451 U.S. 477 (1981)
On January 19, 1976, a sworn complaint was filed against Edwards in Arizona state court charging him with robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder.1 An arrest warrant was issued pursuant to the complaint, and Edwards was arrested at his home later that same day.2 At the police station, he was informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona.3 Petitioner stated that he understood his rights, and was willing to submit to questioning.45 After being told that another suspect already in custody had implicated him in the crime, Edwards denied involvement and gave a taped statement presenting an alibi defense.6 He then sought to make a deal.7 The interrogating officer told him that he wanted a statement, but that he did not have the authority to negotiate a deal. The officer provided Edwards with the telephone number of a county attorney. Petitioner made the call, but hung up after a few moments. Edwards then said: I want an attorney before making a deal. At that point, questioning ceased and Edwards was taken to county jail.8
At 9:15 the next morning, two detectives, colleagues of the officer who had interrogated Edwards the previous night, came to the jail and asked to see Edwards.9 When the detention officer informed Edwards that the detectives wished to speak with him, he replied that he did not want to talk to anyone.10 The guard told him that he had to talk and then took him to meet with the detectives.1112 The officers identified themselves, stated they wanted to talk to him, and informed him of his Miranda rights.13 Edwards was willing to talk, but he first wanted to hear the taped statement of the alleged accomplice who had implicated him.1415 After listening to the tape for several minutes, petitioner said that he would make a statement so long as it was not tape-recorded. The detectives informed him that the recording was irrelevant since they could testify in court concerning whatever he said. Edwards replied: I'll tell you anything you want to know, but I don't want it on tape. He thereupon implicated himself in the crime.16
Prior to trial, Edwards moved to suppress his confession on the ground that his Miranda rights had been violated when the officers returned to question him after he had invoked his right to counsel.17 The trial court initially granted the motion to suppress, but reversed its ruling when presented with a supposedly controlling decision of a higher Arizona court.18 The court stated without explanation that it found Edwards' statement to be voluntary.1920 Edwards was tried twice and convicted. Evidence concerning his confession was admitted at both trials.21
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Edwards had invoked both his right to remain silent and his right to counsel during the interrogation conducted on the night of January 19.22 The court then went on to determine, however, that Edwards had waived both rights during the January 20 meeting when he voluntarily gave his statement to the detectives after again being informed that he need not answer questions and that he need not answer without the advice of counsel.23 The trial court's finding that the waiver and confession were voluntarily and knowingly made is upheld.24
Whether the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require suppression of a post-arrest confession, which was obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to consult counsel before further interrogation?25
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court held that if the accused indicates that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. If he requests counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.26 The Court further held that once an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.27 An accused having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.28
Yes. On January 19, 1976, a sworn complaint was filed against Edwards in Arizona state court charging him with robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder.29 An arrest warrant was issued pursuant to the complaint, and Edwards was arrested at his home later that same day. At the police station, he was informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona. Petitioner stated that he understood his rights, and was willing to submit to questioning. After being told that another suspect already in custody had implicated him in the crime, Edwards denied involvement and gave a taped statement presenting an alibi defense. He then sought to make a deal but ultimately said that he wanted an attorney before making a deal, at which point questioning ceased and Edwards was taken to county jail.30
At 9:15 the next morning, two detectives came to the jail and asked to see Edwards.31 When the detention officer informed Edwards that the detectives wished to speak with him, he replied that he did not want to talk to anyone. The guard told him that he had to talk and then took him to meet with the detectives. The officers identified themselves, stated they wanted to talk to him, and informed him of his Miranda rights. Edwards was willing to talk, but he first wanted to hear the taped statement of the alleged accomplice who had implicated him. After listening to the tape for several minutes, petitioner said that he would make a statement so long as it was not tape-recorded and thereupon implicated himself in the crime.32
Prior to trial, Edwards moved to suppress his confession on the ground that his Miranda rights had been violated when the officers returned to question him after he had invoked his right to counsel. The trial court initially granted the motion to suppress, but reversed its ruling when presented with a supposedly controlling decision of a higher Arizona court. The court stated without explanation that it found Edwards' statement to be voluntary. Edwards was tried twice and convicted, with evidence concerning his confession admitted at both trials.33
On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that Edwards had invoked both his right to remain silent and his right to counsel during the interrogation conducted on the night of January 19. The court then went on to determine, however, that Edwards had waived both rights during the January 20 meeting when he voluntarily gave his statement to the detectives after again being informed that he need not answer questions and that he need not answer without the advice of counsel. Applying the rule to these facts, Edwards invoked his right to counsel on January 19, but the police reinitiated interrogation on January 20 without providing counsel and without Edwards initiating the contact.34 Therefore, the statement was obtained in violation of Edwards' Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and must be suppressed.35
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require suppression of the post-arrest confession obtained after Edwards invoked his right to counsel.36
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger concurred only in the judgment.37 He did not agree that Miranda or the Constitution calls for a special rule as to how an accused in custody may waive the right to be free from interrogation.38 Instead, the inquiry should be whether resumption of interrogation is the result of a voluntary waiver under the traditional Johnson v. Zerbst standard, depending on the particular facts and circumstances including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.39
In this case, the Arizona Supreme Court described that when the detention officer told Edwards that the detectives were there to see him, Edwards said he did not wish to speak to anyone, but the officer told him that he had to.40 This is enough to show that the resumption of interrogation was not the product of a voluntary waiver.41
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell agreed that the judgment must be reversed but did not join the Court's opinion because he was not sure what it means.42 He agreed with the settled rule that waivers of counsel must be voluntary and constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right, depending on the particular facts and circumstances.43 However, he found the opinion unclear due to its emphasis on initiation, and he would not superimpose a new element of proof on the established doctrine of waiver of counsel.44
Powell noted that the ultimate question is whether there was a free and knowing waiver of counsel before interrogation commenced.45 Who initiated the conversation may be relevant but is not the sine qua non of the inquiry.46 He cautioned against reading the opinion as constitutionalizing a single element of fact among the facts that may be relevant to determining whether there has been a valid waiver.47