452 U.S. 594 (1981)
Congress enacted the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.1 The statute directed the Secretary of Labor to develop detailed mandatory health and safety standards for the Nation's mines and authorized federal mine inspectors to conduct warrantless inspections of all mines at specified frequencies without advance notice.2
In July 1978, a federal mine inspector attempted to inspect quarries owned by Waukesha Lime and Stone Co. to determine whether 25 previously discovered safety and health violations had been corrected.3 After the inspector had been on the site for about an hour, company president Douglas Dewey refused to allow the inspection to continue unless the inspector first obtained a search warrant.4 The inspector issued a citation to Waukesha for terminating the inspection.5 The Secretary of Labor filed a civil action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin seeking to enjoin the appellees from refusing to permit warrantless searches.6
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on the ground that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the warrantless searches authorized by the Act.7 The Secretary appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.8
Whether § 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 violates the Fourth Amendment?9
These decisions make clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme. The federal regulatory presence must be sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes.10
Yes. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 requires the Secretary of Labor to develop detailed mandatory health and safety standards to govern the operation of the Nation’s mines.11 The Act directs the Secretary of Labor to create detailed health and safety standards. It empowers inspectors to enter mines without warrants or advance notice to check compliance with those standards.12 The Act applies to all mines, including surface quarries.13
Subsequently, in July 1978, a federal mine inspector arrived at the Waukesha Lime and Stone Co. quarries to verify that 25 previously discovered violations had been corrected.14 After spending about an hour on the site, the inspector was confronted by company president Douglas Dewey.15 Dewey refused to allow the inspection to continue unless the inspector obtained a search warrant.16 The inspector then issued a citation to the company for terminating the inspection.17
The Secretary of Labor responded by filing a civil lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.18 The suit sought an order compelling the company to permit future warrantless inspections.19 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Dewey and the company, holding that the warrantless searches violated the Fourth Amendment.20 The Secretary appealed directly to the Supreme Court.21
Applying the rule to these facts, the Mine Safety and Health Act satisfies the requirements for the Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement. Congress determined that warrantless inspections are necessary because advance notice would allow hazards to be concealed.22 The regulatory presence is comprehensive and defined because the Act mandates inspections of all mines at specified frequencies and the standards are publicly set forth.23 The owner of a mine such as Waukesha Lime and Stone Co. cannot help but be aware that the property will be subject to periodic inspections.24 The Act's provision for civil enforcement rather than forcible entry accommodates privacy interests.25 Thus, the inspection program provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.26
Section 103(a) does not violate the Fourth Amendment.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment.28 He agreed that legislative schemes authorizing warrantless administrative searches of commercial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment.29 He expressed doubt that the pervasively regulated rationale would justify warrantless searches in other contexts such as drug activity even if pervasively regulated for a longer period.30
He concurred because the stone quarry was largely visible to the naked eye without entrance onto the property, invoking the open fields doctrine.31 He reserved judgment on the extent to which the Fourth Amendment would prevent implementation of the Act in the absence of the particular fact situation presented here.32
Justice Stevens concurred.33 He believed the Court erred in Camara and Barlow's but accepted the law as it is.34 He found the majority's explanation of the differences between the scope of the Mine Safety and Health Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act sufficient to support a different result.35
He agreed with the majority that the cases are distinguishable and did not need to confront whether Camara represented a fundamental misreading of the Fourth Amendment.36
Justice Stewart dissented.37 He accepted that administrative inspections are searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that warrantless inspections are invalid except in precisely defined circumstances.38 He argued that the Colonnade-Biswell exception applies only to businesses that are both pervasively regulated and have a long history of regulation.39
Because stone quarries became pervasively regulated only in 1966, the exception does not apply and a warrant is required.40 He contended that the majority discards the long-tradition requirement and allows Congress to avoid the Fourth Amendment industry by industry.41
Whether the Act's authorization of warrantless inspections of stone quarries is constitutional despite the industry's more recent subjection to federal regulation?42
Of course, the duration of a particular regulatory scheme will often be an important factor in determining whether it is sufficiently pervasive to make the imposition of a warrant requirement unnecessary. But if the length of regulation were the only criterion, absurd results would occur.43
Yes. The Fourth Amendment's central concept of reasonableness will not tolerate arbitrary results based solely on the length of regulation.44 Stone quarries came under federal regulation in 1966, yet the Act is specifically tailored to the notorious hazards of mining and imposes a pervasive and defined regulatory presence.45 The Act requires inspection of all mines at specified frequencies and sets forth the standards in the statute or regulations.46
The operator of a stone quarry cannot help but be aware that the facility will be subject to effective inspection.47 The same analysis that upholds the Act for other mines applies equally to stone quarries.48
The Act's authorization of warrantless inspections of stone quarries is constitutional.49
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart dissented on this issue as well.50 He maintained that because Barlow's states the exception applies only when business is both pervasively regulated and has a long tradition of regulation, the exception does not apply to stone quarries.51 He argued that Congress is left free after today's opinion to avoid the Fourth Amendment industry by industry even though Barlow's held Congress could not avoid the Amendment all at once.52
He would require a warrant for nonconsensual inspections of stone quarries.53