437 U.S. 463 (1978)
Coopers & Lybrand is an accounting firm that certified the financial statements in a prospectus issued in connection with a 1972 public offering of securities in Punta Gorda Isles for an aggregate price of over $18 million.1 Respondents purchased securities in reliance on that prospectus.2 In its next annual report to shareholders, Punta Gorda restated the earnings that had been reported in the prospectus for 1970 and 1971 by writing down its net income for each year by over $1 million.3 Thereafter, respondents sold their Punta Gorda securities and sustained a loss of $2,650 on their investment.4
Respondents filed this action on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated purchasers.5 They alleged that petitioner and other defendants had violated sections 11, 12(2), and 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.6 The District Court first certified, and then, after further proceedings, decertified the class.7
Respondents did not request the District Court to certify its order for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).8 Rather, they filed a notice of appeal pursuant to § 1291.9 The Court of Appeals regarded its appellate jurisdiction as depending on whether the decertification order had sounded the “death knell” of the action.10 After examining the amount of respondents’ claims in relation to their financial resources and the probable cost of the litigation, the court concluded that they would not pursue their claims individually.11 The Court of Appeals therefore held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and, on the merits, reversed the order decertifying the class.12
Because there is a conflict in the Circuits over this issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether a district court’s determination that an action may not be maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 is a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291?14
Federal appellate jurisdiction generally depends on the existence of a decision by the District Court that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.15 An order refusing to certify or decertifying a class does not of its own force terminate the entire litigation because the plaintiff is free to proceed on his individual claim.16 Such an order is appealable only if it comes within an appropriate exception to the final-judgment rule.17
No. The decertification order in this securities action did not end the litigation on the merits.18 Respondents remained free to proceed on their individual claims after the District Court decertified the class that it had initially certified.19 Coopers & Lybrand had certified financial statements in a prospectus for the 1972 public offering of securities in Punta Gorda Isles for over $18 million, and respondents purchased in reliance but sustained a $2,650 loss after the earnings restatement.20 Respondents appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 without seeking certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).21
The district court’s determination that an action may not be maintained as a class action is not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and therefore is not appealable as a matter of right.22
Whether an order passing on a request for class certification falls within the collateral order exception to the final-judgment rule?23
To come within the small class of decisions excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.24 An order passing on a request for class certification does not fall in that category because it is subject to revision in the District Court, involves considerations enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the cause of action, and is subject to effective review after final judgment.25
No. The class determination in respondents' securities action was subject to revision under Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1) before decision on the merits.26 It involved considerations enmeshed in the factual and legal issues of the claims under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.27 Therefore, the decertification order did not fall within the collateral order exception.28 An order denying class certification remains subject to effective review after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs or intervening class members.29
An order passing on a request for class certification does not fall within the collateral order exception to the final-judgment rule.30
Whether orders relating to class certification are independently appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 prior to judgment under the death knell doctrine?31
The death knell doctrine assumes that without the incentive of a possible group recovery the individual plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his lawsuit to a final judgment and then seek appellate review of an adverse class determination.32 Orders relating to class certification are not independently appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 prior to judgment.33 The doctrine would apply equally to many interlocutory orders in ordinary litigation and would undermine the final-judgment rule and the policies served by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).34
No. Although the Court of Appeals examined the amount of respondents’ claims in relation to their financial resources and the probable cost of the litigation and concluded that they would not pursue their claims individually, the death knell doctrine does not support appellate jurisdiction.35 Allowing appeals of right from such orders would run directly contrary to the policy of the final judgment rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.36 The doctrine requires case-by-case jurisdictional inquiries that burden judicial administration without sufficient justification.37
Orders relating to class certification are not independently appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 prior to judgment under the death knell doctrine.38