Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862
,
103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743-44
,
77 L.Ed.2d 235
(1983). The finding of this aggravating circumstance as a part of the guilt determination process does not finally control the imposition of the death penalty. Such a finding only permits the death penalty to be considered."
Welcome,
793 F.2d at 677
.
The utilization of an aggravating circumstance, although it duplicates an element of the felony upon which the conviction of first degree murder was premised, does not fail to "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty."
Zant,
462 U.S. at 877
,
103 S.Ct. at 2742
. This was the criticism levied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Collins,
754 F.2d 258
, and I conclude that the stance there taken is fallacious.
Statutory aggravating circumstances are invoked to circumscribe those instances in which capital punishment may be imposed after the defendant has been found guilty of a capital offense. If the jury finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one of the legislatively defined aggravating circumstances has been established, it may impose capital punishment on the basis of all the evidence without transgressing the Constitution of the United States.
Zant;
Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939
, 103 S.Ct.
*174
3418,
77 L.Ed.2d 1134
,
reh'g denied
464 U.S. 874
,
104 S.Ct. 209
,
78 L.Ed.2d 185
(1983).
"Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. But the constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors in the process of selecting, from among that class, those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. What is important
at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime."
Zant,
462 U.S. at 878-79
,
103 S.Ct. at 2743-44
(citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
Since a single aggravating circumstance can be used to narrowly define the offense and be construed as constitutional, or, alternatively, the same circumstance may be characterized as an aggravating circumstance to be considered by the jury in connection with all evidence bearing on the "character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime," I cannot be persuaded that an element of the underlying felony cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the sentencing stage. In the form of statute that Wyoming has adopted, the definition of the crime serves a narrowing function with respect to those instances in which capital punishment may be imposed. Even though the same information is invoked as an aggravating circumstance following conviction, at that stage of the trial, it simply serves to further narrow the instances in which capital punishment may be and should be imposed. There is no justification for a contention that this sequential consideration simply results in arbitrary imposition.
In determining whether capital punishment should be imposed, the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States demands that the evidence against the defendant focus on his character and the circumstances of the crime.
Booth,
482 U.S. 496
,
107 S.Ct. 2529
;
Zant; Barclay.
There is nothing in these interpretations of the constitution that justifies a rule that relevant evidence should be excluded from the jury's consideration in the sentencing phase simply because that evidence also established the defendant's guilt of the crime. Rather than assuring arbitrary action, the utilization of this evidence serves to avoid the possibility of capricious action.
The constitution does not require a state to limit the evidence presented against a defendant in the sentencing portion of a capital case, but it may choose to do so.
Zant.
In Wyoming, the legislature made a choice. It limited the evidence which may be presented and considered against a defendant to that which is relevant to one of the statutorily defined aggravating circumstances, even though it permitted any relevant mitigating evidence whether or not it is probative of one of the statutorily defined mitigating circumstances. Section 6-2-102(d), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.);
Hopkinson,
632 P.2d 79
. In performing this function, the jury is doing exactly that which the Supreme Court has indicated must be done. It is the classic sentencing function of imposing "[a]n individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime."
Zant,
462 U.S. at 879
,
103 S.Ct. at 2744
.
[3]
Engberg's argument, based upon the rule in the Fifth Circuit, would be more persuasive if the duty of the jury at the sentencing stage was simply to count the number of aggravating circumstances against the number of any mitigating circumstances. We explained in
Engberg,
686 P.2d 541
, however, that the sentencing stage analysis in Wyoming is qualitative not quantitative, and we approved the instruction
*175
of the trial court which explained to the jury how that process should be accomplished. In considering the evidence as to the underlying felony at the guilt stage, the jury is concerned only with whether certain facts have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. When that same information is presented at the sentencing stage, however, the legislature has given the jury additional discretion that it may use to deny capital punishment. At this point in the trial, the jury must focus not upon whether facts have been proved, but upon the qualitative evaluation of those facts in the light of other aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The inevitable result is to narrow further the instances in which capital punishment will be the sentence.
Finally, the position of the Fifth Circuit simply fails to acknowledge the significance of mandatory appellate review. We explained in
Hopkinson:
"A sentence of death is subject to automatic review by this court. We must consider, not only the errors enumerated by way of appeal, but also whether the sentence was the product of an arbitrary factor, the evidence supports the findings of the trier of fact, and the sentence is excessive or disproportionate when compared with similar cases. In addition to affirming or reversing the underlying conviction, we may affirm the sentence of death, set aside the sentence and impose a sentence of life imprisonment, or remand for resentencing by the trial judge."
Hopkinson,
632 P.2d at 153
.
It is our duty to determine that a capital sentence was not imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. The United States Supreme Court has recognized meaningful appellate review as a strong factor in determining whether a capital punishment statute adopted by a state is constitutional.
E.g.
Barclay,
463 U.S. 939
,
103 S.Ct. 3418
;
Godfrey,
446 U.S. 420
,
100 S.Ct. 1759
;
Zant.
I also would conclude to abide by our decision in
Engberg,
686 P.2d 541
, with respect to the claim that it was error to allow the jury to consider both aggravating circumstances: (1) that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery and (2) that it was committed for pecuniary gain. Again, I recognize that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has changed positions from
Oliver,
274 S.E.2d 183
, to
Quesinberry,
354 S.E.2d 446
. Again, the utilization of both aggravating circumstances would be more troublesome if the Engberg jury was performing a quantitative analysis. Because the jury in this state must invoke a qualitative rather than a quantitative analysis of the aggravating factors, the significance of any overlap of the factors is diminished substantially. Furthermore, as the dissenting justice noted in
Quesinberry,
the act of robbery involves the consideration of the
actus reus
while the pecuniary gain circumstances considers the
mens rea
of the defendant. Perhaps the overlap is more imagined than real. In accord with the individualized determination requirement by the Supreme Court of the United States,
Zant,
462 U.S. 862
,
103 S.Ct. 2733
, I note that the act of the robbery focuses on a circumstance of the crime, whereas the reason for the robbery, that it was committed for pecuniary gain, focuses on the character of the defendant. The evidence relating to the circumstances may overlap, but the considerations are separate and meaningful.
I cannot share the confidence of the majority that "Engberg will now, on remand, be given a lawful sentencing hearing at which a jury can correctly consider life or death upon proper instructions on the law and, if appropriate, impose the death penalty." Majority opinion on the issues affecting imposition of the capital sentence, at 13. It may be that the majority intended to invoke the language of § 6-2-103(e)(iii), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1991), which provides that this court may "[s]et the sentence aside and remand the case for resentencing." The last sentence of the opinion, however, provides only "case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion." In my view the likelihood of a new sentencing hearing is not high. The case is ten years old, and I think the prosecutor must be possessed of unusual tenacity and perseverance to pursue the capital sentence.
*176
The state secured a conviction and the imposition of a capital sentence in 1982, and the conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court in 1984. A petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. While the capital sentence was affirmed under the applicable rules, it now is set aside because in the interim someone in another place decided to modify Wyoming's rules. How is the prosecutor to understand, with any degree of confidence, that if another capital sentence is imposed, someone somewhere will not decide to change the rules while the new sentence is subject to review? The prosecutive effort would be frustrated again, as it is now. For me it is doubtful that Engberg will again face a capital sentence, and the humanitarian philosophy of the majority will be vindicated.
I would affirm both the conviction of first degree murder and the imposition of the sentence to death. The death sentence was arrived at in a lawful and rational manner, and it should be affirmed.
538 P.2d 1298
(Wyo. 1975), we quoted from
Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293, 297
,
87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970
,
18 L.Ed.2d 1199
(1967), the following:
"* * * The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicates (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."
422 P.2d 84
(Wyo. 1967), as recently applied in
Gist v. State,
737 P.2d 336
(Wyo. 1987),
appeal after remand
766 P.2d 1149
(Wyo. 1988).
See
Lacey v. State,
803 P.2d 1364
(Wyo. 1990). The fact that the evidence was not discovered because of a failure by the prosecution to follow the rule of
Gee
is a significant distinction. Under those circumstances, it is inappropriate to invoke the newly discovered evidence rule.
See
United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97
,
96 S.Ct. 2392
,
49 L.Ed.2d 342
(1976). As quoted in
Agurs,
427 U.S. at 111
, "If the standard applied to the usual motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence were the same when the evidence was in the State's possession as when it was found in a neutral source, there would be no special significance to the prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice."
376 A.2d 827
(D.C.App. 1977),
cert. denied
434 U.S. 973
,
98 S.Ct. 529
,
54 L.Ed.2d 464
(1977);
United States v. Brown,
540 F.2d 1048
(10th Cir.1976),
cert. denied
429 U.S. 1100
,
97 S.Ct. 1122
,
51 L.Ed.2d 549
(1977);
United States v. Amaral,
488 F.2d 1148
(9th Cir.1973).
727 P.2d 280
(Wyo. 1986),
cert. denied
479 U.S. 1098
,
107 S.Ct. 1321
,
94 L.Ed.2d 174
(1987);
Hopkinson v. State,
632 P.2d 79
(Wyo. 1981),
cert. denied
455 U.S. 922
,
102 S.Ct. 1280
,
71 L.Ed.2d 463
(1982). More recently we have reversed a conviction in a case in which the trial court permitted the prosecution to call witnesses in the presence of the jury who the court and the prosecution knew would invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify.
Jones v. State,
777 P.2d 54
(Wyo. 1989). In an instance such as this, as in
Haselhuhn
and
Hopkinson,
if counsel or the court is aware that the privilege may be invoked, it is far better to approach the matter in chambers. Certainly, the proceeding should be adjourned to chambers as soon as that possibility becomes apparent. Otherwise, there is a clear risk of a reversal as in
Jones.
We deplore the unnecessary presentation of such an issue in front of the jury because of the potential for prejudice.
771 F. Supp. 552
(E.D.N.Y. 1991).
751 P.2d 367
(Wyo. 1988);
State v. Wood,
208 Conn. 125
,
545 A.2d 1026
,
cert. denied
488 U.S. 895
,
109 S.Ct. 235
,
102 L.Ed.2d 225
(1988);
State v. Ah Choy,
70 Haw. 618
,
780 P.2d 1097
(1989);
Woods v. State,
547 N.E.2d 772
(1989),
reh'g
557 N.E.2d 1325
(Ind. 1990),
cert. denied
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 2911
,
115 L.Ed.2d 1074
(1991);
State v. McCovey,
803 P.2d 1234
(Utah 1990). See, in current review, Comment,
Application of the Merger Doctrine to the Felony Murder Rule in Texas: The Merger Muddle,
42 Baylor L.Rev. 535 (1990).
See also
State v. Ortega,
___ N.M. ___,
817 P.2d 1196
(N.M. 1991).
664 P.2d 43
(Wyo.),
cert. denied
464 U.S. 908
,
104 S.Ct. 262
,
78 L.Ed.2d 246
(1983). In addition, the conflicting aggravation-mitigation instruction actually given in this case meets neither present standards nor even proper application of constitutional principles when
Engberg I
was written.
492 U.S. 1
,
109 S.Ct. 2765, 2769
,
106 L.Ed.2d 1
(1989),
cert. denied
___ U.S. ___,
111 S.Ct. 83
,
112 L.E.2d 55
(1990). It is recognized that this quotation is suspect considering the statements of limitation that followed. It is an interesting footnote to history that Joseph Giarratano received a death penalty commutation from the Governor of the State of Virginia.
See also
Essay,
"To the Best of Our Knowledge, We Have Never Been Wrong": Fallibility vs. Finality in Capital Punishment,
100 Yale L.J. 1005
(1991) and Essay,
Teetering on the Brink: Between Death and Life,
100 Yale L.J. 993
(1991).
672 P.2d 777
(Wyo. 1983),
cert. denied
465 U.S. 1051
,
104 S.Ct. 1331
,
79 L.Ed.2d 726
(1984);
Osborn v. Shillinger,
639 F. Supp. 610
(D.Wyo. 1986),
aff'd
861 F.2d 612
(10th Cir.1988) and finally,
Osborn v. State,
806 P.2d 259
(Wyo. 1991).
225 U.S. 347, 391
,
32 S.Ct. 793, 811
,
56 L.Ed. 1114
(1912), said "[i]t is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter * * * cease to provoke further analysis."
774 P.2d 597
;
Murray,
776 P.2d 206
;
Kallas,
776 P.2d 198
.
I find "that the inexcusable failure of petitioner's appellate counsel to raise crucial assignments of error, which arguably might have resulted in a reversal, deprived petitioner of the effective assistance of appellate counsel to which he was entitled under the Constitution."
In re Smith,
3 Cal.3d 192
,
90 Cal. Rptr. 1
,
474 P.2d 969, 975
(1970). "`[W]e have never intimated that the right to counsel is conditioned upon actual innocence.'"
Osborn v. Shillinger,
861 F.2d 612
, 629 n. 17 (10th Cir.1988) (quoting
Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365
,
106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586
,
91 L.Ed.2d 305
(1986)).
When justifying constitutional forfeiture by procedural default, the incapacity of appellate counsel to either find the forest or see the trees remains unexplained; one need only read the explicit Wyoming statute and evidence rule, W.S. 1-12-104 and W.R.E. 501, in conjunction with Note,
Spouse's Testimony in Criminal Cases,
19 Wyo. L.J. 35 (1964), as well as Comment,
Symposium on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Their Effect on Wyoming Practice if Adopted,
XII Land & Water L.Rev. 601, 628-29 (1977) (footnotes omitted), where the authors commented:
Some jurisdictions grant the witness-spouse the privilege not to testify and some grant the privilege to both. The issue is unresolved in Wyoming. The judicial analysis that does exist suggests that the privilege may belong only to the party-spouse.
743 F.2d 775, 780
(11th Cir.1984),
overruled sub nom.
Peek v. Kemp,
784 F.2d 1479
(11th Cir.),
cert. denied
479 U.S. 939
,
107 S.Ct. 421
,
93 L.Ed.2d 371
(1986),
reh'g denied
479 U.S. 1047
,
107 S.Ct. 912
,
93 L.Ed.2d 862
(1987):
Morgan also asserts ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal. It is uncontradicted in the record that Morgan's trial counsel did not file a notice of appeal and filed a brief only after the Georgia Supreme Court threatened to impose sanctions. The brief, which included only five pages of argument, failed to raise as an issue the trial court's charge to the sentencing jury. Counsel failed to attend oral argument before the Georgia Supreme Court and failed to heed a request by the court that he file a supplemental brief on the adequacy of the trial court's penalty charge. We find this conduct on the part of Mr. Morgan's attorney woefully inadequate and likely ineffective.
Despite what the federal court thereafter said, it is obvious that there was prejudice since the decision by the Georgia Supreme Court in
Morgan v. State,
241 Ga. 485
,
246 S.E.2d 198, 199
(1978),
cert. denied,
441 U.S. 967
,
99 S.Ct. 2418
,
60 L.Ed.2d 1073
,
reh'g denied
444 U.S. 976
,
100 S.Ct. 475
,
62 L.Ed.2d 393
(1979) produced a dissent on the non-briefed issue and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals then reversed by unanimous decision. There was not any prejudice left in ineffectiveness of counsel after the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had corrected the trial mistake and appellate brief neglect.
425 N.W.2d 27
.
755 S.W.2d 98, 123
(Tex.Cr.App.),
cert. denied
488 U.S. 986
,
109 S.Ct. 543
,
102 L.Ed.2d 573
(1988).
750 S.W.2d 620
(Mo. App. 1988). Compare the majority and dissent in
People v. Miranda,
44 Cal.3d 57
,
241 Cal. Rptr. 594
,
744 P.2d 1127
(1987),
cert. denied
486 U.S. 1038
,
108 S.Ct. 2026
,
100 L.Ed.2d 613
,
reh'g denied
487 U.S. 1246
,
109 S.Ct. 4
,
101 L.Ed.2d 956
(1988).
See
Stephens,
846 F.2d at 651
;
United States ex rel. Kubat v. Thieret,
679 F. Supp. 788
(N.D.Ill. 1988) as compared to the state appeal of
People v. Kubat,
94 Ill.2d 437
,
69 Ill.Dec. 30
,
447 N.E.2d 247
,
cert. denied
I find "that the inexcusable failure of petitioner's appellate counsel to raise crucial assignments of error, which arguably might have resulted in a reversal, deprived petitioner of the effective assistance of appellate counsel to which he was entitled under the Constitution." In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1, 474 P.2d 969, 975 (1970). "`[W]e have never intimated that the right to counsel is conditioned upon actual innocence.'" Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 629 n. 17 (10th Cir.1988) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)).
When justifying constitutional forfeiture by procedural default, the incapacity of appellate counsel to either find the forest or see the trees remains unexplained; one need only read the explicit Wyoming statute and evidence rule, W.S. 1-12-104 and W.R.E. 501, in conjunction with Note, Spouse's Testimony in Criminal Cases, 19 Wyo. L.J. 35 (1964), as well as Comment, Symposium on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Their Effect on Wyoming Practice if Adopted, XII Land & Water L.Rev. 601, 628-29 (1977) (footnotes omitted), where the authors commented:
Some jurisdictions grant the witness-spouse the privilege not to testify and some grant the privilege to both. The issue is unresolved in Wyoming. The judicial analysis that does exist suggests that the privilege may belong only to the party-spouse.
Morgan also asserts ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal. It is uncontradicted in the record that Morgan's trial counsel did not file a notice of appeal and filed a brief only after the Georgia Supreme Court threatened to impose sanctions. The brief, which included only five pages of argument, failed to raise as an issue the trial court's charge to the sentencing jury. Counsel failed to attend oral argument before the Georgia Supreme Court and failed to heed a request by the court that he file a supplemental brief on the adequacy of the trial court's penalty charge. We find this conduct on the part of Mr. Morgan's attorney woefully inadequate and likely ineffective.
Despite what the federal court thereafter said, it is obvious that there was prejudice since the decision by the Georgia Supreme Court in Morgan v. State, 241 Ga. 485, 246 S.E.2d 198, 199 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S.Ct. 2418, 60 L.Ed.2d 1073, reh'g denied 444 U.S. 976, 100 S.Ct. 475, 62 L.Ed.2d 393 (1979) produced a dissent on the non-briefed issue and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals then reversed by unanimous decision. There was not any prejudice left in ineffectiveness of counsel after the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had corrected the trial mistake and appellate brief neglect.
These standards, as rules of conduct infused with the attitudes and orientations expressed by the guidelines, state the elements constituting reasonably competent attorney performance in capital cases. Only through such guidelines and standards, and close judicial scrutiny in enforcing them, will the death penalty be reserved for those few who, because there is truly nothing to mitigate their death-qualifying crimes or elicit mercy, may be deemed unworthy of life. This is the true purpose of the trial for life.
Goodpaster, supra, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 362.
K. Use of informer:
(1) There x was — was not an informer involved.
(2) The informer — will — will not be called as a witness at the trial.
(3) X It has supplied the name, address, and phone number of the informer.
(4) — The State will claim privilege of non-disclosure as to No. 8K — (1), (2), or (3).
Engberg referenced the same subject in Section K of his pretrial submission filed October 25, 1982 as follows:
K. X (1) Any information about the use of an informer or lookout in this case.
X (2) A statement of the State's intention of calling the informer or lookout as a witness.
C. X Other motions to suppress: Motion to suppress testimony of the spouse of the Defendant on the grounds and for the reasons that there is absolute spousal immunity.
Thereafter, the motion to suppress was filed October 25, 1982, as well as a request for disclosure of informer:
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through his attorney and moves the Court for the disclosure of the Informer stated in Paragraph 8(k) of the State's Pretrial Conference Form, and whether the Informer will be called at trial.
(Emphasis in original.)
By a list of prospective witnesses filed October 29, 1982, Donna Engberg was included as an anticipated witness for the State.
Engberg, in defense witness list filed November 22, 1982, included:
- All witnesses and addresses listed on State's Witness List and State's Supplementary Witness List.
An Application for Certificate for Attendance of Out Of State Witness was filed by the State on December 7, 1982, which included:
- That petitioner believes that Donna Engberg is residing in Gothenburg, Nebraska, is a necessary and material witness to be called in the prosecution of said action for the following reasons:
Donna Engberg was with defendant on December 22, 1981 and thereafter traveled with him to Las Vegas, Nevada where they stayed until defendant was arrested on January 1, 1982. Donna Engberg has given statements to law enforcement agents implicating the defendant in the crimes for which he is charged.
Petitioner believes that unless said witness is taken into immediate custody she may fail to appear even though so ordered. Such belief is based on the fact that the said Donna Engberg agreed to appear in Douglas, Wyoming on the 6th day of December 1982 but has now failed to appear and has asserted that she will not appear. Petitioner, therefore, respectfully requests that the court recommend in its Certificate that said witness be taken into immediate custody and be delivered to the Deputy Sheriff of Converse County, State of Wyoming, an officer of the State of Wyoming, to assure [her] attendance in this state as a witness in said criminal proceeding.
On the same day, a Certificate for Attendance was issued by the trial court, as prepared by the county attorney, and in part stated:
- That [the State] believes that Donna Engberg is residing in Gothenburg, Nebraska is a necessary and material witness to be called in the prosecution of said criminal trial for the following reasons:
Donna Engberg was with defendant on December 22, 1982 and thereafter traveled with him to Las Vegas, Nevada where they stayed until defendant was arrested on January 1, 1982. Donna Engberg has given statements to law enforcement agents implicating the defendant in the crimes for which he is charged.
- That the court recommends that said witness be taken into immediate custody and be delivered to Deputy Sheriff of Converse County, State of Wyoming, to assure her attendance in the State of Wyoming, as a witness in said criminal proceeding.
An interesting analysis is provided in Note, Twenty-Years of Diminishing Protection: A Proposal to Return to the Wade Trilogy's Standards, 15 Hofstra L.Rev. 583 (1987). See also Comment, Erroneous Eyewitness Identification at Lineups — The Problem and Its Cure, 5 U.S.F.L.Rev. 85 (1970), and compare the earlier article, Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of the Eyewitness Identification Cases, 42 U.Colo.L.Rev. 135 (1970). In addition, see Charpentier v. State, 736 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1987) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
Until recently, the judiciary had done little to correct the abuses of eyewitness identification.
Quinn, supra n. 23, 42 U.Colo.L.Rev. at 135 (footnotes omitted).
The vagaries of visual identification evidence have traditionally been of great concern to those involved in the administration of criminal law. It has been thought by many experts to present what is conceivably the greatest single threat to the achievement of our ideal that no innocent man shall be punished.
McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 235, 238 (1970).
"All legal systems have made the mistake of suspecting and watching for voluntary errors in testimony, rather than for the involuntary ones. Yet it is comparatively rare in a civilized society for an innocent person to be put in peril of conviction by the lying testimony of the prosecution; the real danger is of mistaken evidence."
Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 Mich.L.Rev. 717, 719 (1974) (quoting G. Williams, The Proof of Guilt 89 (3d ed. 1963)).
"Although eyewitness identification is a highly regarded form of evidence in criminal trials, its inaccuracy has not gone unnoticed." Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perception, 82 Dick.L.Rev. 465, 465 (1978).
"`[I]nnocent people will be imprisoned, and many of the guilty will remain free.'" Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and the Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 Wash.U.L.Q. 1387, 1387 (1983) (quoting Jonakait, Reliable Identification: Could the Supreme Court Tell in Manson v. Brathwaite?, 52 U.Colo.L.Rev. 511, 528 (1981)).
"Justice would less often miscarry if all who are to weigh evidence were more conscious of the treachery of human memory."
Throughout this century, experimental psychologists have demonstrated with increasing clarity that, due to normal deficiencies in the human memory process, eyewitness identification testimony is an inherently unreliable form of evidence. This inherent unreliability, in combination with the legal system's unwillingness to effectively safeguard against its disastrous effects, poses a serious threat to the fair and efficient administration of criminal justice in America.
Comment, Helping the Jury Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony: The Need for Additional Safeguards, 12 Am.J.Crim.L. 189, 189 (1984) (quoting H. Munsterberg, supra n. 24).
Eyewitness testimony plays a critical role in the American judicial system. Many cases are decided daily based substantially or entirely on the testimony of eyewitnesses. Since this testimony is produced by inherently fallible human systems of perception, memory and recall, there is a constant concern that it may not be as accurate as it seems. Recently many psychologists and legal commentators have suggested that psychologists should be permitted to testify as experts to inform jurors of scientific findings relevant to eyewitness testimony and the facts of the particular case.
Comment, Do the Eyes Have It? Psychological Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy, 38 Baylor L.Rev. 169, 169 (1986) (footnote omitted).
Of all the areas where the very issue of participation of expert witness in criminal trials is at issue, perhaps the most controversial at the present time is eyewitness identification. With increasing frequency experts have been testifying in this area. Whether such testimony should be admitted has, however, been within the discretion of the trial court. Almost all appellate courts that have ruled on the matter have upheld the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony introduced to discuss the effects of various factors on eyewitness performances, or on juror assessment of eyewitness identification.
Recently, however, the supreme courts of Arizona in State v. Chapple [135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 (1983)] and California in People v. McDonald [37 Cal.3d 351, 375-76, 690 P.2d 709, 726-27, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 252-53 (1984)] have ruled that a trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to admit expert testimony on eyewitness identification. These are the first state courts to adopt this position. There are indications, however, that other jurisdictions may follow. And, it is important to keep in mind that many trial judges already admit this testimony in criminal trials.
Sanders, Expert Witnesses in Eyewitness Facial Identification Cases, XVII Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 1409, 1410-11 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
There remains unanswered the haunting inquiry of the nineteenth century student: "What would really prevent erroneous identification?" In the most perfect of worlds and with all the suggested guidelines adopted, perfected, implemented and in full force and effect, inequities, inequalities and injustices will continue to exist — at least in this life.
The author argues from his experience in litigation as a judge that the polygraph may serve as a more adequate answer than what presently is done. His reasoning in regard to the polygraph for expert witness examination is singularly applicable also to the psychological evaluation and scientific evidence expert who analyzes behavioral facts and identification questions.
In Jackson, 589 F.2d at 111, the court observed in regard to a Wade hearing:
The state trial judge made no detailed findings either as to suggestiveness or as to reliability and evidenced a basic lack of familiarity with the appropriate legal standards.
In holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit this expert testimony, we do not mean to suggest that we think the broader issue of reliability of eyewitness identification testimony is unimportant. Rather, we simply believe that requiring trial courts to admit this sort of evidence is not the answer. There is no one answer to the problem, but there are a number of safeguards to prevent convictions of the innocent based on unreliable eyewitness identification. Prosecutors do not have to prosecute if they think the evidence is unreliable. Trial courts may suppress identification testimony if the identification procedures rendered the evidence unreliable. Effective cross-examination and persuasive argument by defense counsel are additional safeguards. Proper instruction of the jury on the factors in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony and on the state's burden of proving identification beyond a reasonable doubt are other safeguards. The requirement of jury unanimity is also a safeguard. Finally, this court has the power to grant relief if it is convinced that the evidence of a convicted defendant's guilt was legally insufficient.
State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980). Unfortunately, the foregoing enumeration contemplates nothing different than what has historically occurred as insufficient to counteract the recognized insufficiencies and irregularities of the eyewitness identification testimony. For a recent example, see How Did the Wrong Man Get Snared?, The National Law Journal, supra and Memory on Trial. Witnesses of Crimes Are Being Challenged as Frequently Fallible, The Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1988, at 1, col. 1, which states:
The new research indicates that such publicized cases of eyewitnesses' fallibility "are just the tip of a much larger iceberg," says Stephen D. Penrod, a memory researcher at the University of Wisconsin in Madison who holds doctorates in both psychology and law. "The rate of mistaken identification is significantly higher than most people tend to believe," he says.
Suggestions can also become memories, experiments by Prof. Loftus suggest. * * *
Hypnotists also can deliberately or inadvertently implant an unreal or false memory in a witness in a similar fashion, experiments have shown.
Subtle suggestions by police can lead an eyewitness to err in picking a suspect out of a lineup, dozens of experiments indicate.
But more advanced, behold with strange surprise
New distant scenes of endless science rise! Loftus & Schneider, supra, 56 UMKC L.Rev. at 1 (quoting Pope, Essay on Criticism (1711)).
Typically, hypnosis sessions begin with a period known as induction. The hypnotist initially establishes some rapport with the subject by discussing the purpose of the session and by making certain that the subject freely wishes to proceed. Through a variety of methods, the subject is then asked to focus intensely on the hypnotist, to relax, and to try to visualize what the hypnotist is saying.
Once hypnotized, the subject generally becomes increasingly willing to suspend his or her critical judgment. Apparently, this results in a response criterion shift, which is a willingness to report details about events that are usually rejected as too unsure to relay. Unfortunately, this lax response criterion often results in an increase in inaccurate as well as accurate recollections.
Distinct from, yet congruent with, the lowered response criterion is the hypnotized subject's increased suggestibility resulting from the attention he or she focuses on the hypnotist. Having suspended his or her critical judgment, the subject may be anxious to please the questioner by responding favorably to both the explicit and implicit suggestions made by the hypnotist or anyone else present at the session. This may lead the subject to confabulate, or fill gaps in his or her memory with plausible, but not necessarily accurate, data. It may also result in pseudomemory, which is a perceived recollection where there is no memory at all.
Additionally, the subject's preconceptions about the ability of hypnosis to induce recollections and the nature of the hypnotist's questions enhance the possibility of inaccurate recall. A subject may unconsciously alter his or her responses during hypnosis in accordance with any expectations he or she has prior to the session. There is also evidence that hypnotized subjects make more errors in responding to leading questions than non-hypnotized subjects.
Compounding these accuracy problems is a change in confidence subjects often experience after hypnosis as a result of their perceived increased recollection. This phenomenon becomes particularly significant in the context of a trial. A witness who testifies with self-assurance, even if misplaced, and in great detail, though inaccurate, is considerably more credible to a jury than his or her less confident and less descriptive counterpart. A witness whose confidence has been artificially increased is also less vulnerable to cross-examination. Thus, the risk inherent in admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony in a trial is an outcome based on unreliable information. This risk forms the basis for the legal debate as to whether hypnotically refreshed testimony ought to be admitted in criminal trials.
Note, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments — A Constitutional Paradigm For Determining the Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony, 78 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 853, 854-57 (1988) (footnotes omitted). See similarly, Goleman, New Studies on the Hypnotic State: Is it Real or Feigned?, New York Times News Service, Wyoming State Tribune (Cheyenne, WY), April 5, 1987. The conclusion of this writer perceives susceptibility and suggestion, but much of the scientific community questions suggestion and susceptibility to what?
On December 31, 1984, the Wyoming Supreme Court appointed Mr. McClain as Mr. Engberg's attorney for purposes of pursuing any available post-conviction relief, and ordered that the resources of the State Public Defender's Office be made available to assist in Mr. McClain's representation of Mr. Engberg.
In the course of examining the trial transcript, Mr. McClain was struck by questions and answers during Ms. Otto's redirect examination. Ms. Otto indicated that the discrepancy in her testimony regarding the length of time she had viewed the robber's face was caused by the fact that since the preliminary hearing, she counted the seconds she viewed the face and determined her initial estimate was in error. * * *
Mr. McClain also noted the sudden change in Robert Latham's recollection of the robber's identity which occurred at trial. * * *
Based on these oddities, Mr. McClain talked with Mr. Engberg's trial counsel, Wyatt Skaggs and Linda Miller, in order to ascertain whether they had received any information indicating that prosecution had hypnotically enhanced the eye-witnesses' memories.
Both trial counsel indicated they were never provided any information so indicating. However, Ms. Miller did indicate that she recalled in other cases in 1982, the Casper Police had used hypnosis to enhance a witness's memory.
Mr. McClain then checked the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision on the topic of hypnosis and discovered the case of Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1983). * * * During the cross-examination of one witness, the defense counsel discovered that the witness had been hypnotized to enhance her memory. The Supreme Court affirmed because materials had been furnished to defense counsel prior to trial with a notation that the witness had been hypnotized. However, the Court noted the failure to disclose would have been error under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
Because of the testimony given in the present case and because of the similarities between it and Gee, there exists a suspicion that hypnosis may have been used here.
Greenberg, supra, 91 Yale L.J. at 928.
No theoretical penological justification for the death penalty supports the capital punishment system as it is now administered. Whatever view one takes of the deterrent capacity of the death penalty when it is the swift and certain result of criminal activity, the current, roller coaster system — though absolutely necessary to protect the innocent from execution, to safeguard basic constitutional rights, and to avoid racially motivated executions — makes swift and certain executions impossible. A hypothetical killer who calculates his chances of being executed before committing homicide must calculate that he or she is quite unlikely to be put to death.
Id. at 927. See also Amnesty International, United States of America: The Death Penalty (1987).
The pattern is so simple it is stunning. Every Western industrial nation has stopped executing criminals, except the United States. The unanimity is quite recent.
F. Zimring & G. Hawkins, Capital Punishment and The American Agenda, at 3 (1986). Amsterdam, supra, 14 Human Rights 14; Mello, supra, 37 Am.U.L.Rev. 513; Landis & Goodstein, When Is Justice Fair? An Integrated Approach to the Outcome Versus Procedure Debate, 1986 Am. B.Found.Res.J. 675 (1986); Goldstein, Application of Res Judicata Principles to Successive Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions in Capital Cases: The Search for an Equitable Approach, 21 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 45 (1987); Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 Geo.L.J. 97 (1979); Geimer, Death At Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat From Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 737 (1985); Note, Statistics and the Death Penalty: A Break With Tradition, 21 Creighton L.Rev. 265 (1987); Note, Tison v. Arizona: Justice O'Connor Creates a New Standard of Culpability for Capital Crimes, 21 Creighton L.Rev. 359 (1987); Letwin, Impeaching Defendants With Their Prior Convictions: Reconsidering the Dangerous Propensities of Character Evidence After People v. Castro, 18 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 681 (1985); Bedau, Thinking of the Death Penalty as a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 18 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 873 (1985); Paduano & Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 Colum.Hum.Rts.L.Rev. 211 (1987); Scheidegger, Capital Punishment in 1987: The Puzzle Nears Completion, 15 W.St.U.L.Rev. 95 (1987); Havlena, Abolishing the Death Penalty — Why? How? When?, 15 W.St.U.L.Rev. 127 (1987); Comment, Factual Innocence ... Who Pays the Price?, 15 W.St.U.L.Rev. 319 (1987); Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 Tenn.L.Rev. 95 (1987); Paternoster & Kazyaka, The Administration of the Death Penalty in South Carolina: Experiences Over the First Few Years, 39 S.C.L.Rev. 245 (1988); Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View From the Court, 100 Harv.L.Rev. 313 (1986); Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 Ariz.L.Rev. 143 (1986); Project, Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1985-1986, 75 Geo.L.J. 713 (1987); Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 Mich.L.Rev. 1741 (1987); Note, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Is the Current Test of the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment Proper? Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981), XVII Land & Water L.Rev. 681 (1982); Dolinko, Foreword: How to Criticize the Death Penalty, 77 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 546 (1986); Allen, Supreme Court Review. Foreword — Evidence, Inference, Rules, and Judgment in Constitutional Adjudication: The Intriguing Case of Walton v. Arizona, 81 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 727 (1991), Wright, Life Without Parole: The View From Death Row, 27 Crim.L.Bull. 334 (1991). See also Book Review, Serial Murder: An Elusive Phenomenon, 81 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 1102 (1991).
Thirty-six state and federal jurisdictions presently authorize the death penalty. Of these, only eight jurisdictions authorize imposition of the death penalty solely for participation in a robbery in which another robber takes life. [As footnoted: California, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming] Of the remaining 28 jurisdictions, in 4 felony murder is not a capital crime. Eleven States require some culpable mental state with respect to the homicide as a prerequisite to conviction of a crime for which the death penalty is authorized. Of these 11 States, 8 make knowing, intentional, purposeful, or premeditated killing an element of capital murder. Three other States require proof of a culpable mental state short of intent, such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human life, before the death penalty may be imposed. In these 11 States, therefore, the actors in a felony murder are not subject to the death penalty without proof of their mental state, proof which was not required with respect to Enmund either under the trial court's instructions or under the law announced by the Florida Supreme Court.
Four additional jurisdictions do not permit a defendant such as Enmund to be put to death. Of these, one State flatly prohibits capital punishment in cases where the defendant did not actually commit murder. Two jurisdictions preclude the death penalty in cases such as this one where the defendant "was a principal in the offense, which was committed by another, but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution." [Quoting from Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-103(5)(d) (1978) and 49 U.S.C. § 1473(c)(6)(D)] One other State limits the death penalty in felony murders to narrow circumstances not involved here.
Nine of the remaining States deal with the imposition of the death penalty for a vicarious felony murder in their capital sentencing statutes. In each of these States, a defendant may not be executed solely for participating in a felony in which a person was killed if the defendant did not actually cause the victim's death. For a defendant to be executed in these States, typically the statutory aggravating circumstances which are present must outweigh mitigating factors. To be sure, a vicarious felony murderer may be sentenced to death in these jurisdictions absent an intent to kill if sufficient aggravating circumstances are present. However, six of these nine States make it a statutory mitigating circumstance that the defendant was an accomplice in a capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor. By making minimal participation in a capital felony committed by another person a mitigating circumstance, these sentencing statutes reduce the likelihood that a person will be executed for vicarious felony murder. The remaining three jurisdictions exclude felony murder from their lists of aggravating circumstances that will support a death sentence. In each of these nine States, a nontriggerman guilty of felony murder cannot be sentenced to death for the felony murder absent aggravating circumstances above and beyond the felony murder itself.
Thus only a small minority of jurisdictions — eight — allow the death penalty to be imposed solely because the defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a murder was committed. Even if the nine States are included where such a defendant could be executed for an unintended felony murder if sufficient aggravating circumstances are present to outweigh mitigating circumstances — which often include the defendant's minimal participation in the murder — only about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant who somehow participated in a robbery where a murder occurred to be sentenced to die. Moreover, of the eight States which have enacted new death penalty statutes since 1978, none authorize capital punishment in such circumstances.
The Bullock decision is problematic in two ways. First, it allows sentencing procedures which do not afford felony murderers the same protection as deliberate murderers. Second, it weakens the traditional role of the jury in sentencing procedures.
[The case result] combines fact finding with appellate review in the same proceeding for felony murderers. This creates a distinction between felony murderers and deliberate murderers. A deliberate murderer is assured complete consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances while a felony murderer is not.
The advantages to any death charged defendant for application of the provisions of the most current Wyoming statute are self-evident. The Coleman v. McCormick, 874 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 944, 110 S.Ct. 349, 107 L.Ed.2d 337 (1989) ex post facto determinant consequently does not apply where the amendatory provisions for death penalty assessment will not disfavor the accused. The retrospective application addressed in Aden v. State, 761 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 1988) is not appropriate for present decision to follow the general rule for the procedure to assess death penalty now in effect for retrial as more rational and objective, id. at 90, and certainly thoughtfully composed by the legislature to address obvious concerns about the efficacy of the prior law.
For the purposes of W.S. 8-1-107, amendments to W.S. 6-2-102 for retrial do not affect a pending prosecution following prior reversal of conviction. We have applied the Attletweedt rule as exculpated from W.S. 6-1-101(c). Dobbert, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290. For amendatory purposes, the changes to the death penalty statute were procedural, Matter of Boyd's Estate, 606 P.2d 1243 (Wyo. 1980), and affected the penalty. Dobbert, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290.
The recurrent problems encountered by the appellate courts in consideration of the burden of proof and weighing instructions for death penalty determination are excruciatingly illustrated by samples of current cases from illustrative jurisdictions:
Federal: Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 959, 110 S.Ct. 378, 107 L.Ed.2d 363 (1989); Martin, 891 F.2d 807; Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3301, 111 L.Ed.2d 810 (1990); Pulley, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871; Williams v. Armontrout, 891 F.2d 656 (1989), reh'g 912 F.2d 924 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1092, 112 L.Ed.2d 1197 (1991); Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1051, 110 S.Ct. 854, 107 L.Ed.2d 848 (1990); Lusk v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 332 (1989), reh'g denied 894 F.2d 414 (11th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3297, 111 L.Ed.2d 805, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 10, 111 L.Ed.2d 825 (1990); Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285 (1989), reh'g denied 898 F.2d 160 (11th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2628, 110 L.Ed.2d 648 (1990); Harris, 874 F.2d 756; Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 206, 107 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989); Coleman, 874 F.2d 1280; Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir.1988); Clark v. Ricketts, 886 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir.1989); People v. Boyde, 46 Cal.3d 212, 250 Cal. Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25 (1988), cert. granted 490 U.S. 1097, 109 S.Ct. 2447, 104 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1989), aff'd 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1961, 109 L.Ed.2d 322 (1990).
Alabama: Hallford v. State, 548 So.2d 526 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), aff'd 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 945, 110 S.Ct. 354, 107 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); Hinton v. State, 548 So.2d 547 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), aff'd 548 So.2d 562 (Ala.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 419, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989).
Arkansas: Robertson v. State, 298 Ark. 131, 765 S.W.2d 936, 940 (1989), Hickman, J. concurring; Ruiz v. State, 299 Ark. 144, 772 S.W.2d 297 (1989); Wilson v. State, 295 Ark. 682, 751 S.W.2d 734, opinion modified 295 Ark. 682, 752 S.W.2d 762 (1988).
California: Lang, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627; People v. Sheldon, 48 Cal.3d 935, 258 Cal. Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330 (1989); People v. Bell, 49 Cal.3d 502, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129 (1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2576, 109 L.Ed.2d 757 (1990); In re Sixto, 48 Cal.3d 1247, 259 Cal. Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164 (1989).
Connecticut: State v. Breton, 212 Conn. 258, 562 A.2d 1060 (1989).
Florida: Bello v. State, 547 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1989).
Idaho: State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 775 P.2d 599, cert. denied 493 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 290, 107 L.Ed.2d 270 (1989).
Illinois: People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill.2d 235, 138 Ill.Dec. 233, 547 N.E.2d 202 (1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3296, 111 L.Ed.2d 804, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 18, 111 L.Ed.2d 831 (1990); People v. Kidd, 129 Ill.2d 432, 136 Ill.Dec. 18, 544 N.E.2d 704 (1989).
Indiana: Huffman v. State, 543 N.E.2d 360 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3257, 111 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990); Minnick v. State, 544 N.E.2d 471 (Ind. 1989); Games v. State, 535 N.E.2d 530 (Ind.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 205, 107 L.Ed.2d 158, reh'g denied 493 U.S. 985, 110 S.Ct. 523, 107 L.Ed.2d 523 (1989); Lowery v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1046 (Ind. 1989); cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 217, 112 L.Ed.2d 176 (1990); Smith, 547 N.E.2d 817.
Louisiana: State v. Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886 (La. 1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 798, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2579, 109 L.Ed.2d 761 (1990).
Mississippi: Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d 77 (Miss. 1988), cert. granted ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1921, 109 L.Ed.2d 285, rev'd ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990); Clemons v. State, 535 So.2d 1354 (Miss. 1988), cert. granted in part 491 U.S. 904, 109 S.Ct. 3184, 105 L.Ed.2d 693 (1989), judgment vacated 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990); Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782 (Miss. 1987); West v. State, 553 So.2d 8 (Miss. 1989).
New Jersey: State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A.2d 792 (1988); State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 558 A.2d 1259 (1989); Davis, 561 A.2d 1082; State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A.2d 130 (1987); State v. Biegenwald, 110 N.J. 521, 542 A.2d 442 (1988); State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 594 A.2d 172 (1991).
New Mexico: State v. Clark, 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 291, 107 L.Ed.2d 271, reh'g denied 493 U.S. 998, 110 S.Ct. 555, 107 L.Ed.2d 551 (1989), overruled sub nom. State v. Henderson, 109 N.M. 655, 789 P.2d 603 (1990).
North Carolina: State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 384 S.E.2d 470 (1989), cert. granted and vacated 494 U.S. 1023, 110 S.Ct. 1466, 108 L.Ed.2d 604 (1990); State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), cert. granted and vacated ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3266, 111 L.Ed.2d 777 (1990).
Ohio: State v. Dickerson, 45 Ohio St.3d 206, 543 N.E.2d 1250, reh'g denied 46 Ohio St.3d 706, 545 N.E.2d 1285 (1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1836, 108 L.Ed.2d 965 (1990); State v. Cooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895, reh'g denied 46 Ohio St.3d 717, 546 N.E.2d 1335 (1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1431, 113 L.Ed.2d 482 (1991); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, reh'g denied 43 Ohio St.3d 712, 541 N.E.2d 78 (1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3258, 111 L.Ed.2d 768, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 16, 111 L.Ed.2d 830 (1990).
South Carolina: State v. Smith, 298 S.C. 482, 381 S.E.2d 724 (1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1536, 108 L.Ed.2d 775, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2221, 109 L.Ed.2d 546 (1990).
Virginia: Spencer v. Com., 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 759, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990).
The burden of this case law would have required reversal on Engberg's death penalty in any event. People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1991). Cf. Carter, A Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard in Death Penalty Proceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness, 52, Ohio St.L.J. 195 (1991).
The thesis that will emerge is that, at least in reviewing death penalty judgments, two very different models of the appellate function are at work.
The Lucas court approaches the review of death penalty cases very much like intermediate appellate courts approach the review of ordinary criminal cases. The process closely matches the process described in a classic study of criminal appeals in the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District as it operated in the mid-1970s: "The court approaches its work from a perspective that is noninterventionist, nonsupervisory, and conflict avoiding. Its decision process accentuates the value of finality and is strongly inclined toward affirmance." That study noted that a high rate of affirmance of criminal appeals reflected basic institutional norms and perspectives. Essentially, the justices approached their task with great deference to the trial judge:
"As a result, the Court of Appeal seldom asks what the best or most appropriate answer to a legal issue would be; rather, it usually asks only whether the trial court's answer is within acceptable bounds. In addressing that latter question, the basic norms of appellate review collectively call for the Court of Appeal to defer to the judgment of the trial court if possible, and direct the Court of Appeal to resolve any doubts or ambiguities in the direction of affirmance."
The basic norms of appellate review thus become norms of affirmance. These include the principle of abstention in issues not presented below, the substantial evidence rule, and the harmless error rule. The common effect of each of these norms, as described by Dr. Davies, "is to cut off inquiry and transform problematic issues into routine affirmances. Once these norms are internalized by intermediate appellate judges, the norms create a perceptual filter that makes the appeals themselves appear to be devoid of any significant issues."
Id. at 238-39 (footnotes omitted and citing Davies, Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making Norms in a California Court of Appeal, 1982 Am.B.Found.Res.J. 543, 592, 607, 612 (1982)).
"* * * [A] system `could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.' 428 U.S. at 195, n. 46, 96 S.Ct. at 2935, n. 46. To avoid this constitutional flaw, an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible from the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant, 462 U.S. at 877, 103 S.Ct. at 2742.