487 U.S. 201 (1988)
In 1984 a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Texas began investigating petitioner John Doe for possible federal offenses arising from suspected fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income.1 Doe appeared before the grand jury pursuant to a subpoena that directed him to produce records of transactions in accounts at three named banks in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda.2
He produced some bank records and testified that no additional records responsive to the subpoena were in his possession or control. When questioned about the existence or location of additional records, Doe invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.3
The United States branches of the three foreign banks were also served with subpoenas commanding them to produce records of accounts over which Doe had signatory authority.4 Citing their governments' bank-secrecy laws that prohibit disclosure of account records without the customer's consent, the banks refused to comply.5
The Government then filed a motion in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. It sought an order directing Doe to sign twelve forms consenting to disclosure of any bank records relating to twelve foreign bank accounts over which the Government knew or suspected that Doe had control.6
The District Court denied the motion. It reasoned that by signing the consent forms Doe would necessarily be admitting the existence of the accounts and that he exercised signatory authority over them.7 The Government sought reconsideration and submitted a revised proposed consent directive that applied to any and all accounts over which Doe had a right of withdrawal without acknowledging the existence of any such account.8
The District Court denied this motion as well. It concluded that execution of the proposed form would admit signatory authority over speculative accounts.9 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in an unpublished per curiam opinion, holding that Doe could not assert his Fifth Amendment privilege because the form did not have testimonial significance.10
On remand the District Court ordered petitioner to execute the consent directive. He refused, and the District Court found him in civil contempt and ordered that he be confined until he complied, staying imposition of the sanction pending appeal.11 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the contempt order in an unpublished per curiam opinion.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether the compelled execution of a consent form directing the disclosure of foreign bank records is inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment.13
Whether a court order compelling a target of a grand jury investigation to sign a consent form directing foreign banks to disclose records of his accounts violates the target's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?14
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications.15 To qualify as testimonial, a communication must itself explicitly or implicitly relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Acts that do not require the accused to disclose knowledge he might have, such as providing handwriting or voice exemplars, are not testimonial.16
No. The consent directive at issue does not require Doe to make any statement, explicit or implicit, regarding the existence of or his control over any bank accounts at the foreign institutions.17 By signing the form, Doe makes no factual assertion about the accounts, and the form is drafted in hypothetical terms without identifying specific accounts or acknowledging their existence.18 This is analogous to compelling a handwriting exemplar, which the Court has held is not testimonial because it does not require the suspect to disclose any knowledge he might have.19 The execution of the form does not convey any information to the Government or the banks about the existence or control of accounts.20
The court order compelling Doe to sign the consent directive does not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented. He argued that a defendant cannot be compelled to use his mind to assist the prosecution in convicting him of a crime.22 Stevens distinguished the compelled production of physical evidence from compelling the use of the mind.
He likened it to being forced to reveal the combination to a wall safe rather than surrendering a key to a strongbox.23 The Fifth Amendment protects the inviolability of the human personality and the realm of human thought and expression.24 The forced execution of the document invades the dignity of the human mind by purporting to communicate a deliberate command.25