540 U.S. 945 (2003)
In March 2000 Michael A. Newdow filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California against the United States Congress, the President of the United States, the State of California, the Elk Grove Unified School District, and its superintendent.1
Newdow, an atheist ordained in a ministry that espouses reason over mythology, alleged that the daily group recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in his daughter's kindergarten class violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses because the Pledge contains the words "under God."2
At the time of filing, Newdow's daughter was enrolled in kindergarten in the School District and participated in the daily recitation of the Pledge.3
California law requires every public elementary school to begin each day with appropriate patriotic exercises.4 The Elk Grove Unified School District implemented that requirement by directing each elementary school class to recite the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag once each day.5 The resulting text of the Pledge, as amended by Congress in 1954, states: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."6 The School District permits students who object on religious grounds to abstain from the recitation.7
The district court adopted a magistrate judge's recommendation and dismissed the complaint on July 21, 2000.8
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously held that Newdow has standing as a parent to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter.9 Over the dissent of one judge, the court held that both the 1954 Act and the School District's policy violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.10
After the Ninth Circuit's initial decision, Sandra Banning, the mother of Newdow's daughter, moved to intervene or dismiss the complaint.11 Banning declared that a state-court order granted her exclusive legal custody of the child, including the sole right to make decisions about her education and welfare.12 Banning further stated that the daughter is a Christian who believes in God and has no objection either to reciting or hearing others recite the Pledge of Allegiance, or to its reference to God.13
On September 25, 2002, the California Superior Court entered an order enjoining Newdow from including his daughter as an unnamed party or suing as her next friend.14
The Ninth Circuit reconsidered Newdow's standing in light of Banning's motion.15 The court unanimously concluded that the grant of sole legal custody to Banning did not deprive Newdow, as a noncustodial parent, of Article III standing to object to unconstitutional government action affecting his child.16
On February 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued an order amending its first opinion and denying rehearing en banc.17 The amended opinion omitted the initial opinion's discussion of Newdow's standing to challenge the 1954 Act.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Newdow has standing as a noncustodial parent to challenge the School District's policy and, if so, whether the policy offends the First Amendment.
Whether Newdow has standing as a noncustodial parent to challenge the Elk Grove Unified School District's policy requiring daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance?19
Prudential standing embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.20 These limits include the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights. In the realm of domestic relations, federal courts customarily decline to intervene when the suit depends on a determination of the status of the parties.21 Federal courts also decline when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiff's claimed standing.22
No. Newdow's standing derives entirely from his relationship with his daughter.23 Under the California Superior Court order, Banning has exclusive legal custody, including the sole right to make decisions about her education.24 The court enjoined Newdow from suing as her next friend.25 The interests of the parent and child are not parallel and are potentially in conflict.26
Although the Court of Appeals held that California law vests Newdow with a cognizable right to influence his daughter's religious upbringing. Newdow seeks relief that would dictate to the School District what it may say to his child.27 That request exceeds the zone of private authority recognized in In re Marriage of Murga and In re Marriage of Mentry.28 When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law.29
Newdow lacks prudential standing to bring this suit in federal court.30
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by O'connor, J., And Thomas, J., As To Part I
The Court erred by erecting a novel prudential standing principle to avoid the merits.31 Newdow satisfies Article III standing requirements because his injury in fact from the Pledge policy is fairly traceable to the School District's conduct.32 The domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction does not apply because this case involves a substantial federal question about the constitutionality of the Pledge ceremony rather than a request for a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.33
Abstention is likewise inappropriate because the status of the domestic relationship has been determined as a matter of state law and has no bearing on the underlying constitutional claim.34 The Court should have deferred to the Ninth Circuit's construction of California law under Murga and Mentry, which preserves Newdow's right as a noncustodial parent to expose his daughter to his religious views.35
Newdow has standing to bring his constitutional claim before a federal court.36 The policy of having teachers lead students in voluntary recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance does not offend the Establishment Clause.37 References to religion in public life can serve legitimate secular purposes such as commemorating the role of religion in our history and solemnizing public occasions.38
The phrase under God in the Pledge qualifies as an instance of ceremonial deism because of its history and ubiquity, absence of worship or prayer, absence of reference to a particular religion, and minimal religious content.39 A reasonable observer fully aware of the history, ubiquity, and context would not perceive the recitation as conveying a message of endorsement of religion.40
Newdow has standing, and the Pledge policy is constitutional.41 Lee v. Weisman adopted an expansive definition of coercion that cannot be defended.42 The Establishment Clause is a federalism provision that resists incorporation against the States.43
The traditional establishments of religion involved actual legal coercion by force of law and threat of penalty.44 The Pledge policy does not create or maintain any religious establishment and does not expose anyone to the legal coercion associated with an established religion.45 Neither does it infringe any free-exercise rights.46