363 S.E.2d 449 (1987)
Gary Lynn Cross and Trinichia Lee Cross were married in 1969 and had four children.1 During the marriage Gary Cross was employed by the Jackson County Board of Education as a teacher and was later promoted to principal.2 Trinichia Cross never worked outside the home although she holds a college liberal arts degree and served as a homemaker throughout the marriage.3
On 7 June 1984 Gary Cross filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court of Jackson County seeking liberal visitation with the children and equitable distribution of the marital property.4 Trinichia Cross filed a counterclaim requesting custody of the children, alimony, and an equitable division of marital property and alleged a history of poor health to support her request for permanent alimony.5 The marital property consisted of the marital house in Ravenswood, one car, and Gary Cross's employment-related retirement account.6
Evidence on behalf of the parties was taken before a special commissioner.7 The divorce decree in this proceeding was entered in November 1985.8
The final order awarded custody of the children to Trinichia Cross with Gary Cross ordered to pay $125 per month per child in child support.9 Gary Cross was permitted to claim the children as exemptions for income tax purposes.10 Trinichia Cross received exclusive use and possession of the former marital home until the youngest child reaches age 18.11 She was also awarded rehabilitative alimony of $125 per month for a period not to exceed five years.12
Whether the circuit court erred in awarding rehabilitative alimony of limited duration rather than permanent alimony to Trinichia Cross in light of her claimed health problems and homemaker status?13
Rehabilitative alimony is appropriate to encourage a dependent spouse to become self-supporting by providing alimony for a limited period when the spouse has marketable skills that deteriorated or can acquire new skills through training. Courts must consider the three inquiries from Molnar v. Molnar along with the sixteen factors in W. Va. Code § 48-2-16(b) [1984] without requiring express findings on each.14
No. The record does not support a conclusion that Trinichia Cross has poor health.15 She has nagging but not debilitating health problems and is able to carry out all her normal household tasks.16 She failed to offer medical evidence to the commissioner.17 The final order did not foreclose permanent alimony in the future.18
Trinichia Cross has not yet tried to find employment and been unsuccessful.19 Even if permanent alimony were granted, she would still need to work at least part time because the combined alimony and child support would not suffice for a single parent family of five.20 With a college degree Trinichia Cross has a good chance of obtaining employment.21 The order encouraging her to do so was proper.22
The award of rehabilitative alimony was within the sound discretion of the circuit court.23
Whether the 1986 West Virginia legislation that expressly includes pensions as marital property subject to equitable distribution applies retroactively to a divorce decree entered in November 1985?24
An amendment that simply clarifies the law as it existed under earlier Code provisions and LaRue v. LaRue applies to a prior divorce decree because W. Va. Code §§ 48-2-1 [1984] and 48-2-32 [1984] were already broad enough to encompass pension plans.25
Yes. The divorce decree was entered in November 1985.26 The new legislation did not become effective until 1986.27 Yet the 1986 Amendment simply clarified the law as it existed under earlier Code provisions and LaRue v. LaRue so that the broad general provisions of the 1984 Code sections encompass pension plans.28
The 1986 legislation applies to the November 1985 divorce decree.29
Whether the circuit court erred by failing to consider Gary Cross's teachers' retirement account when equitably distributing the marital assets?30
Under the doctrine of equitable distribution from LaRue v. LaRue, property acquired as the result of joint efforts during marriage is marital property subject to equitable distribution.31 A pension or retirement account earned during the marriage is includable in total marital assets even if not subject to direct division.32
Yes. Virtually all but five months of Gary Cross's accumulated pension entitlement was earned during the parties' marriage that began in 1969.33 The right to receive benefits vested after five years of employment.34 The pension is marital property that must be considered in equitable distribution even if the court cannot withdraw the money due to plan terms.35
The circuit court erred in not considering the retirement account, and the case is remanded for a hearing to devise an appropriate distribution plan.36
Whether a circuit court may order the custodial parent to execute the written waiver required by IRC § 152(e) so that the non-custodial parent may claim the child dependency tax exemption?37
The 1984 amendment to IRC § 152(e) does not preclude state courts from requiring the custodial parent to execute the waiver.38 The statute seeks only to relieve the Internal Revenue Service of the burden of resolving factual disputes over which parent provides more support.39 It contains no express or implied prohibition on court-ordered waivers.40 It meets both the physical impossibility and obstacle tests for no conflict with federal law under Florida Lime & Avocado Growers and Hines v. Davidowitz.41
Yes. The new IRC § 152(e) places the exemption with the custodial parent unless a waiver is executed.42 Nothing in the amendment precludes a state court's equitable power to order the waiver as part of setting child support.43 A court-ordered waiver satisfies the statute's goal of relieving the IRS from involvement in support disputes while allowing the court to adjust cash support to offset the exemption's value.44
A circuit court has the power to allocate the dependency tax exemption by ordering the custodial parent to execute the required waiver.45