390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004)
We remain unconvinced and, accordingly, hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the requirements of Rule 23(b) were not satisfied either.
Under Rule 23(b)(2), class certification is appropriate when the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met and the defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Back pay is considered equitable relief and can therefore be awarded in a case certified under Rule 23(b)(2). Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974).
Here, however, the plaintiffs also sought compensatory and punitive damages, legal relief that can only be awarded in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action when the damages sought are “incidental” to the claims for equitable and declaratory relief. Murray, 244 F.3d at 812. Damage claims in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action must be incidental to the equitable and declaratory relief because the basic premise of such a class action -- that class members suffer a common injury properly addressed by class-wide equitable relief -- “begins to break down when the class seeks to recover . . . monetary relief to be allocated based on individual injuries.” Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We explained in Murray those criteria used to evaluate whether money damages should be considered “incidental” to equitable claims in a 23(b)(2) case. In Murray, we adopted the position of the Fifth Circuit in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.:
By incidental, we mean damages that flow directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief. . . . Liability for incidental damages should not . . . entail complex individualized determinations. Thus, incidental damages will, by definition, be more in the nature of a group remedy, consistent with the forms of relief intended for (b)(2) class actions.
Murray, 244 F.3d at 812 (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 415).1 In keeping with the requirement that monetary damages be incidental to equitable relief in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, the advisory committee’s note to Rule 23 explains that certification under section (b)(2) is not proper in “cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, advisory committee’s note (emphasis added).
The plaintiffs argue, nevertheless, that the district court could have certified a class under Rule 23(b)(2) only as to the injunctive and declaratory prayer for relief, thereby excluding altogether the damages issues from class certification. However, to the extent the named plaintiffs were willing to forego class certification on damages in order to pursue injunctive relief that consisted of an admonition to follow general principles of settled law,2 it is far from clear that the named plaintiffs would adequately represent the interests of the other putative class members. Indeed, to many of the class members (and especially to those who no longer work for the defendants), the monetary damages requested might be of far greater significance than injunctive relief, stated at a high order of abstraction, that simply directs the defendants not to discriminate. Moreover, determining the level of damages to which each class member was entitled plainly would require detailed, case-by-case fact finding, carefully calibrated for each individual employee. The “complex, individualized determinations” necessary to fix the appropriate level of individual damage awards in this case are exactly the type that Murray and Allison make clear should not be considered “incidental” to the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.3
Finally, as the district court noted, since the plaintiffs demanded a jury trial in this case, the parties were entitled under the Seventh Amendment to have all matters at law determined by a single jury before having decisions concerning equitable relief made by the trial court. See Cooper, 205 F.R.D. at 629 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538-39, 90 S. Ct. 733, 738, 24 L. Ed. 2d 729 (1970)). Under the circumstances of this case, even assuming that the district court could conduct an initial bench trial on the merits of the equitable claims, and that the court actually found in favor of the plaintiffs, it would still be necessary for a single jury to hear and rule on more than 2,000 individual claims for compensatory damages. Again, on this record we can discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to proceed under the class action umbrella.
The plaintiffs also say that even if certification under Rule 23(b)(2) was not appropriate, the district court still should have certified the class for equitable relief, back pay, and damages under Rule 23(b)(3). But, for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) to be appropriate, common questions still must “predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and the class action mechanism must be “superior . . . for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
We have explained that in addition to the requirements embodied in Rule 23(a), Rule 23(b)(3) “imposes two additional requirements, and increased efficiency is only one of them. Predominance is the other . . . .” Jackson, 130 F.3d at 1006. Therefore, “the issues in the class action that are subject to generalized proof and thus applicable to the class as a whole, must predominate over those issues that are subject only to individualized proof.” Kerr v. City of W. Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Common issues will not predominate over individual questions if, “as a practical matter, the resolution of . . . [an] overarching common issue breaks down into an unmanageable variety of individual legal and factual issues.” Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 1996). Our case law plainly establishes that a class action should not proceed under Rule 23(b)(3) when it appears that “most, if not all, of the plaintiffs’ claims will stand or fall, not on the question whether [the defendant] has a practice or policy of [race] discrimination, but on the resolution of . . . highly case-specific factual issues.” Rutstein, 211 F.3d at 1235 (quoting Jackson, 130 F.3d at 1006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3) is “far more demanding” than Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. Jackson, 130 F.3d at 1005 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the plaintiffs attempted to use statistical proof to establish the existence of a generalized policy of discrimination that provided the common thread linking together plaintiffs’ otherwise disparate and individualized claims. However, we agree with the district court that substantial limitations in the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence rendered the form of proof wholly insufficient to show that any pattern or practice of discrimination disparately affected the plaintiffs’ class, or, for that matter, that the defendants had a general policy of discrimination. See Cooper, 205 F.R.D. at 630. Moreover, the individual determinations on liability and damages necessary for the individual plaintiffs to succeed would require highly fact-specific inquiries concerning each plaintiff. Thus, we can discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the issues subject to individualized proof predominated over those that could be established with class-wide proof, and therefore that the Rule 23(b)(3) class action procedure would not be superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
Finally, we turn to the district court’s orders granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the claims of each of the seven individual plaintiffs. We review the district court’s orders granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court did and viewing all of the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S. Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1968)). “[A]ll reasonable doubts about the facts should be resolved in favor of the non-movant.” Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Clemons v. Dougherty County, 684 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1982)).
As we have observed, the plaintiffs claimed racial discrimination under three distinct Title VII theories: pattern and practice discrimination, disparate treatment discrimination, and disparate impact discrimination. See Joe’s Stone Crab, 220 F.3d at 1273. The first two theories require the plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent; the third does not. Id. The plaintiffs also assert claims under Section 1981, which, unlike Title VII, only provides a cause of action for claims involving intentional discrimination. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 102 S. Ct. 3141, 3150, 73 L. Ed. 2d 835 (1982); Brown, 939 F.2d at 949.
The basic legal framework governing these theories is by now well-established. In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the employer intentionally discriminated against him because of his race. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff can establish discriminatory intent through either direct4 or indirect evidence; to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination using circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs may use the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).5
Again, in a “pattern and practice” disparate treatment case, “the plaintiff must prove, normally through a combination of statistics and anecdotes, that discrimination is the company’s ‘standard operating procedure.’” Joe’s Stone Crab, 220 F.3d at 1274 (citation omitted). “To meet this burden of proof, a plaintiff must ‘prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or accidental or sporadic discriminatory acts. It ha[s] to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . discrimination [is] . . . the regular rather than unusual practice.’” Id. at 1286-87 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. at 1843).
To state a claim under a disparate impact theory, in contrast, a plaintiff need not establish that he suffered intentional discrimination. Rather, “disparate impact theory prohibits neutral employment practices which, while non-discriminatory on their face, visit an adverse, disproportionate impact on a statutorily-protected group.” Id. at 1274. We have noted that the disparate impact theory is “a doctrinal surrogate for eliminating unprovable acts of intentional discrimination hidden innocuously behind facially-neutral policies or practices.” Id.
Thus, to state a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must establish that (1) there is a significant statistical disparity among members of different racial groups; (2) there is a specific, facially-neutral employment policy or practice; and (3) there is a causal nexus between the specific policy or practice and the statistical disparity. Id. Moreover, in order to satisfy the third, critical requirement, a plaintiff “must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group.” Id. at 1274-75 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In general terms, disparate impact cases are more amenable than other types of discrimination claims to class treatment, since they arise out of specific policies or practices that have a disproportionate impact on an entire class of employees. In contrast, when disparate treatment is the basis of a class action, it is generally more likely that individual issues will predominate and make proceeding in a class action format inappropriate. See, e.g., Reyes v. Walt Disney World Co., 176 F.R.D. 654, 658 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (explaining that disparate treatment claims are inherently “highly individualized” and where employees worked in different divisions with different structures and decision makers, each plaintiff was subject to his “own set of unique circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action about which they now attempt to collectively complain”).
In a discrimination action brought under either Title VII or Section 1981, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which the defendant can rebut by offering a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the allegedly discriminatory act. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000). “In other words, the defendant must produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1481, 75 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is important to bear in mind . . . that the defendant's burden of rebuttal is exceedingly light . . . . At this stage of the inquiry, the defendant need not persuade the court that its proffered reasons are legitimate; the defendant's burden is merely one of production, not proof.” Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).6
If the defendant successfully rebuts the plaintiff’s prima facie case, “the presumption of discrimination is eliminated.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must then “come forward with evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.” Id. (quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143, 120 S. Ct. at 2106; Perryman, 698 F.2d at 1142. To show that the employer’s reasons were pretextual, the plaintiff must demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538. “If the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each of the defendant employer’s articulated reasons is pretextual, the employer is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25; see also Combs, 106 F.3d at 1529 (explaining that the plaintiff must present “sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action”).
The plaintiffs argue that they have presented sufficient statistical evidence in support of their pattern and practice and disparate impact claims to raise genuine issues of material fact, and thus to defeat summary judgment. In contrast to the individual claims of disparate treatment, which we address infra, the pattern and practice and disparate impact claims depend on the same body of statistical evidence. Accordingly, these claims stand or fall in concert.
As we have observed at some length, the statistical evidence consists primarily of two expert reports authored by Dr. Janice Madden. However, Dr. Madden’s reports were not sufficiently tailored to compare similarly situated employees. They failed to effectively measure job-related skills, education, experience, and job performance, using only broad, imprecise measurements as proxies for work experience. Nor did the reports sufficiently narrow the classes of employees who were compared, instead using company-wide data that did not reliably identify discrimination within designated segments of the workforce. And, as we have observed, the reports did not distinguish between competitive and non-competitive promotions, did not capture in-grade progressive promotions and did not measure outcomes for employees who actually applied for promotions as opposed to those who did not.
After reviewing this body of statistical evidence, we agree with the district court that basic analytical deficiencies in the reports render them insufficient to support a conclusion that intentional discrimination was the defendants’ standard operating procedure. Even if we accept all the calculations underlying Madden’s reports as correct, the reports’ conclusions are of very limited value because the data on which those calculations were based was not meaningfully tailored. That is, even crediting as true the conclusions, we do not believe that a jury reasonably could infer, based on the evidence, that the plaintiffs established a pattern and practice claim. Summary judgment was therefore properly entered for the defendants as to the plaintiffs’ discriminatory pattern and practice claims.
Moreover, the district court properly entered summary judgment for the defendants on the disparate impact claims. The plaintiffs say they identified a statistical disparity between white and black employees, along with a facially neutral employment practice -- the use of subjective hiring criteria by the defendants -- that has caused this disparity. First, however, a substantial question exists as to whether the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence is sufficiently tailored to establish statistical disparities within the specific segments of the defendants’ workforce in which the individual plaintiffs worked. See, e.g., Maddox, 764 F.2d at 1549-50. But even assuming that the plaintiffs had met this requirement, they have failed to demonstrate a causal nexus between any statistical disparities in the defendants’ workforce and the practice of using partially subjective hiring criteria by some managers in some of the defendants’ facilities. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 651-55, 109 S. Ct. at 2121-24. Accordingly, the district court did not err in entering summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims.
We turn, then, to the arguments mounted by each plaintiff concerning his or her disparate treatment claims.
Cooper asserts that the district court erred by entering final summary judgment in favor of the defendants on his individual disparate treatment claims.7 Specifically, Cooper argues that the district court erred in entering summary judgment against him as to the denial of two promotions in 1998, one to a Lighting Coordinator position and the other to a Trainer position.8 Cooper also argues that the district court erred in excluding an expert report which, he claims, would have established that it was highly unlikely that the selection process used to deny him his position was “race blind.”
Cooper first says that he established pretext as to the denial of a Lighting Coordinator job within GPC’s Lighting Services Business Unit (“LSBU”). Lighting Coordinators at GPC are involved in selling outdoor lighting systems and overseeing the installation and maintenance of these systems by outside contractors. Cooper was one of more than fifty applicants for two Lighting Coordinator positions posted on the defendants’ JobNet system in 1998, but was denied an interview for the position. He established a prima facie case that the denial of the promotion was discriminatory, but the district court concluded he had failed to show that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for GPC’s denying him the promotion were pretextual.
We dispense first with Cooper’s suggestion that statistical evidence found in the declaration of expert John Del Roccili raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the interview selection process used by GPC was race blind. The district court excluded Del Roccili’s declaration after finding that the plaintiffs had not properly identified Del Roccili as an expert or provided a statement of his intended testimony, as required by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court also held that, to the extent the plaintiffs sought to use Del Roccili as a fact witness, his declaration was inadmissible because he lacked personal knowledge of the data about which he opined.
We review the district court’s decision to exclude Del Roccili’s declaration for abuse of discretion, see Benson v. Tocco, Inc., 113 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1997), and conclude that the district court clearly acted within its discretion here. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, all parties must disclose expert opinion reports when directed by the court, or at least 90 days before trial. These reports must contain “a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Under Rule 37(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party “that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1) . . . is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial . . . any witness or information not so disclosed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
In this case, plaintiffs originally represented that Del Roccili was a fact witness, but later identified him as an expert witness in response to defendants’ discovery requests. However, the plaintiffs never provided defendants with an expert report containing Del Roccili’s opinions or, for that matter, the bases for his opinions, as required under Rule 26. Because the expert witness discovery rules are designed to allow both sides in a case to prepare their cases adequately and to prevent surprise, see Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2000), compliance with the requirements of Rule 26 is not merely aspirational.
Plaintiffs have identified Del Roccili as “an expert in extracting and analyzing data from human resources databases,” R282 at 2, and in his declaration, Del Roccili extracted substantial data from the defendants’ databases, performed statistical probability calculations, and expressed opinions about the significance of these calculations. While we do not evaluate the reliability of DelRoccili’s opinions, the techniques utilized and opinions presented plainly require the kind of technical or specialized knowledge that is the hallmark of expert evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. We therefore conclude that Del Roccili’s declaration was properly construed as an expert report and, thus, because the plaintiffs failed to comply with the explicit requirements of Rule 26, it was within the sound discretion of the trial judge to sanction plaintiffs for their failure to disclose by enforcing the unambiguous terms of Rule 37(c). See Firefighters’ Inst. for Racial Equality ex rel. Anderson v. City of St. Louis, 220 F.3d 898, 902 (8th Cir. 2000).
Cooper claims, however, that he has demonstrated pretext even in the absence of Del Roccili’s declaration. We remain unpersuaded. It is undisputed that LSBU Sales Manager Mike Clay was responsible for choosing for interviews applicants who had applied for the Lighting Coordinator positions. After receiving more than 50 applications for the openings, Clay reviewed a computer-generated list of applicants, including a candidate profile listing each applicant’s work history. Clay reviewed the applicant profiles and selected candidates to interview based on the following specific job-related criteria: applicants needed at least two years of experience in power delivery; demonstrated communication, leadership and teamwork skills; experience in contract administration and contractor supervision; and experience as a foreman. Clay also considered applicants whom he knew personally, for whom he had received recommendations, and who had taken initiative by expressing specific interest in learning more about the Lighting Coordinator positions. Clay stated that he did not select Cooper for an interview because (1) Cooper lacked any experience as a foreman; (2) Cooper was not known personally to Clay; (3) Cooper had not been recommended; and (4) Cooper had not contacted Clay or other members of the LSBU regarding the positions.
Cooper contends that Clay’s stated reliance on recommendations was pretextual. Because the JobNet posting did not require applicants to submit a recommendation, Cooper says that Clay’s use of this non-posted requirement created an “informal, secretive and subjective . . . promotion decision process[ which] tend[ed] to facilitate the consideration of impermissible criteria.” Roberts v. Gadsden Mem’l Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 798 (11th Cir. 1988). We are unpersuaded that Clay’s use of applicant recommendations as one factor -- among other, clearly job-related factors -- in determining who would be interviewed was a pretext for a secretive, subjective, and discriminatory process. Moreover, GPC has offered evidence that one preferred qualification was that an applicant had previously served as foreman -- a legitimate, job-related requirement -- and Cooper had not served as a foreman. In short, Cooper has not shown that GPC’s proffered, legitimate reasons for denying him an interview were “unworthy of credence.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981).
Cooper also claims that he was discriminated against on account of race when he was denied a non-union job as a Trainer, and that he has raised a genuine question that the legitimate reasons provided for the denial of this job were also pretextual. Trainers work with line crew employees, instructing them on safety techniques and job-related skills through hands-on training. The defendants maintain that, in addition to requiring technical knowledge, the Trainer position requires significant communication skills, since Trainers must be able to teach their charges efficiently. The hiring manager in charge of filling the Trainer vacancies, Francis Howard, stated that he did not select Cooper because he believed Cooper did not possess superior communication skills, job knowledge, experience, teamwork skills, and peer credibility. Howard also said that he learned from other members of the Screening Committee that Cooper had experienced difficulty articulating training instructions to student employees when he served as a guest instructor at the Training Center. See R-204-2 at 10.
Cooper responds that he did have the necessary communication and other skills. However, the crucial question here is not whether Cooper fulfilled the requirements, but whether Howard honestly believed that Cooper did not meet the criteria. See Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991). Cooper does not dispute that some selection committee members told Howard that Cooper had trouble articulating instructions to trainees when he served as guest trainer. Nor has Cooper presented any evidence suggesting that Howard did not genuinely believe that Cooper did not posses the requisite job skills.
Moreover, Howard testified that he honestly believed Cooper did not have up-to-date job knowledge of overhead lines at the time trainers were hired. Howard drew this conclusion because Cooper only had experience in underground cable repair during the two years preceding his Trainer application. Cooper says that because GPC was filling both overhead and underground Trainer positions, this reason is also pretextual. Again, however, Cooper has presented no evidence suggesting that Howard did not honestly believe a trainer required up-to-date knowledge of all line crew work, including overhead and underground cable repair.
Finally, Cooper challenges Howard’s explanation that Cooper lacked peer credibility and teamwork skills. But here, again, Cooper’s argument that he indeed possessed these attributes is wide of the mark: Cooper has offered no evidence that Howard did not honestly believe this. Short of some evidence that Howard did not genuinely believe the legitimate reasons, on this bare record we will not second-guess Howard’s honest assessment of Cooper’s qualifications. See id. (“Federal courts do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions. . . . Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “We do not ask whether the employer selected the ‘most’ qualified candidate, but only whether it selected the candidate based on an unlawful motive.” Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1188 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). And even if Cooper could discredit one of the reasons Howard offered for not hiring him, it would still not establish pretext, because to do so, Cooper would have to establish that each of Howard’s reasons was pretextual. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024-25 (“If the plaintiff does not proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether each of the defendant employer’s articulated reasons is pretextual, the employer is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim.” (emphasis added)). This he has failed to do.
In short, because Cooper has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to each of the legitimate reasons proffered for why he was not offered the Lighting Coordinator or Trainer position in 1998, the district court did not err in awarding GPC final summary judgment.
The plaintiff Edwards complained that he suffered discrimination when his managers at GPC denied him numerous promotions. On appeal, he alleges the district court erred in its review of the denial of four specific promotions for which he applied.9 Edwards maintains that it was on account of race that GPC declined to offer him a promotion to a Cable Locator position in April 2000; to an Operator I job in March 2000; to an Operating Service Representative position in June 1999; and to a Power Delivery Supervisor position, also in 1999.10 The district court concluded that Edwards failed to show that the legitimate, non-discriminatory explanations offered for hiring other candidates were pretextual. We agree.
During his 13 years at GPC, Edwards worked in a range of different union positions, at a range of locations. Between 1987 and December 1990, Edwards served as Laborer in the Nuclear Operations area of a plant in Waynesboro, Georgia. After leaving that position, he served until July 1993 as a Line Crew Helper in Augusta, Georgia, before working as an Apprentice Lineman in Hinesville, Georgia until April 1996. Beginning at that time, Edwards worked as a Lineman based in Tucker, Georgia. While Edwards progressed through these various positions during his tenure at GPC, he complains that several promotions he sought in 1999 and 2000 were denied him on account of race.
We begin with GPC’s decision not to offer him a Cable Locator position in April 2000. After suffering various injuries that interfered with his working as a Lineman -- including a severe thumb injury and damage to his back -- and after taking various medical leaves and light-duty assignments, Edwards received an assignment as a temporary cable locator in November 1999. In that capacity, Edwards reported to James Weldon, GPC’s Cable Locating Manager, and was responsible for locating underground electrical cable while facilitating engineering, construction, and other projects. After working as a temporary Cable Locator for four or five months, Edwards applied for a full-time Cable Locator position in early April 2000.
Weldon was the hiring manager for the permanent Cable Locator position, and he chose seven individuals, including Edwards, for interviews. Along with a Human Resources Representative who worked as a facilitator, Weldon assembled an interviewing panel that included, in addition to Weldon, a white woman, a white man, and a black man. The interview panel spoke with each of the seven applicants individually, rating their responses to six structured, job-related questions on a scale of 0 to 3. After all of the interviews were completed, the four interviewers ranked the applicants based on their “gut feel,” and Edwards scored very highly. Subsequently, the scores assigned to each candidate, based on their answers to the six questions, were tallied. The top three candidates, based on these aggregate scores, were Jim Brown (69 points), Carey Rutledge (62.5 points), and the plaintiff Edwards (61 points). The committee then discussed the three “finalists.” One of the interviewers explained that she had reservations about Edwards’s job performance in his capacity as a temporary Cable Locator. She said she had frequently seen Edwards in the office socializing and speaking on the phone, while other employees were in the field. Moreover, she felt that Edwards had not performed well in his interview.
The committee recommended not offering the job to the most highly ranked applicant (Brown) because he had expressed doubt that he would accept the job even if it were offered to him. The members of the committee then agreed to recommend that the position be offered to Rutledge, whose aggregate interview score was slightly higher than that of Edwards. Rutledge had previous work experience related to the Cable Locator position, interviewed effectively, and was familiar with the equipment used in the position. Rutledge accepted the offer.
Edwards claims that the reasons GPC advances for offering the job to Rutledge must be pretextual because the hiring manager, Weldon, testified that Edwards was well qualified, because GPC only revealed the job-performance concerns of the committee member in its summary judgment motion, rather than at the earliest stages of discovery, and because Edwards was better qualified for the position than Rutledge.
The relevant issue here, however, is not whom we would determine to be better qualified for the job. See Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470. Again, we do not sit in judgment of the wisdom of an employer’s selection. Edwards “cannot . . . establish pretext simply by showing that [he] is more qualified than [Rutledge]. Rather, [Edwards] must adduce evidence that the disparity in qualifications is ‘so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in the face.’” Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Denney, 247 F.3d at 1187); see also Lee v. GTE Fla., Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2000). This principle “should be understood to mean that disparities in qualifications must be of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question.” Lee, 226 F.3d at 1254 (quoting Deines v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280-81 (5th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On this record, the evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether GPC’s stated reasons for promoting Rutledge instead of Edwards are pretextual. Edwards has not offered evidence showing that he was “so clearly more qualified for the position than [Rutledge] that a reasonable juror could infer discriminatory intent from the comparison.” Id. at 1255. Indisputably, Rutledge received a higher aggregate score than Edwards on his interview, Rutledge had relevant job experience and familiarity with the work required of a Cable Locator, and at least one committee member believed that Edwards had adopted an inappropriate demeanor during his interview and had questionable work habits. The evidence was not sufficient to show a disparity between Edwards’s qualifications and Rutledge’s so great that a jury could infer the committee did not honestly believe Rutledge was more qualified. See id.
Moreover, because the plaintiffs’ Complaint listed only the Cable Locator position, the district court observed that Edwards was limited to pursuing only that claim. Out of “an abundance of caution,” however, the district court addressed several other claims raised by Edwards. It need not have done so. Any claims not asserted in the plaintiff’s Complaint are properly dismissed. See Coon v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1568-71 (11th Cir. 1987).11 Yet even if Edwards had included the remaining three promotion denials in the Complaint, summary judgment still would have been properly granted in favor of GPC, because Edwards did not establish pretext as to any of those employment decisions.
First, Edwards says that he was more qualified than the two white candidates who were offered Operator I positions in March 2000, but he has failed to demonstrate a disparity between him and them so great that a factfinder could infer discrimination from the decision not to promote. Moreover, some of the evidence Edwards relied upon is taken from performance evaluations completed after the successful applicants had already begun working in the Operator I positions. Isolated negative comments in these evaluations cannot support an inference that those charged with filling the openings declined Edwards’s application because of race.
As for the Operating Service Representative promotion Edwards was denied in June 1999, Edwards claims that the district court erred by basing its decision on “inadmissible hearsay.” Appellants’ Brief at 69. The alleged hearsay was a statement by a member of the selection committee, David Keenum, that, to his knowledge, the hiring manager, Bob Davidson, chose the white candidate because he believed the white candidate was the best-qualified candidate for the position. Regardless of whether this statement is fairly characterized as hearsay, Edwards failed to present any evidence to challenge GPC’s evidence that the successful candidate was hired based on his interview performance and extensive experience related to the position. The successful candidate, Gary E. Miller, was a long-term employee of GPC who had extensive experience in metering and power delivery. He was recommended by the interview committee as one of the most qualified candidates for the Operator Service Representative position Edwards had sought. Moreover, Edwards has not undermined GPC’s evidence that his race was unknown during the selection process, rendering untenable the suggestion that he was denied the position because of his race.
Finally, Edwards has not established pretext concerning his failed application for the Power Delivery Supervisor position in February 1999. GPC maintains that Edwards was not selected for an interview because his application did not reflect familiarity with the repair shop operations or any mechanical background. In contrast, the successful candidate, Al R. Kuzava, was the consensus recommendation of the interview committee, having been deemed the most qualified for the position based on his extensive repair shop and mechanical experience, his substantial experience as a journeyman, and his demonstrated leadership skills, all job-related skills identified by the hiring manager, Mark Edward Cawthon, as prerequisites for the job. Our review of the record confirms that the successful candidate had extensive mechanical and repair shop experience, and that Edwards’s application lacked any indication that he had familiarity with repair shop operations. Accordingly, Edwards has failed to cast doubt on the legitimate reasons proffered by GPC for denying him the Power Delivery Supervisor position.
In short, we find no reversible error in the decision to grant summary judgment in favor of GPC.
Plaintiff Green contends that she was discriminated against as to both promotion and compensation, and she challenges the district court’s entry of summary judgment against her on both claims.12 We turn, first, to Green’s arguments concerning her promotion discrimination claim, stemming from the denial of a Manager of Education Services position in 1998.13
The district court determined that summary judgment was appropriate on Green’s promotion claim because, having accrued more than two years before this lawsuit was filed, the claim was time-barred. Green maintains, however, that the district court erred in calculating when her promotion claim accrued. The district court also found that the claim failed on the merits. Because we agree that Green’s promotion claim was time-barred, we need not reach the merits of her claim.
The district court applied a two-year statute of limitations to Green’s Section 1981 promotion claim, determining that, to be timely, Green’s claim had to accrue after July 28, 1998. See R-303 at 8 (citing Hill v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 841 F.2d 1533, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988)). Green did not contest the applicability of this two-year statute of limitations before the district court or in the briefs submitted to this Court, and therefore has waived any challenge to the district court’s use of a two-year limitations period. See supra note 19. The limitations period begins to run when the facts that will support a claim are apparent, or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for her rights. See Everett v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1407, 1410 (11th Cir. 1998). Therefore, if Green knew or should have known before July 28, 1998 that she had been denied the Manager of Education Services position because of race, her promotion claim was time-barred.
As the district court noted, Green’s deposition testimony reveals that she learned in early July 1998 that the educational manager position she had applied for had been given to Pamela Thomas, a white employee. When deposed, Green stated that the position had been filled “either toward the end of June or the first part of July [1998].” R137-R at 254. Green testified that she received a voice mail stating that Ms. Thomas had been hired “about two days” before a performance review that was held on July 15, 1998. Id. at 180-82. Green also testified that shortly after finding out Ms. Thomas had been hired, she expressed her concern about not being given the position to administrators at GPC, including the administrators conducting her performance review on July 15, 1998. Id. Moreover, Green stated that when she applied for the opening she knew she was the most qualified person for the job, indicating her belief that the successful candidate was, in fact, less qualified. In her deposition, Green also stated that she began to suspect she was a victim of racial discrimination as early as 1996. The two-year limitations period ended at the latest in mid-July 2000, some two weeks before this suit was commenced. Thus, the trial court properly determined that the promotion claim was time-barred.
Green also argues that the district court erred by entering a final order of summary judgment against her on the compensation claims. Green says she was discriminated against on account of race in that she was paid less than white co-workers who performed similar jobs. To state a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in compensation, a plaintiff must establish that (1) she belongs to a racial minority; (2) she received low wages; (3) similarly situated comparators outside the protected class received higher compensation; and (4) she was qualified to receive the higher wage. See Miranda v. B&B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1992) (compensation discrimination by gender); MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 774 (11th Cir. 1991) (compensation discrimination by age). The comparators must perform jobs similar to the plaintiff’s; thus, the plaintiff must show that, in her job, she “shared the same type of tasks” as the comparators. B&B Cash Grocery, 975 F.2d at 1529.
It is undisputed that Green began working for GPC as an intern in 1983, later becoming a full-time, regular employee and continuing at GPC for several years. In October 1996, while Green was working at GPC’s Shenandoah Center, an environmental education center, GPC underwent a corporate restructuring that closed the Shenandoah Center. Green was then transferred to GPC’s Community and Economic Development Department (“CEDD”), where she claims she began suffering discrimination in compensation.
After the 1996 corporate restructuring, Green accepted a position as an Education Advisor within the CEDD. She claims she was compensated on less favorable terms than white colleagues who served as Urban Advisors or Community Advisors, positions that Green claims are equivalent to Education Advisor. Indeed, Urban, Community, and Education Advisors are all classified within the defendants’ employment database as “ADO Advisors,” but GPC asserts that Urban and Community Advisors are not appropriate comparators because the jobs they perform are notably different from those of Education Advisors. GPC relies on this distinction because it is undisputed that white Community and Urban Advisors are compensated more generously than is Green.
GPC Vice President Rebecca Blalock and CEDD administrator Lamar Norton testified that, during GPC’s corporate restructuring, pay grade ranges were set by performing a market review to compare new positions to similar positions in the region. According to Blalock, this survey revealed that the market value of Education Advisors was less than that of Community and Urban Advisors within the CEDD, leading GPC to classify Education Advisors at pay grades E3 to E5, but Community and Urban Advisors at grades E5 to E7. GPC maintains that this distinction justifies the lesser salaries for Green and other Education Services employees, as compared to the Community and Urban Advisors.14
There is a substantial question whether Green has established a prima facie case of compensation discrimination, because it is not clear that the Community and Urban Advisors Green uses as comparators are similarly situated in all relevant respects. See MacPherson, 922 F.2d at 774 n.16 (“In a comparator analysis, the plaintiff is matched with a person or persons who have very similar job-related characteristics and who are in a similar situation to determine if the plaintiff has been treated differently than others who are similar to him.” (emphasis added)). Even assuming, however, that the different Advisors are proper comparators, see B&B Cash Grocery, 975 F.2d at 1529, Green has not established that the legitimate reason advanced by GPC for the pay disparity is really a pretext for race discrimination. Green has not demonstrated that GPC’s stated reliance on a market survey to classify Education Advisors’ salary levels was false or otherwise shown that race discrimination motivated the salary structure. Indeed, when GPC classified Education Advisors in the E3 to E5 pay grade range, all Education Advisors were so classified -- including Green and at least two white colleagues.15 The fact that Green’s two white colleagues were paid according to the same scale undermines Green’s pretext argument.
In short, as to her compensation claim, Green has failed to introduce sufficient evidence to raise a material question on the issue of pretext.
P. Harris argues that the district court erroneously entered summary judgment against her on her Section 1981 claim of discrimination in compensation.16 The district court concluded that, while P. Harris had established a prima facie case of compensation discrimination, she failed to raise an issue of fact concerning the legitimate reasons the defendants offered to explain the differences in her salary and those of her white colleagues. We agree.
P. Harris began working for GPC in June 1990, when she was offered a Secretary III position on a contract basis. She became a full-time, regular GPC employee on July 1, 1991, when she accepted a Senior Secretary position. Between 1993 and 1997, P. Harris worked for GPC as a Research Analyst in the Competitve Intelligence Department, before taking a job as an Economic Development Analyst in the Economic Research Department.
In the summer of 1997, P. Harris applied for a position as Market Research and Support Analyst in the Atlanta, Georgia offices of SCS. She contends that she was discriminated against when, on account of race, her manager at SCS set her salary at an artificially low level as compared with salaries of white colleagues performing similar work.17
When P. Harris interviewed for the Analyst position at SCS, she met with an interview committee and also had an individual meeting with the Marketing Research Department’s manager, Charles Plunkett. Because P. Harris lacked education or experience in marketing, the interview committee recommended against hiring her; Plunkett, however, overrode the committee’s recommendation and chose to offer P. Harris the Analyst position. Plunkett testified that, owing to P Harris’s lack of experience and marketing education, he would ordinarily have offered her an entry level position as a Market Research and Support Analyst II. However, based on P. Harris’ salary grade at GPC, hiring her as an Analyst II would have precluded giving her a raise, presumably one reason she had desired to transfer to SCS. As a result, Plunkett chose to select P. Harris as an Analyst I, placing her in a higher salary grade than her position at GPC. In doing so, Plunkett awarded P. Harris an 8% raise in this new position, which was his understanding of the maximum pay increase that an employee transferring from GPC could receive.18 P. Harris continued to receive substantial salary raises during her tenure at SCS.19
In spite of the raises she received, P. Harris maintains that she suffered discrimination in compensation in that her salary still was lower than those paid to white co-workers performing the same tasks. The district court concluded that three white employees were valid comparators: John Page, Darin Klein, and Rebekah Golden. All three employees were paid higher salaries than P. Harris, and we agree with the district court that P. Harris successfully established a prima facie case of compensation discrimination. However, SCS offered legitimate, non-discriminatory explanations for the pay disparities -- that P. Harris did not have either the professional experience or formal education of Page, Klein, and Golden, could not therefore perform her job as efficiently or independently, and was thus less valuable to the department. The district court concluded that P. Harris had failed to rebut these reasons and had not established that the proffered reasons were pretext.
On appeal, P. Harris contends that the district court erred because she had, in fact, established pretext as to Page and Golden.20 However, on this record we cannot find “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in [SCS’s] proferred legitimate reasons . . . that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). P. Harris’s own contention that she was equally qualified and experienced does not create an issue of fact.
P. Harris holds a master of business administration degree from the DeVry Institute and had worked for GPC for six years prior to taking the Analyst I position at SCS; she maintains that she gained relevant marketing experience at GPC. Golden possessed a bachelor’s degree and had six years of market research experience before joining SCS, in which she held marketing positions including Project Director of Marketing, Supervisor of Marketing Research, and Marketing Research Coordinator for Cox Communications. Page had limited work experience, having worked as a Market Research Management intern with BellSouth Communications for six months, but held a bachelor’s degree in business and marketing as well as a master’s degree in marketing research from the University of Georgia, one of only a few universities to offer an advanced degree in market research.
Both Golden and Page were external hires, unlike P. Harris, who was an internal transfer from GPC. Plunkett testified that he considered different criteria in hiring Golden and Page, who were hired in tight labor markets in which new employees could command more competitive compensation packages. According to Plunkett, when Golden was hired, her extensive marketing experience allowed her to perform more efficiently than P. Harris; Golden was able to work with minimal supervision and was given more responsibility than P. Harris.
Similarly, while Page lacked Golden’s extensive experience, Plunkett testified that Page’s training at the University of Georgia made him well-prepared to take on extensive market research tasks. Plunkett also stated that he believed a candidate with Page’s education could develop more rapidly than an employee like P. Harris, who lacked the training, and could also help SCS attract additional graduates from the University of Georgia’s graduate program in Market Research. According to Plunkett, Page’s valuable educational experience allowed him to work independently and take on significant responsibilities.
The plaintiff contends that her master’s degree from the DeVry Institute and six years of marketing experience at SCS, much of which was spent effectively in on-the-job training, were equivalent to the qualifications of Page and Golden. However, Plunkett offered legitimate explanations for why the educational and work experiences of Page and Golden were more valuable to him as their manager.
P. Harris’s assertion that she deserved to earn the same salary as these employees does not render Plunkett’s stated explanations unworthy of credence or otherwise raise any genuine issue of fact. As we have observed, we do not “sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.” Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the absence of any other evidence that Plunkett’s compensation decisions were motivated by race, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of SCS.
S.J. Harris also claims that the district court erred by granting summary judgment for the defendants on her claims of discrimination in compensation and unlawful retaliation.21 The district court concluded that because of S.J. Harris’s unique disciplinary history, the comparators she used to establish a prima facie case of compensation discrimination were not similarly situated, and that even if S.J. Harris had been able to establish a prima facie case, she failed to show that the proffered legitimate reasons for her compensation were pretextual. The district court also determined that S.J. Harris failed to show pretext as to the legitimate reason offered to explain her termination: that she was fired because, while on disciplinary probation, her job performance deteriorated and she falsified a company document. But Harris contends that a material issue of fact still remains as to whether the proffered reasons were a pretext for racial discrimination.
GPC hired S.J. Harris as a General Clerk in 1979, and her employment was terminated on August 24, 2000, approximately a month after this case was filed.22 From 1997 until her firing, S.J. Harris worked in Duluth, Georgia as a Region Support Representative, a customer service position in GPC’s Gwinnett Region. It is undisputed that, while she held this position, S.J. Harris received poor performance evaluations and was eventually subjected to formal discipline. In evaluating S.J. Harris’s job performance in 1997, her supervisor, Hugh Walters (“Walters”), noted concerns relating to S.J. Harris’s personal use of the telephone, as well as her punctuality, cooperation, teamwork, and communications with co-workers. Similar concerns were also expressed in S.J. Harris’s evaluation for 1998, and S.J. Harris received ratings of “Unsatisfactory” or “Needs Improvement” in all categories on her mid-year 1999 evaluation.
Because of concerns about her job performance, S.J. Harris was placed in GPC’s Positive Discipline program in mid-1999. GPC’s disciplinary program prescribed formal processes designed to improve employee performance: at level one, S.J. Harris received the “Oral Reminder” about her work goals, and at level two she received the “Written Reminder” laying out the improvements she needed to make. When her job performance did not show sufficient improvement, S.J. Harris was placed in the final level of discipline, the “Decision-Making Leave” (“DML”). S.J. Harris’s placement on DML occurred on October 7, 1999, at which time she was given a day off to decide whether she wished to leave GPC, or to return and redouble her efforts to improve her job performance. GPC employees placed on DML status are informed that if any disciplinary action occurs within 18 months after placement on DML, then the employee will likely be fired.
After returning to work, S.J. Harris showed some improvement in her performance during the later part of 1999 and the first months of 2000. However, GPC has offered uncontroverted evidence that in July and August 2000, Walters received complaints about S.J. Harris both from customers and co-workers, including complaints that her personal telephone usage had again increased, and that she was not completing assignments in a timely fashion. In addition, Walters received several complaints about delays for service orders that S.J. Harris oversaw. The plaintiff has not offered any evidence challenging GPC’s assertion that much of her work in this time period suffered from various errors.
S.J. Harris argues, however, that this evidence must be pretextual, because an evaluation she received just before her termination in August 2000 failed to refer to these performance issues. Indeed, GPC acknowledges that S.J. Harris’s performance improved somewhat in late 1999 and during the first part of 2000. But the problems that GPC maintains led to Harris’s firing occurred in July and August 2000, while the performance evaluation covered only the period from January to June 2000, thus explaining why the disciplinary issues of July and August were absent from the evaluation.
According to GPC, the event that actually precipitated the firing occured in late August 2000. On August 22, 2000, Walters learned that an engineer, Keith Thomas (“Thomas”), received a work order from S.J. Harris that day, which Thomas believed had originally been filed with S.J. Harris on August 16, 2000. After speaking with Thomas and his supervisor, Walters concluded that S.J. Harris had falsified a computer entry to make it appear as if she had given Thomas a work order on August 16th, when in fact she had failed to do so until August 22nd. Walters conferred with other administrators and concluded that because of S.J. Harris’s DML status, the decline in her performance in the summer of 2000, and her falsification of the computer entry, her employment should be terminated. S.J. Harris was fired on August 24, 2000.
We turn, first, to S.J. Harris’s argument that the district court erred by entering summary judgment for GPC on her retaliation claim. To establish a prima facie showing of retaliation under Title VII, “the plaintiff must show (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is some causal relation between the two events.” Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1021 (11th Cir. 1994).
Here, the first two elements are not in dispute, and S.J. Harris established a prima facie case of retaliation because the delay between the filing of the lawsuit and her firing was so brief. See Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “close temporal proximity” may be sufficient to establish causal relation in retaliation cases). However, GPC may rebut the prima facie case by offering a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for S.J. Harris’s termination. GPC has done so by maintaining that S.J. Harris was fired because of the speedy and substantial decline in her job performance during the late summer of 2000, and because of her manager’s good-faith belief that she had falsified a computer entry.
After review of the record, we are satisfied that the district court properly concluded that Walters honestly believed Harris had falsified the record. The relevant issue here is not whether Harris actually falsified the entry, but rather whether Walters honestly believed Harris falsified the entry. See Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470; E.E.O.C. v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000). The record reflects that on August 22, 2000, S.J. Harris printed a service order and provided it to Thomas. On the same day, she made a computer entry stating that she had given the order to Thomas on August 16, 2000. GPC introduced evidence that Walters conferred with Thomas and his supervisor about the incident,
The plaintiffs read Desert Palace too broadly. While it is true that some courts have suggested that Desert Palace may spell the end of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, see, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990-91 (D. Minn. 2003), the Desert Palace holding was expressly limited to the context of mixed-motive discrimination cases under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Indeed, the Court explained that it did not decide whether its analysis applied in other contexts. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94 n.1, 123 S. Ct. at 2151 n.1. Moreover, the fact that the Court did not even mention McDonnell Douglas in Desert Palace makes us even more reluctant to believe that Desert Palace should be understood to overrule that seminal precedent. Finally, after Desert Palace was decided, this Court has continued to apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis in non-mixed-motive cases. See, e.g., Maynard v. Bd. of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2003).
In addition, while McCullers did work for GPC between 1978 and January 1997, her employment at GPC occurred more than two years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. As we have explained, see supra note 19, the district court applied a two-year statute of limitations to the plaintiffs’ claims, and because McCullers did not raise any objection to the two-year limitations period applied by the district court below or in her initial briefs, she is deemed to have waived any argument that a longer limitations period applies. See Padilla-Reyes, 247 F.3d at 1164 (“Because this issue is raised for the first time in supplemental briefing, we deem it waived.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant GPC. The remainder of our analysis relating to McCullers’s claims, therefore, is devoted to the final summary judgment entered in favor of defendant SCS.