395 S.W.3d 653, 665-666 (Tenn. 2013)
In June 1997, Dick Broadcasting Company and related companies held FCC licenses for radio stations including WIVK, WIVK-FM, WIOL, and WXVO-FM.1 They executed three agreements with Oak Ridge FM, Inc., the FCC licensee for WOKI-FM, and ComCon Consultants, a partnership composed of John W. Pirkle and his son Jonathan W. Pirkle. The Time Brokerage Agreement sold substantially all of WOKI-FM's broadcast time to DBC for seven years and was binding on successors and assigns with no limitation on assignment.2 The Consulting Agreement paid the Pirkles to serve as consultants to DBC for seven years and likewise contained no limitation on assignment.3 The Right-of-First-Refusal Agreement granted DBC the right to purchase Oak Ridge FM's WOKI-FM assets at a discounted price.4 It provided that no party could assign its rights without the prior written consent of the other party, subject to limited exceptions benefiting DBC.5
On April 30, 2000, DBC entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with Citadel Broadcasting Company to sell most of its radio station assets, including the WOKI-FM agreements, for $300,000,000.6 On July 18, 2000, DBC informed John Pirkle of the pending acquisition and requested consent to assign the Right-of-First-Refusal Agreement.7 Pirkle, as president of Oak Ridge FM, notified DBC that none of the agreements could be assigned without permission and refused consent unless an arrangement satisfying Oak Ridge FM's concerns was reached.8 In an affidavit, Pirkle acknowledged that on counsel's advice he refused to agree to the assignment without additional consideration and sought to negotiate a separate agreement with Citadel.9 DBC offered to guarantee Citadel's obligations under the agreements, but Pirkle continued to withhold consent.10
DBC finalized the sale to Citadel without assignment of the agreements and with a $10,000,000 reduction in the sales price.11 On March 27, 2001, DBC sued Oak Ridge FM, ComCon, and Pirkle, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Time Brokerage Agreement and Consulting Agreement were assignable without consent and that Pirkle breached the agreements by wrongfully withholding consent.12 DBC also alleged that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applied to the Right-of-First-Refusal Agreement.13 The defendants admitted refusing consent but denied any breach.14
Both sides moved for summary judgment.15 The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants.16 DBC appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the summary judgment.17 The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review.18
Whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to a non-assigning party's conduct in refusing to consent to an assignment when the agreement does not specify a standard of conduct?19
Tennessee law implies a duty of good faith in the performance of contracts.20 This Court has recognized that an implied duty of reasonableness or good faith exists where contract terms are silent as to the standard of conduct.21 The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to every contract.22 It requires parties to act in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner when a consent-to-assign clause is silent regarding the standard for withholding consent.23
Yes. The Right-of-First-Refusal Agreement contained a silent consent clause.24 Oak Ridge FM refused consent to extract additional consideration from the Citadel transaction.25 Because the clause is silent, the implied covenant applies and requires Oak Ridge FM to act in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner when deciding whether to consent.26 Genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether that standard was satisfied.27
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to the silent consent clause and requires the non-assigning party to act in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Koch concurs in applying the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to the contracts.29 He writes separately to caution that in arm's-length commercial transactions the duty is weaker than a fiduciary obligation.30 The duty is best understood as the absence of bad faith.31
Parties in such transactions pursue their own self-interest.32 Pursuing self-interest does not breach the duty unless the conduct falls outside acceptable commercial practice or is motivated by dishonest purpose, fraudulent intent, or ill will.33 The record does not show either party acted with such bad faith.34
Experienced commercial parties should be left to fend for themselves without judicial intervention that introduces uncertainty into contractual relationships.35
Whether the defendants breached the Consulting Agreement by objecting to assignment when its terms indicated it was binding on successors and assigns without requiring consent?36
Yes. The Consulting Agreement stated it would be binding on the parties and their successors and assigns, indicating the parties intended it to be assignable without consent.39 Mr. Pirkle nevertheless insisted his consent was necessary and refused to consent despite the clear contractual language to the contrary.40 The trial court erred in considering Mr. Pirkle's testimony regarding advice of counsel because that evidence is extraneous and inadmissible under the parol evidence rule where the written agreement is clear and unambiguous.41
It is inadvisable to permit a party to defend a breach claim by asserting a good faith but mistaken interpretation of a contract provision when the written agreement clearly supports the contrary conclusion.42
The defendants breached the Consulting Agreement by objecting to assignment when its terms indicated it was binding on successors and assigns without requiring consent.43