594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979)
Corenswet, Inc., an independent wholesale distributor headquartered in New Orleans, entered into a distributorship agreement with Amana Refrigeration, Inc., a Delaware corporation domiciled in Iowa, in 1969.1 Under the agreement Corenswet became the exclusive distributor of Amana refrigerators, freezers, room air conditioners, and other merchandise in southern Louisiana.2 The initial agreement was of indefinite duration but terminable by either party at any time with or without cause on ten days' notice.3 The agreement was modified in 1971 and again in July 1975, with the 1975 version allowing termination by either party at any time for any reason on ten days' notice.4
Over the following years Corenswet invested more than $1.5 million in developing the market for Amana products.5 Annual sales in the distributorship area grew from $200,000 in 1969 to over $2.5 million in 1976, and the number of retail outlets increased from six to seventy-two.6 Amana products accounted for nearly twenty-six percent of Corenswet's total sales by 1976.7 Amana representatives repeatedly praised Corenswet's performance during this period.8
In early 1976 Corenswet exceeded its credit limit with Amana.9 At the 1976 mid-year meeting of distributors Amana's president George Foerstner informed Corenswet that the distributorship would be terminated because Corenswet was underfinanced.10 Despite assurances that satisfactory arrangements would be made, Amana changed its requirements for security multiple times during negotiations.11 In September 1976, after Corenswet offered a $500,000 bank letter of credit, Amana sent a termination letter citing Corenswet's inability to provide minimum guarantees and security.12
Corenswet filed suit in state court in October 1976 alleging that Amana had breached the distributorship agreement by terminating it arbitrarily.13 The state court issued a temporary restraining order barring termination.14 After removal to federal district court the district court conducted a three-day hearing on Corenswet’s prayer for a preliminary injunction.15 The court issued the preliminary injunction prohibiting Amana from terminating or attempting to terminate the relationship in November 1976.16 In late 1977 Amana proposed a new one-year distributorship agreement which Corenswet refused to sign.17 The district court modified the injunction to require Corenswet to execute the new agreement while restricting Amana's ability to refuse renewal without reason.18 Amana appealed both the original and modified injunctions.19
Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Amana terminated the distributorship arbitrarily?20
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), a district court's finding of fact is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.21
No. The primary facts are not disputed.22 The record reflects that in early 1976, well before the mid-year distributor meeting, Amana began negotiating with another New Orleans concern, George H. Lehleitner & Co., about transferring its area distributorship to Lehleitner.23 There was ample evidence in the record, moreover, to support the district court’s conclusion that the real factor motivating Foerstner’s decision was animosity towards Fred Schoenfeld, the president of Corenswet’s parent corporation, Select Brands, Inc.24 That animosity dated back to 1972, when Schoenfeld’s action in protesting to Raytheon Corporation, Amana’s parent, aborted Amana’s attempt to transfer the distributorship from Corenswet to Corenswet’s then Amana sales manager.25
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Amana terminated the distributorship arbitrarily.26
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Amana terminated the distributorship arbitrarily.
Whether the termination clause permitting termination at any time for any reason allowed Amana to end the relationship arbitrarily?27
Yes. The contractual language "for any reason" was intended to remove all limitations upon the exercise of the termination power.30 The exact parallelism of the phrases "at any time" and "for any reason" reinforces the interpretation of the "any reason" language as negating any limitations whatsoever.31 There is no evidence in the record that the parties understood the phrase otherwise.32
Even if it is assumed that Amana needed "some reason" to terminate the contract, that reason is supplied by its evident desire to give the New Orleans distributorship to the Lehleitner company.33 The express contract term cannot be construed as Corenswet would constitute it, and it therefore controls over any allegedly conflicting usage or course of dealing.34 The termination clause permitting termination at any time for any reason allowed Amana to end the relationship arbitrarily.35
The termination clause permitting termination at any time for any reason allowed Amana to end the relationship arbitrarily.
Whether the Uniform Commercial Code good faith obligation under Iowa law prohibited arbitrary termination of the distributorship agreement?36
No. When a contract contains a provision expressly sanctioning termination without cause there is no room for implying a term that bars such a termination.40 The Iowa case law on this question is pre-Code and follows the common law rule, which is essentially the rule of section 2-309 as applied to distributorship contracts.41 In Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distributors, Inc. v. Drewrys Limited, U. S.
A., Inc., the Iowa Supreme Court held that an exclusive distributorship contract of indefinite duration may be terminated without cause only upon reasonable notice.42 The better approach is to test the disputed contract clause for unconscionability under section 2-302 of the Code rather than to focus on the terminating party’s state of mind under the good faith provision.43 Under the better view, the Code does not ipso facto bar unilateral arbitrary terminations of distributorship agreements, and Iowa’s adoption of the Code therefore left undisturbed the law reflected in the Drewrys decision.44 The Uniform Commercial Code good faith obligation under Iowa law did not prohibit arbitrary termination of the distributorship agreement.45
The Uniform Commercial Code good faith obligation under Iowa law did not prohibit arbitrary termination of the distributorship agreement.
Whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction and later modifying it to address the new one-year agreement?46
Difficulty of enforcement is often a sufficient reason for denying injunctive relief that would require continuous court supervision of an antagonistic business relationship.47
Yes. The evidence brought out at the hearing in the district court did not demonstrate that Corenswet was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim.48 The contract expressly permitted Amana to terminate Corenswet’s distributorship without cause.49 Iowa law does not prohibit or bar the enforcement of contract clauses permitting termination without cause, except in cases of unconscionability.50
Although Corenswet alleged in its complaint that the contract term was unconscionable, it never pressed that issue, and the district court made no finding in that regard, as indeed it could not on the state of the record.51 Corenswet’s rights with respect to termination extend only to a right to notice.52 The Amana contract permits termination on ten days’ notice.53 Under the Code, section 2-309(3), and under the Drewrys case, however, a distributor is entitled to reasonable notice, but any claim that Corenswet might have based on inadequate notice would not entitle Corenswet to injunctive relief.54
The district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction and later modifying it to address the new one-year agreement.55
The district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction and later modifying it to address the new one-year agreement.