457 U.S. 164, 102 S. Ct. 2335 (1982)
California moved for leave to file a bill of complaint against Texas in the Supreme Court of the United States.1 The complaint sought a determination of Howard Hughes' domicile at the time of his death to resolve which state could impose death taxes on his estate.2
This renewed California's November 1977 motion, which the Court had denied.3 After the denial, the estate initiated an interpleader action in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335.4 California filed the current motion alongside its petition for certiorari in Cory v. White.5
The Court granted certiorari in Cory v. White and subsequently held that the Interpleader Act did not confer jurisdiction due to the Eleventh Amendment.6 With the interpleader option unavailable, the Court considered whether to grant leave to file the original action.7
Howard Hughes had spent much of his time in California, where many of his business activities were based.8 He was born in Texas, however, and long continued to use Texas as his mailing address while sometimes stating that Texas was his domicile.9 A Texas jury in probate proceedings determined that Hughes was a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death, and an appeal of that judgment remained pending.10
Additional circumstances had changed since 1978.11 Juries and courts had rejected claims to the estate under a Mormon Will and a lost will favoring the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.12 A conditional settlement agreement between California and the estate had also expired.13
Whether California and Texas present a controversy between states over the domicile of Howard Hughes at death that falls within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)?14
The Supreme Court possesses original jurisdiction over controversies between two or more States under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).15 A justiciable controversy arises when two States assert rival claims to death taxes based on the decedent's domicile and the estate is insufficient to satisfy both claims, creating a real and substantial risk of loss to one or both States, as the Court recognized in Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).16
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that California and Texas assert inconsistent claims to tax the Hughes estate based on domicile.17
These facts establish a controversy because only one State is entitled to impose death taxes, and the outcome would determine which State is privileged to tax, with the other barred from doing so.18 The allegations of high combined marginal tax rates exceeding 100 percent and interest depleting the estate are sufficient to show a real risk of loss under the standard from Texas v. Florida.19
Upon the grant of certiorari in Cory v. White, the Court addressed the jurisdictional issues.20 These developments eliminated the uncertainties that previously affected the case.21
California and Texas present a controversy between states that falls within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, And Stevens
Justice Powell dissented from the conclusion that a controversy exists.23 He noted that under Worcester County there is no constitutional bar to both Texas and California taxing the Hughes estate on the ground that he was a domiciliary.24 If both States legally can tax the Hughes estate, a controversy between them would arise only if both were to obtain money judgments against the estate and, further, if the estate then were to prove insufficient to satisfy both claims.25
Yet it is no more clear today than it was in 1978 that this situation ever will occur.26 Thus, under the Court's own assumptions, there is no ripe controversy between the States, and no basis for consideration of the original complaint in No. 88, Original.27
Whether changed circumstances since the 1978 denial of California's prior motion, including the unavailability of federal interpleader, warrant exercise of original jurisdiction now?28
Although the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, it exercises that jurisdiction only in appropriate cases, considering the seriousness of the claim and the availability of another forum.29 Prudential limitations apply, and the Court inclines to a sparing use of original jurisdiction, as explained in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).30 When statutory interpleader is unavailable, the precondition for exercising original jurisdiction is met.31
Yes. The changed circumstances since the 1978 denial warrant exercise of original jurisdiction.3233
At the time of the prior denial, it seemed that statutory interpleader might resolve the dispute.34 The Court has now held in Cory v. White that the Interpleader Act does not provide jurisdiction due to the Eleventh Amendment.35 Thus the precondition for the exercise of original jurisdiction has been met.36 Other uncertainties such as the pending claims under the Mormon Will and lost will have been resolved by rejection in the courts.37 The conditional settlement agreement has expired.38 These developments make it appropriate to exercise jurisdiction now.39
Changed circumstances since the 1978 denial warrant exercise of original jurisdiction.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, And Stevens
Justice Powell maintained that the mere possibility of inconsistent state determinations of domicile resulting in a remote possibility of the estate being insufficient does not give rise to a case or controversy in the constitutional sense.40 He argued that the analogy to interpleader is irrelevant because interpleader jurisdiction does not create an independently justiciable controversy between the States.41 The necessity that the plaintiff stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Article III requirement.42
Nor is the Court entitled to base its finding of original jurisdiction on an analogy between the original action and a bill in the nature of interpleader.43