351 U.S. 570 (1956)
An author who secured original copyrights on numerous musical compositions died before the time to apply for renewals arose. He was survived by his widow and one illegitimate child, who are both still living.1
Respondent, the child’s mother, brought this action on the child’s behalf against the widow, who is the petitioner here, seeking a declaratory judgment that the child has an interest in the copyrights already renewed by the widow and those that will become renewable during her lifetime, and for an accounting of profits from such copyrights as have been already renewed.2
The District Court, holding that the child was within the meaning of the term “children” as used in the statute but that the renewal rights belonged exclusively to the widow, gave judgment for the widow.3 Agreeing with the District Court on the first point, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that on the author’s death both widow and child shared in the renewal copyrights. 226 F. 2d 623.4
Because of the great importance of these questions in the administration of the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 350 U. S. 931.5
Whether the widow and children of the author take the renewal rights as a class or in order of enumeration under the Copyright Act?6
Under 17 U.S.C. § 24, upon the death of the author the widow or widower and children succeed to the renewal rights as a class rather than in order of enumeration.7
Yes. The author secured original copyrights on numerous musical compositions and died before renewal applications could be made. He was survived by a widow and one illegitimate child. The child’s mother sued the widow on the child’s behalf for a declaratory judgment and accounting, asserting the child’s interest in already-renewed and future copyrights.
The District Court ruled that the child qualified as a statutory “child” but awarded exclusive renewal rights to the widow. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that widow and child share the rights. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the questions’ importance to copyright administration. The statutory text, read against the 1831 Act’s use of “and” and the lack of any legislative intent to change class treatment in 1870 or 1909, confirms that the widow and children take the renewal rights simultaneously as a class.8
The widow and children take the renewal rights as a class upon the author’s death.9
Whether the term 'children' in the renewal provision of the Copyright Act includes an illegitimate child?10
The term “children” in 17 U.S.C. § 24 is defined by reference to state law governing familial status for inheritance purposes; an illegitimate child acknowledged under state law therefore qualifies.11
Yes. The child is the illegitimate son of the deceased author, and his mother brought suit on his behalf against the surviving widow.12 Under California Probate Code § 255 the child, having been acknowledged in writing by his father, possesses the status of an heir entitled to inherit from the father’s estate.13 That status aligns directly with the evident purpose of § 24, which is to provide for the author’s family after death through a compulsory bequest of renewal rights.14
Because the child therefore qualifies as an heir under the controlling state inheritance provision, he is included within the statutory term “children.”15
The term “children” includes an illegitimate child who qualifies as an heir under applicable state inheritance law.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to stress that the meaning of “children” under § 24 presents a federal question.17 He acknowledged that Congress could have directed reference to state law.18 Yet he maintained that the statutory policy of protecting dependents would be better served by a uniform national rule rather than by incorporating the varying laws of the forty-eight States.19
Douglas would therefore hold that illegitimate children qualify as “children” within the meaning of the Copyright Act regardless of whether state law grants them dependency benefits.20 He drew support from federal death-benefit precedents that focus on those morally entitled to support.21