867 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1989)
Andrea Dworkin is a prominent feminist author and activist who served as one of the principal drafters of an antipornography ordinance enacted by the city of Indianapolis.1
Hustler Magazine is a pornographic periodical.2 In February, March, and December of 1984, Hustler published three features mentioning Dworkin by name in a derogatory fashion.3
The February feature is a cartoon depicting two women engaged in a lesbian act of oral sex with the caption "You remind me so much of Andrea Dworkin, Edna. It's a dog-eat-dog world."4 The March feature is a ten-page pictorial consisting of photographs of women engaged in acts of lesbianism or masturbation.5 One caption in the March feature references the Andrea Dworkin Fan Club.6 The December feature appeared in the "Porn from the Past" section and showed a man performing oral sex on an obese woman with a caption stating that one editor swore the woman was the mother of radical feminist Andrea Dworkin.7
Dworkin joined with Judith Fouts and Priscilla Moree in their individual capacities and as representatives of the Wyoming and Jackson, Wyoming chapters of the National Organization for Women.8 They filed the complaint in Wyoming state court against Hustler Magazine, Larry Flynt, Inland Empire Periodicals, Park Place Market, and later Flynt Distributing Company. The complaint asserted claims for libel, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional injury, a civil rights claim under the Constitution, and an implied private cause of action based on a Wyoming criminal obscenity statute.9 Dworkin sought $50 million in actual damages and $100 million in punitive damages.10 The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief.11
The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming.12 The Wyoming district court found removal proper based on both federal question and diversity jurisdiction after determining that certain Wyoming defendants had been fraudulently joined.13 The Wyoming district court granted motions to dismiss several counts and transferred venue to the Central District of California.14 The California district court subsequently granted the Hustler defendants' motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims.15 Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit from multiple procedural and substantive rulings.16
Whether the Features could reasonably be understood as expressing statements of fact about Dworkin?17
Courts examine the facts surrounding the publication, the context in which the statements were made, and the nature of the language used to distinguish fact from opinion.18 Statements that are not themselves factual and do not suggest a conclusion drawn from undisclosed facts are opinions protected by the First Amendment.19
No. The February cartoon, March pictorial, and December Porn from the Past feature used extreme language in the context of a heated public debate over pornography within a magazine known for its pornographic content.20 These elements match the privileged opinion analysis applied in similar Hustler cases such as Ault and Leidholdt.21 The Features therefore cannot reasonably be understood as literal factual assertions about Dworkin.22 The court concluded that the Features consisted of privileged opinion.23
The Features could not reasonably be understood as expressing statements of fact about Dworkin.24
Whether Dworkin presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to New York Times malice?25
No. Dworkin relied on the colloquial meaning of malice as spite or ill will rather than evidence of knowing falsity or reckless disregard.28 No probative evidence of the required subjective awareness was identified in the record of the Features' publication.29 The Supreme Court has held that the lack of New York Times malice is a proper ground for summary judgment.30 Dworkin failed to meet her burden on this element.31
Dworkin did not presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to New York Times malice.32
Whether the Features addressed matters of public concern?33
Speech addressing a public controversy in which the plaintiff participates, including ad hominem attacks on advocates in an ongoing political debate, qualifies as addressing matters of public concern under the First Amendment.34
Yes. Dworkin is a prominent antipornography activist who drafted the Indianapolis ordinance.35 The Features formed part of the heated public debate on pornography between her viewpoint and Hustler's editorial position.36 The Features attacked her as an advocate in that ongoing controversy.37 The Supreme Court has recognized that vehement criticism of public figures is a component of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment.38
The Features addressed matters of public concern.39
Whether Dworkin could recover on her invasion of privacy claims under New York Civil Rights Law section 51?40
New York Civil Rights Law section 51 provides the exclusive remedy for invasion of privacy and protects only against commercial appropriation of name or likeness for advertising or trade purposes, not against non-endorsement uses in editorial content.41
No. The Features did not appropriate Dworkin's identity for advertising purposes or suggest her endorsement of Hustler.42 New York law does not recognize the asserted privacy theories on these facts.43 The statute was drafted narrowly to encompass only the commercial use of an individual's name or likeness and no more.44 Dworkin does not and cannot plausibly argue that the cartoons constitute an appropriation by Hustler of the commercial benefit of a performance in which Dworkin has a proprietary interest.45
Dworkin could not recover on her invasion of privacy claims under New York Civil Rights Law section 51.46
Whether plaintiffs could assert an implied private cause of action under the Wyoming criminal obscenity statute?47
No. Because the Features expressed opinions on matters of public concern, they possessed serious value under the Miller test and could not be found obscene.50 No implied private cause of action therefore arises.51 Under the three-part test for obscenity of Miller v. California, a publication may be obscene only if it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.52 The Features did not lack such value.53
Plaintiffs could not assert an implied private cause of action under the Wyoming criminal obscenity statute.54
Whether Hustler and Flynt were state actors for purposes of the civil rights claim?55
No. Hustler Magazine and Larry Flynt are private entities whose publication of the Features does not constitute state action.58 The civil rights claim therefore fails as a matter of law.59 A plaintiff must plead state action in order to pursue a constitutional claim.60 The first amendment requires other ideas to compete with private viewpoints in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open public debate.61
Hustler and Flynt were not state actors for purposes of the civil rights claim.62