482 U.S. 451 (1987)
Appellee Raymond Wayne Hill is a lifelong resident of Houston, Texas.1 At the time this lawsuit began, he worked as a paralegal and executive director of the Houston Human Rights League. He had carried city and county press passes since 1975.2
The incident that sparked this lawsuit occurred in the Montrose area on February 14, 1982.3 Hill observed a friend, Charles Hill, intentionally stopping traffic on a busy street.4 Two Houston police officers approached Charles and began speaking with him.5 Hill began shouting at the officers in an admitted attempt to divert attention from Charles.6
Hill was arrested under Houston Code of Ordinances § 34-11(a).7 The charge was later dismissed after a nonjury trial in Municipal Court.8 Hill had been arrested four times under the ordinance since 1975 but never convicted.9
Following his acquittal, Hill brought suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas.10 He sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face and as applied, a permanent injunction, an order expunging arrest records, and damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.
At trial, Hill introduced evidence of over 200 arrests under the ordinance between November 1981 and March 1982.11 The District Court held the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad on its face.12 A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.13 After rehearing en banc, the full court affirmed the panel judgment by an 8-7 vote.14 The city appealed, claiming error in the overbreadth holding and arguing that abstention was required.15 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument on March 23, 1987.16
Whether a municipal ordinance that makes it unlawful for any person to interrupt any policeman in the performance of his duties is substantially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment?17
A statute that makes unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid under the First Amendment even if it also has legitimate application.18 Criminal statutes must be scrutinized with particular care, and only those that reach a substantial amount of protected conduct may be invalidated on their face.19
Yes. The ordinance reaches Hill's verbal challenge to the officers while they questioned his friend Charles Hill after he stopped traffic.20 It also reaches the more than two hundred arrests documented in city records for conduct such as arguing, talking, failing to remain quiet, and cursing.21 These instances involve speech that the First Amendment protects.22
It is not limited to fighting words or to expression likely to produce a clear and present danger of serious substantive evil rising above public inconvenience or unrest.23
The ordinance is substantially overbroad and therefore facially invalid under the First Amendment.24
Related opinions on this issue
I concur in the Court's opinion.25 I write separately to emphasize that municipalities have a legitimate interest in protecting the safety of their police officers.26 But that interest must be pursued by means that do not sweep so broadly as to prohibit speech that is protected by the First Amendment.27
The Houston ordinance is far more broad and more offensive to First Amendment values than prior cases and is susceptible of regular application to protected expression.28
I join all but Part II of the Court's opinion.29 I agree that the ordinance is substantially overbroad, but I would not reach the question whether the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.30 For the reasons stated by JUSTICE POWELL in Part II of his opinion, I agree that abstention would not be appropriate in this case.31
Because I do not believe that the Houston ordinance is reasonably susceptible of a limiting construction that would avoid the constitutional question posed in this case, I agree with the Court that certification would also be inappropriate.32 On the merits, I agree with the views expressed by JUSTICE POWELL in Part III of his opinion.33 I therefore concur in the judgment and join Parts II and III of JUSTICE POWELL's opinion.34
Whether the ordinance is subject to a limiting construction that would eliminate the facial overbreadth problem?35
No. The Houston Court of Appeals decisions in Johnson and McLendon do not constitute authoritative constructions by the state's highest court.38 The ordinance's text forbids interrupting an officer in any manner.39 It cannot be narrowed to fighting words or to speech creating a clear and present danger without rewriting its unambiguous terms.40
The ordinance is not subject to a limiting construction that would eliminate the facial overbreadth problem.41
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor
The challenged ordinance does not contain an explicit intent requirement.42 Texas Penal Code section 6.02(b) requires imputation of some culpability requirement.43 It would be plausible for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to construe the intent requirement to demand proof that the person intended to interfere with the officer's performance of his duties.44
This interpretation would narrow substantially the scope of the ordinance and possibly resolve the overbreadth question.45 It is not this Court's role to place an interpretive gloss on the words the Houston City Council has chosen.46
Whether abstention is required pending construction of the ordinance by state courts?47
Abstention is the exception rather than the rule and is inappropriate when a statute is attacked on its face as abridging free expression. If the statute is not obviously susceptible of a limiting construction that would substantially modify the federal constitutional question, the federal court must exercise its jurisdiction.48
No. The ordinance language is plain and unambiguous.49 The challenge is facial under the First Amendment. No uncertain question of state law exists that would avoid or substantially alter the constitutional issue.50 The city's proposed constructions are insufficient.51 Certification would not eliminate the overbreadth problem.52
Abstention is not required.53
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice O'connor
Pullman abstention is inappropriate unless the state courts provide the parties with adequate means to adjudicate the controverted state law issue.54 It is not clear that Texas law affords a remedy by which Hill could obtain a state court interpretation of the ordinance.55 The only apparent means would be through an action for a declaratory judgment.56
Texas law treats declaratory judgment actions as civil cases appealable to the Texas Supreme Court.57 The Texas Supreme Court has held that injunctive or declaratory relief against criminal statutes is not available in civil cases.58 The late stage at which the city raised this issue weighs heavily against abstention.59
Joined by Justice Powell
I join Parts I and II of Justice Powell's opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.60 I do not agree that the Houston ordinance, in the absence of an authoritative construction by the Texas courts, is unconstitutional. The Court today strikes down a Houston ordinance that prohibits interrupting a police officer in the performance of his duties.61
The ordinance is not substantially overbroad.62 It is directed at conduct that interferes with the performance of police duties, not at protected speech.63 The First Amendment does not prohibit municipalities from enacting laws that protect the ability of police officers to do their jobs without unwarranted interruption.64
I therefore dissent from the Court's affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.65