142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022)
Maine's Constitution requires towns to provide for the support and maintenance of public schools.1 Because Maine is highly rural, many school administrative units do not operate a public secondary school.2 Maine provides tuition assistance for families in such SAUs by paying the tuition at the public school or the approved private school chosen by the parent, up to a statutory maximum.3
To be approved for attendance purposes, a private school must meet basic statutory requirements.4 It must be either currently accredited by a New England association of schools and colleges or approved by the Department.5 In 1981 Maine amended the statute to require that any school receiving tuition assistance be nonsectarian.6 The Department interprets nonsectarian to mean a school not associated with a particular faith or belief system that in addition to teaching academic subjects promotes that faith or presents material through the lens of that faith.7
This litigation arose from two families in SAUs that neither operate secondary schools nor contract with any secondary school.8 The Carsons send their daughter to Bangor Christian Schools, founded as a ministry of Bangor Baptist Church.9 The Nelsons send their son to Temple Academy, affiliated with Centerpoint Community Church.10 Both schools are NEASC-accredited and approved for attendance purposes but are deemed sectarian under the Department's interpretation and so are ineligible for tuition assistance.11
Petitioners sued, contending that the nonsectarian requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and Equal Protection.12 The District Court, relying on earlier First Circuit precedent, rejected the constitutional claims.13 The First Circuit, after this Court's decision in Espinoza, affirmed the District Court.14 This Court granted certiorari.15
Whether Maine's nonsectarian requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause?16
The Free Exercise Clause protects against indirect coercion or penalties on religious exercise, not just outright prohibitions.17 A State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes religious observers from otherwise available public benefits solely because of their religious character.18 Once a State chooses to subsidize private education through public funds, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious; such exclusions trigger strict scrutiny under precedents such as Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer and Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.19
Yes. Maine offers a generally available benefit of tuition assistance to parents in SAUs without secondary schools. A wide range of private schools are eligible to receive payments under the program.20 Bangor Christian Schools and Temple Academy are disqualified from this benefit solely because of their religious character.21 The Department deems them sectarian for promoting faith through curriculum and activities in addition to academic subjects. This disqualification conditions receipt of the public benefit on the schools' religious exercise. It thereby penalizes the free exercise of religion by the Carsons and Nelsons.22 The State's asserted antiestablishment interest in maintaining a secular educational benefit cannot justify the exclusion.23 Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza establish that once a State subsidizes private education it may not disqualify schools solely on religious grounds. The program therefore fails strict scrutiny.24
The First Circuit's characterizations of the benefit as the rough equivalent of a public-school education and of the restriction as use-based rather than status-based do not remove the Free Exercise problem.25 The statute speaks of tuition at a public or private school selected by the parent.26 It imposes no requirement that private schools replicate public-school features such as open admissions or certified teachers.27 The only required resemblance is secularism.28 Distinguishing status from use would allow the State to evade protections by disqualifying schools based on anticipated religious use of funds.29 This is contrary to the principle that religious education is central to the mission of the schools at issue.30
Maine's nonsectarian requirement violates the Free Exercise Clause.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer dissented on the ground that the Religion Clauses contain play in the joints permitting States leeway to withhold aid from religious institutions without violating the Free Exercise Clause.32 He explained that Maine's nonsectarian requirement is use-based rather than status-based. It excludes schools only when they both affiliate with a faith and promote that faith through curriculum or activity.33 This prevents the use of public funds for religiously integrated education. This approach serves substantial antiestablishment interests by avoiding promotion of religion with taxpayer money, denominational favoritism, and social conflict.34
Breyer relied on Locke v. Davey to argue that a historic and substantial tradition supports refusing to fund funds that would be used to prepare for the ministry.35 He concluded that the play-in-the-joints doctrine allows Maine to decline subsidizing religious indoctrination as a substitute for secular public education.36
Justice Sotomayor dissented to emphasize that the Court's recent decisions beginning with Trinity Lutheran have dramatically altered the balance between the Religion Clauses. They treat refusals to fund religious institutions as unconstitutional discrimination. This erodes the historical play in the joints.37
She highlighted the practical consequences. The holding forces Maine and similar States to subsidize institutions providing religious instruction and objectionable policies on admissions or hiring, or else deny benefits to residents.38 Sotomayor further argued that the benefit at issue is the public education guaranteed by Maine's Constitution.
The Establishment Clause requires that public education be secular and neutral.39 It is therefore irrational to hold that the Free Exercise Clause compels funding of religious teaching when the State may constitutionally provide only a religiously neutral education.40