249 U.S. 211 (1919)
The defendant delivered a public speech on June 16, 1918, in Canton, Ohio, to an assembly of people.1 The main theme was socialism and its growth.2 The speech also eulogized three comrades convicted of aiding and abetting failure to register for the draft.3 It praised others like Kate Richards O’Hare and Rose Pastor Stokes who had been convicted of obstructing enlistment.4 The defendant stated that if those individuals were guilty, so was he.5 He expressed opposition to the war while addressing the jury by admitting he abhorred war and would oppose it.6
The United States indicted the defendant under the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, as amended by the Act of May 16, 1918, with two counts remaining after the indictment was cut down.7 The third count charged that the defendant caused and incited insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces with intent to do so by delivering the speech.8 The fourth count charged that he obstructed and attempted to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service to that end by delivering the same speech.9
Before trial, the defendant demurred to the indictment on grounds including unconstitutionality under the First Amendment and insufficiency of the counts, but the demurrer was overruled.10 During the trial, the court admitted evidence of the prior convictions referenced in the speech, and an Anti-war Proclamation and Program from April 1917 in St. Louis, that the defendant had approved in spirit and substance shortly before speaking.11
The jury convicted the defendant on both counts, and the court sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment on each count with the terms to run concurrently.12 The Supreme Court reviewed the case following exceptions to the overruling of the demurrer, the admission of evidence, and other rulings at trial.13
Whether the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, as amended, unconstitutionally interferes with free speech contrary to the First Amendment?14
Speech that has the natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, when uttered with specific intent to achieve that result, may be prohibited by Congress without violating the First Amendment.15
No. The Espionage Act does not unconstitutionally interfere with free speech.16 The Supreme Court disposed of the First Amendment challenge by direct reference to its holding in Schenck v. United States.17 Applying that rule to the established facts, the defendant delivered a public speech on June 16, 1918, in Canton, Ohio, that eulogized three comrades convicted of aiding failure to register for the draft.18 He praised Rose Pastor Stokes and Kate Richards O’Hare for their opposition to enlistment.19 He declared that if those individuals were guilty so was he.20 He told the jury that he abhorred the war and would oppose it if he stood alone.21 The speech also incorporated approval of the St. Louis Anti-war Proclamation that called for continuous active opposition to the war through demonstrations and mass petitions.22
These statements, when viewed in the context of the ongoing conflict, carried the natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct recruiting while demonstrating the requisite specific intent.23
The Espionage Act therefore remains constitutional as applied to the defendant’s speech.24
Whether the two remaining counts of the indictment sufficiently stated the offenses charged?25
Yes. The two remaining counts of the indictment sufficiently stated the offenses charged.28 The third count alleged that on or about June 16, 1918, at Canton, Ohio, the defendant caused and incited insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces with intent to do so by delivering the speech set forth in the indictment.29 The fourth count alleged that he obstructed and attempted to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service to that end by delivering the same speech.30
The Supreme Court confirmed that an indictment in this form meets the requirements of the statute, consistent with its contemporaneous decision in Frohwerk v. United States.31
The demurrer to the indictment was therefore properly overruled.32
Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of the convictions of Ruthenberg, Wagenknecht, Baker, Stokes, and O’Hare together with the Anti-war Proclamation and Program?33
Evidence of prior convictions referenced in a speech and of a defendant’s approval of an anti-war platform is admissible to show what the speaker was talking about, to explain the import of expressions of sympathy, and to illuminate the speaker’s intent.34
Yes. The trial court properly admitted the evidence of the convictions and the Anti-war Proclamation and Program.35 The record of the convictions of Ruthenberg, Wagenknecht, Baker, Rose Pastor Stokes, and Kate Richards O’Hare was introduced to demonstrate the grounds on which those persons had been imprisoned so that the jury could understand the true import of the defendant’s eulogies and expressions of sympathy.36 The Anti-war Proclamation adopted at St. Louis in April 1917 was admitted because the defendant had stated approximately an hour before his speech that he approved of the platform in spirit and in substance.37 He later referred to it during his address to the jury.38
This evidence tended to prove that when the defendant used words tending to obstruct the recruiting service he meant them to have that effect.39
Admission of the evidence therefore did not constitute error.40
Whether the evidence supported a verdict that the defendant obstructed and attempted to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States?41
Yes. The evidence supported a verdict that the defendant obstructed and attempted to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States.44 The defendant’s speech contrasted the master class that declares war with the subject class that fights and dies.45 It asserted that the working class had never had a voice in declaring war or peace.46 It exhorted listeners not to worry about charges of treason to their masters.47 Immediately after the speech the defendant told the jury that he had been accused of obstructing the war, admitted the accusation, and stated that he abhorred war and would oppose it even if he stood alone.48
The jury was carefully instructed that guilt could be found only if the words had the natural tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct recruiting and the defendant had the specific intent to do so.49 On these facts the Supreme Court sustained the verdict on the fourth count.50
The judgment of conviction on the fourth count is therefore affirmed.51