478 U.S. 109, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 92 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1986)
The Indiana Legislature consists of a 50-member Senate and a 100-member House of Representatives.1 In early 1981, following the 1980 census, the Republican-controlled General Assembly initiated reapportionment of the state's legislative districts.2 The resulting 1981 Reapportionment Act created 50 single-member Senate districts and, for the House, 7 triple-member districts, 9 double-member districts, and 61 single-member districts.3 The plan was drafted by Republican leadership with the assistance of a private computer firm using precinct-level political data, passed along party lines over unanimous Democratic opposition, and signed into law by the Republican Governor.4
In early 1982, several Indiana Democrats, including state legislators, local officials, and private citizens, filed suit against state officials alleging that the 1981 plan constituted a political gerrymander intended to disadvantage Democratic voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the claims.6
In November 1982, the first elections were held under the new districting plan.7 Democratic candidates received 51.9 percent of the statewide House vote but won only 43 of 100 seats, and 53.1 percent of the Senate vote but won 13 of the 25 seats up for election.8 In Marion and Allen Counties, which used multimember House districts, Democratic candidates received 46.6 percent of the vote but won only 3 of 21 seats.9
After trial, the District Court found that the plan intentionally discriminated against Democrats on a statewide basis, that the discrimination was likely to continue throughout the decade, and that it would deny Democrats a fair chance to influence the political process.10 The court declared the plan unconstitutional, enjoined its enforcement, and ordered the General Assembly to prepare a new plan.11
The defendants appealed, seeking review of the District Court's rulings on justiciability and the existence of an equal protection violation.12 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.13
Whether claims that a state legislative apportionment constitutes a political gerrymander present a justiciable controversy under the Equal Protection Clause?14
Under Baker v. Carr, a claim presents a nonjusticiable political question only if there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to another branch, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, or one of the other identified factors.15
Yes. The claim that a political gerrymander violates the Equal Protection Clause is analogous to racial gerrymandering claims that courts have long adjudicated.16 None of the Baker factors applies because the Equal Protection Clause supplies judicially manageable standards for evaluating whether district lines were drawn to disadvantage an identifiable political group. There is no textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to another branch.17 There is no risk of foreign or domestic disturbance from adjudication.18
Political gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Rehnquist
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment.20 She argued that partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable political question.21 The Equal Protection Clause supplies no judicially manageable standards for resolving them.22
The Framers intended such matters to remain with the legislative branch.23 She would have reversed on justiciability grounds alone rather than reaching the merits.24 Her view rests on the concern that adjudication would require courts to make initial policy determinations about fair group representation.25
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Powell agreed that the claims are justiciable.26 He dissented from the plurality's standard.27 Courts must examine multiple neutral factors.28
These include district shapes, adherence to political subdivision boundaries, and the legislative process.29 The inquiry determines whether boundaries were distorted deliberately to achieve illegitimate partisan ends.30 His approach would have upheld the District Court's findings on these factors.31
He emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees fair and effective representation, which requires consideration of factors beyond one person, one vote to identify unconstitutional gerrymanders.
Whether the 1981 Indiana Reapportionment Act violates the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally discriminating against Democratic voters on a statewide basis?32
No. Although the Republican majority intentionally drew the 1981 plan to maximize Republican advantage, the 1982 election results do not establish the required consistent discriminatory effect.35 Indiana is a swing state.36 The District Court made no finding that Democrats would be locked out of majority control throughout the decade.37 A mere lack of proportional representation in a single election is insufficient.38
The 1981 Indiana Reapportionment Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.39
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Rehnquist
Justice O’Connor agreed that the plaintiffs failed to show the plan would consistently degrade Democratic influence on the political process as a whole.40 She would have required a more stringent standard.41 The standard would show systematic reduction of a group's voting strength below its population share before finding a violation.42
Her concurrence emphasized that the plurality's threshold was too low and would invite excessive litigation over apportionment plans.43 She stressed that political gerrymandering is a self-limiting enterprise best left to the political process.
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Powell would have affirmed the District Court.44 The plan's irregular district shapes disregarded county and township boundaries.45 The use of multimember districts stacked and cracked Democratic voters.46
Democrats were excluded from the mapmaking process.47 These facts demonstrated both discriminatory intent and effect sufficient to establish an unconstitutional gerrymander.48 He would have applied neutral factors to uphold the lower court's conclusion.49
He argued that the combination of intent evidence and district configurations already proved unconstitutional vote dilution without needing multiple elections.
Chief Justice Burger joined Justice O’Connor's opinion.50 He emphasized that the Framers placed responsibility for correcting flaws in the political process with the people and their elected representatives rather than the judiciary.51 He questioned the Court's urge to craft a judicial remedy for gerrymandering.52
Relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's representatives.53 He viewed judicial intervention as inconsistent with the constitutional scheme that leaves such matters to the political branches.
Whether proof of discriminatory intent and a single election's results suffice to establish an unconstitutional political gerrymander under the Equal Protection Clause?54
No. The District Court relied primarily on the 1982 election results showing Democrats winning fewer seats than their vote share.57 It also relied on the use of multimember districts in Marion and Allen Counties.58 These facts do not satisfy the standard.59 The court expressly declined to find that the results were the predictable consequence of the plan.60
It also declined to find that Democrats would remain in the minority throughout the decade.61 A single election in a swing state cannot demonstrate the required consistent degradation.62
Proof of discriminatory intent and a single election's results do not suffice to establish an unconstitutional political gerrymander under the Equal Protection Clause.63
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Burger And Justice Rehnquist
Justice O’Connor warned that the plurality's standard would prove unmanageable.64 It would likely evolve toward a loose form of proportional representation.65 This would invite routine judicial superintendence of apportionment.66
It would undermine the two-party system.67 Her view is that courts should not be drawn into the political thicket unless plaintiffs show systematic and durable degradation of voting strength.68 She argued that the standard would lead to pervasive judicial oversight of legislative apportionment.
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Powell rejected the plurality's insistence on a history of disproportionate results across multiple elections.69 He argued that the combination of clearly discriminatory intent, grotesque district shapes, and the 1982 election disparities was already sufficient to prove unconstitutional vote dilution.70 The District Court's findings on the legislative process and district configurations supported this conclusion.71
He would have affirmed without requiring additional elections.72 He maintained that the evidence of deliberate boundary distortion for partisan ends established the violation.