143 S. Ct. 2106 (2023)
From 2014 to 2016, petitioner Billy Counterman sent hundreds of Facebook messages to C. W., a local singer and musician, even though the two had never met and C. W. never responded to any of the messages.1 In fact, she repeatedly blocked Counterman on the platform, but each time he created a new account and resumed contacting her.2
Some of Counterman’s messages were utterly prosaic, such as “Good morning sweetheart” or offers to run errands, except that they came from a total stranger.3 Others suggested that Counterman might be surveilling C. W., as when he asked whether that was her in the white Jeep, referenced a fine display with her partner, and noted a couple of physical sightings.4
And most critically, a number expressed anger at C. W. and envisaged harm befalling her.5 The messages included “Fuck off permanently.”6 “Staying in cyber life is going to kill you.” “You’re not being good for human relations. Die.”
The messages put C. W. in fear and upended her daily existence.7 She believed that Counterman was threatening her life, was very fearful that he was following her, and was afraid she would get hurt.8 As a result, she had a lot of trouble sleeping and suffered from severe anxiety.9 She stopped walking alone, declined social engagements, and canceled some of her performances, though doing so caused her financial strain.10 Eventually, C. W. decided that she had to contact the authorities.11
Colorado charged Counterman under a statute making it unlawful to repeatedly make any form of communication with another person in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress.12 The statute also requires that the communication does cause that person to suffer serious emotional distress.13 The only evidence the State proposed to introduce at trial were Counterman’s Facebook messages.14 Counterman moved to dismiss the charge on First Amendment grounds, arguing that his messages were not true threats and therefore could not form the basis of a criminal prosecution.15
In line with Colorado law, the trial court assessed the true-threat issue using an objective reasonable-person standard.16 The court decided, after considering the totality of the circumstances, that Counterman’s statements rose to the level of a true threat.17 The court accordingly sent the case to the jury, which found Counterman guilty as charged.18 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, declining to require proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.19 The Colorado Supreme Court denied review.20 Courts are divided about whether the First Amendment requires proof of a defendant’s subjective mindset in true-threats cases and, if so, what mens rea standard is sufficient, so the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.21
Whether the First Amendment requires the State to prove in true-threats cases that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the statements’ threatening nature?22
Yes. Counterman was prosecuted and convicted under Colorado’s stalking statute solely on the basis of an objective reasonable-person standard.25 The trial court assessed whether a reasonable person would have viewed the Facebook messages as threatening without any inquiry into Counterman’s subjective understanding of their threatening nature.26 The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction while declining to require proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.27
The conviction therefore violates the First Amendment and must be vacated.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Sotomayor concurs in the judgment that some subjective mens rea is required but would not have reached the question whether recklessness suffices for true-threats prosecutions generally.29 She emphasizes that this case involved stalking through repeated unwanted contact rather than a single utterance of pure speech, so recklessness is amply sufficient here without deciding the standard for isolated threats.30 She notes that the First Amendment stakes are high because the internet amplifies the risk of overcriminalizing heated or political speech that may be misinterpreted.31
She would limit true threats to intentionally threatening speech to avoid chilling protected expression.32 A careful examination of precedent and history shows no long-settled tradition of punishing inadvertently threatening speech.33
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Barrett concurs in the judgment that the State must prove some subjective understanding but disagrees that recklessness is enough.34 She would require proof that the defendant knew his statements would be interpreted as threats, arguing that a reckless speaker has not crossed into unprotected speech.35 She views the majority’s approach as granting true threats preferential treatment compared to other unprotected categories like fighting words and obscenity, which use objective standards.36
An objective test already guards against the risk of silencing protected speech through narrow definition and contextual inquiry.37 The nature of a true threat points to an objective test for determining the scope of First Amendment protection because neither its social value nor its potential for injury depends on the speaker’s subjective intent.38
Justice Thomas dissents in full.39 He argues that the First Amendment does not require any subjective mental state for true threats and that an objective standard is sufficient because such speech inflicts great harm with little social value.40 He contends that the majority’s reliance on Elonis is misplaced because that case involved a federal statute using the term threat, whereas the Colorado statute targets speech causing serious emotional distress.41
He warns that the new rule will make it harder for states to protect victims from true threats.42
Whether a mental state of recklessness suffices to satisfy any such subjective understanding requirement under the First Amendment?43
Yes. Although Counterman was convicted without any proof of subjective understanding, the appropriate constitutional floor is recklessness rather than purpose or knowledge.46 Requiring a higher mens rea would make prosecutions too difficult while still providing breathing space for protected speech.47 Recklessness aligns with the balance struck in defamation cases where the Court has long accepted that standard to accommodate competing interests in free expression and protection from harm.48
Recklessness is the correct mens rea standard under the First Amendment for true-threats prosecutions.49
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Sotomayor agrees that recklessness is sufficient for this stalking prosecution involving repeated contact but maintains that the Court should not have decided whether recklessness works for true threats in general.50 She argues that precedent, history, and First Amendment principles support limiting true threats to intentionally threatening speech, as recklessness would still risk chilling political and artistic expression that may be misinterpreted in online contexts.51 The high stakes around the definition of true threats require caution when delineating the boundaries of unprotected speech.52
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Barrett concurs in the judgment but rejects recklessness as the constitutional floor.53 She would require knowledge that the statements would be interpreted as threats, asserting that only speakers who are actually aware their words will be seen as threats have forfeited First Amendment protection.54 She criticizes the majority for creating an unjustified buffer zone that treats true threats more favorably than other historically unprotected speech categories.55
An objective test already guards against the risk of silencing protected speech through narrow definition and contextual inquiry.
Justice Thomas dissents from the adoption of any subjective standard, including recklessness.56 He maintains that the First Amendment permits punishment of objectively threatening speech that causes serious emotional distress without proof of the speaker’s mental state.57 He argues that the majority’s rule departs from longstanding precedent and will hinder states’ ability to protect citizens from the harms of true threats.58
The Court’s decision imposes a subjective mental-state requirement not found in the text of the First Amendment or in precedents.59