312 U.S. 569 (1941)
Five Jehovah's Witnesses were among sixty-eight defendants convicted in the municipal court of Manchester, New Hampshire, for violating a state statute prohibiting a parade or procession upon a public street without a special license.1 On the evening of Saturday, July 8, 1939, the defendants and twenty other persons met at a hall in the City of Manchester for the purpose of engaging in an information march.2 The company was divided into four or five groups, each with about fifteen to twenty persons, and each group proceeded to a different part of the business district.3
Each of the defendants carried a small staff with a sign reading “Religion is a Snare and a Racket” and on the reverse “Serve God and Christ the King.”4 Some of the marchers carried placards bearing the statement “Fascism or Freedom. Hear Judge Rutherford and Face the Facts.”5 The marchers also handed out printed leaflets announcing a meeting to be held at a later time.6 The defendants did not apply for a permit and none was issued.7 Manchester had a population of over 75,000 in 1930, and there was testimony that on Saturday nights in an hour’s time 26,000 persons passed one of the intersections where the defendants marched.8
The marchers interfered with the normal sidewalk travel, but no technical breach of the peace occurred.9 The march was a prearranged affair.10 Upon conviction in municipal court, the five appellants received a trial de novo before a jury in the Superior Court, while the other defendants agreed to abide by the final decision.11 The appellants were found guilty, and the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire.12
By motions and exceptions, the appellants raised questions regarding the validity of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment.13 The appellants were charged solely with taking part in a parade or procession on public streets without a permit as the statute required.14 The state court observed that the defendants had engaged in a march in formation on the city streets.15
Whether the New Hampshire statute prohibiting parades or processions on public streets without a license deprives the appellants of their rights of freedom of worship, freedom of speech and press, and freedom of assembly under the Fourteenth Amendment?16
A municipality possesses authority to regulate the use of its public streets for parades and processions through a licensing system that considers time, place, and manner to promote public convenience and order, provided the regulation leaves untouched the rights to distribute literature, display signs, or convey information apart from organized formations and is applied in a uniform, non-discriminatory fashion.17
No. The statute as construed regulates only organized parades and processions on public streets.18 In the ESTABLISHED FACTS the five appellants joined sixty-three others in dividing into groups of fifteen to twenty persons who marched in single-file formation along sidewalks in Manchester's business district on the evening of July 8, 1939, each carrying signs reading "Religion is a Snare and a Racket" while handing out leaflets, and the march interfered with normal sidewalk travel where 26,000 persons passed an intersection in an hour on Saturday nights.19 The licensing requirement supplied advance notice for policing and prevented overlapping events without prohibiting the underlying religious expression or the distribution of information.20 The state court limited official discretion to considerations of public convenience after required investigation, ensuring that the appellants retained the right to a license upon a finding that the streets would not be unduly disturbed.21
The New Hampshire statute does not deprive the appellants of their rights of freedom of worship, freedom of speech and press, and freedom of assembly under the Fourteenth Amendment.22
Whether the statute vests unreasonable and unlimited arbitrary and discriminatory powers in the licensing authority?23
The licensing authority must exercise its discretion with uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from improper considerations and unfair discrimination, so that a systematic and just order of treatment with reference to the convenience of public use of the highways remains the statutory mandate.24
No. The state court interpreted the statute to require the licensing board to investigate each application and grant a permit when the public convenience would not be unduly disturbed, adjusting only time, place, and manner as needed.25 In the ESTABLISHED FACTS the appellants understood that a permit was required for their prearranged march yet chose not to apply, and the march proceeded in ordered formation without any technical breach of the peace.26 This construction prevents arbitrary refusal by tying every decision to concrete facts about street use rather than to the content of the marchers' message or their religious identity.27 The absence of any evidence that the statute has been administered in a discriminatory manner confirms that the authority operates within constitutional bounds.28
The statute does not vest unreasonable and unlimited arbitrary and discriminatory powers in the licensing authority.29
Whether the statute is vague and indefinite?30
A statute is not vague or indefinite when state-court construction supplies definite standards that limit licensing decisions to considerations of time, place, and manner in relation to public convenience on the highways and that leave individuals free to engage in expressive activity outside organized parades or processions.31
No. The state court supplied a clear standard by holding that the licensing board must decide applications according to the convenience of public use after investigation and may impose only conditions that avoid disturbance.32 In the ESTABLISHED FACTS the appellants were charged solely with participating in a parade or procession without a permit, and the court found they had marched in formation as a collective body on city streets.33 This construction distinguishes the regulated conduct from the distribution of leaflets or the carrying of signs by unorganized individuals, thereby providing fair notice of what the statute prohibits.34 The resulting framework is sufficiently precise to guide both applicants and officials.35
The statute is not vague and indefinite.36