454 U.S. 432 (1982)
In 1981, three lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens residing in Los Angeles County, California—Jose Chavez-Salido, Pedro Luis Ybarra, and Ricardo Bohorquez—applied for positions as Deputy Probation Officers with the Los Angeles County Probation Department.1 Chavez-Salido, born in Mexico and a resident for 26 years with a Bachelor of Arts degree, and Ybarra, born in Spain with advanced degrees, passed qualifying examinations but were denied employment solely due to their alien status.2 Bohorquez, born in Colombia and a resident since 1961, did not appeal his examination results after being informed that citizenship was required.3
California Government Code section 1031(a) mandates that all public officers or employees declared by law to be peace officers must be United States citizens.4 California Penal Code section 830.5 designates probation officers and deputy probation officers as peace officers.5 The Los Angeles County Probation Department enforced the citizenship requirement against the applicants.6
The three individuals filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, naming county officials and the County of Los Angeles as defendants. They challenged the citizenship requirement under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief along with damages and attorney's fees.7 A three-judge district court was convened.8
In February 1977, the District Court held the requirement unconstitutional both facially and as applied.9 Following vacation of that judgment by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Foley v. Connelie, the District Court on remand again concluded that the California statutory scheme was invalid on its face and as applied to the deputy probation officer positions, with one judge dissenting.10 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1981.11
Whether California Government Code section 1031(a) requiring United States citizenship for positions designated as peace officers is unconstitutional on its face?12
Under the two-step inquiry from Sugarman v. Dougall, a state citizenship requirement for positions performing functions that go to the heart of representative government receives less demanding scrutiny than strict scrutiny.13 The requirement survives if the classification bears a substantial fit to the state's interest in limiting important sovereign functions to citizens.14
No. The statutory scheme satisfies the first Sugarman step because the general law enforcement character of all California peace officers, as defined across Penal Code sections 830.1 through 830.6, provides a substantial fit to the state's interest even though a few categories have only a tenuous connection to traditional police functions.15 The second step is also met because the requirement targets officers who exercise the sovereign's coercive police powers, including arrest authority under section 836 and training under section 832, rather than sweeping indiscriminately into purely economic or ministerial roles.16
California Government Code section 1031(a) is constitutional on its face.17
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that section 1031(a) is facially unconstitutional because it excludes permanent resident aliens from more than seventy peace officer positions without any showing that citizenship is necessary for each.18 He emphasized that the California legislature added numerous unrelated jobs to the peace officer list in 1961 without stating any rationale, resulting in an unthinking and haphazard classification.19 The state's own Attorney General had concluded that the citizenship requirement could no longer validly be imposed and that no compelling interest justified the classification.20
Under the stringent standard of review from Sugarman and its progeny, the statute fails because it is grossly overbroad and does not demonstrate the precise tailoring required when states discriminate against aliens in public employment.21
Whether the citizenship requirement is unconstitutional as applied to the position of deputy probation officer?22
A state may require citizenship for a particular nonelective position if that position involves discretionary decision-making or execution of policy that substantially affects members of the political community and thereby goes to the heart of representative government.23
No. Deputy probation officers in Los Angeles County exercise the sovereign power to arrest under Penal Code sections 830.5, 836, and 1203.2, to release probationers under section 1203.1a, and to supervise compliance with conditions of probation under section 1203.1, all without immediate judicial oversight; these functions parallel the coercive authority upheld for state troopers in Foley v. Connelie and therefore fall within the political-function exception.24 The same officers also determine whether to detain juveniles and initiate proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 628, 630, 653, and 654, further confirming that the position partakes of the state's authority to coerce obedience to its norms.25
The citizenship requirement is constitutional as applied to deputy probation officers.26
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice Blackmun further dissented with respect to the application of the requirement to deputy probation officers, contending that these positions do not involve functions that go to the heart of representative government.27 Probation officers' arrest powers are narrowly conditioned by statute, and their decisions are always advisory to and supervised by judicial officers.28 Moreover, California permits aliens to serve as chief probation officers, attorneys, and even judges, making the exclusion of deputy probation officers arbitrary and inconsistent with the narrow exception recognized in Sugarman.29
He concluded that the statute violates the equal protection rights of the appellees by denying them an individualized determination of fitness based solely on state parochialism.30