584 U.S. 395 (2018)
In September 2014, petitioner Terrence Byrd and Latasha Reed drove in Byrd’s Honda Accord to a Budget car-rental facility in Wayne, New Jersey.1 Byrd stayed in the parking lot while Reed entered and rented a Ford Fusion.2 Reed signed the rental agreement and initialed an addendum that restricted drivers to the renter, the renter’s spouse, a co-employee on company business, or a person who appears at rental and signs an Additional Driver Form.3 The addendum warned that permitting an unauthorized driver to operate the vehicle is a violation that may result in coverage being void and the renter being fully responsible for all loss or damage.4
Reed did not list any additional drivers on the form.5 After receiving the keys, Reed gave them to Byrd.6 Byrd returned to his home in Patterson, New Jersey, placed his personal belongings in the trunk of the rental car, and drove alone toward Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.7
After driving nearly three hours on Interstate 81 near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, State Trooper David Long stopped Byrd for a suspected traffic infraction.8 Byrd appeared visibly nervous, provided an interim license and the rental agreement, and stated that a friend had rented the car.9 Long determined that Byrd was not listed as an authorized driver.10 Trooper Travis Martin arrived, and a records check revealed Byrd’s prior weapons and drug convictions plus an outstanding New Jersey warrant for a probation violation.11
Byrd admitted he had a marijuana cigarette in the car.12 The troopers searched the passenger compartment and trunk without Byrd’s consent and found body armor inside a laundry bag in a cardboard box in the trunk.13 After detaining Byrd, they found 49 bricks of heroin in the same bag.14 Federal authorities charged Byrd with distribution and possession of heroin with intent to distribute and with possession of body armor by a prohibited person.15
The District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied Byrd’s motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that he lacked standing to contest the search.16 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in a summary opinion.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
In its merits brief, the Government asserted that Byrd intentionally used Reed as a strawman in a calculated plan to mislead the rental company from the very outset, all to aid him in committing a crime.19 This argument was premised on the inference that Byrd knew he would not have been able to rent the car on his own.20 He would not have satisfied the rental company's requirements based on his criminal record. He used Reed, who had no intention of using the car for her own purposes, to procure the car for him to transport heroin to Pittsburgh.21
Whether the mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement defeats his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy?22
The mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.23 Reference to property concepts is instructive in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.24 One who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of the right to exclude.25
Yes. In the established facts Byrd was the driver and sole occupant who received the keys from Reed.26 He placed his personal belongings in the trunk.27 He drove the vehicle alone.28 These facts establish lawful possession and control that carries the right to exclude others and thus a reasonable expectation of privacy despite not being listed on the agreement.29
The mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a rental car is not listed on the rental agreement does not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.30
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Gorsuch
Justice Thomas joined the opinion while expressing serious doubts about the reasonable expectation of privacy test from Katz v. United States.31 He agreed that the Court correctly navigated existing precedents without any party asking for reconsideration of that framework.32 Thomas noted that Byrd had also argued for protection under the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment based on a property interest in the rental car as an effect.33
He viewed it as especially unwise to reach that argument in the first instance because the parties had not adequately addressed threshold questions such as what kind of property interest qualifies something as an effect.34 He noted that which body of law determines that interest remains unclear.35 He added that whether unauthorized use affects the analysis is also unresolved.36
Thomas stated that in an appropriate case he would welcome briefing on those questions.37
Justice Alito joined the opinion on the understanding that relevant questions bearing on the driver's ability to raise a Fourth Amendment claim may include the terms of the particular rental agreement.38 He noted that the circumstances surrounding the rental are also relevant.39 He observed that the reason why the driver took the wheel matters.40
He stated that any property right that the driver might have should be considered.41 He added that the legality of his conduct under the law of the State where the conduct occurred is pertinent.42 He emphasized that on remand the Court of Appeals is free to reexamine whether petitioner may assert a Fourth Amendment claim or to decide the appeal on another appropriate ground.43
Whether a rental car driver who is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle?44
A person need not always have a recognized common-law property interest in the place searched to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.45 Legitimate presence alone is insufficient.46 Legitimation of expectations of privacy must have a source outside the Fourth Amendment by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or understandings recognized and permitted by society.47 One who lawfully possesses or controls property likely has a legitimate expectation by virtue of the right to exclude.48
Yes. The established facts show that Reed gave Byrd the keys after renting the car.49 Byrd stored his personal belongings in the trunk.50 He drove as the sole occupant.51 These facts gave him complete dominion and control akin to the situation in Jones where the defendant had authority to exclude others from the apartment.52
A rental car driver who is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement but is in otherwise lawful possession and control has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.53
Whether the fact that driving the rental car violated the rental agreement defeats any expectation of privacy in the vehicle?54
A breach of a rental agreement by permitting an unauthorized driver does not eliminate an expectation of privacy.55 The agreement provisions allocate risk between private parties such as insurance coverage or liability for damage.56 Such contractual violations have no meaningful bearing on Fourth Amendment privacy expectations when the driver otherwise has lawful possession and control.57
No. Although the established facts show that Reed initialed the addendum warning that permitting an unauthorized driver is a violation that may void coverage and make the renter responsible for loss.58 Byrd's driving constituted a breach of the same character as other provisions the Government concedes do not eliminate privacy expectations.59 His lawful possession remained intact.60
The fact that driving the rental car violated the rental agreement does not defeat any expectation of privacy in the vehicle.61
Whether one who intentionally uses a third party to procure a rental car by a fraudulent scheme for the purpose of committing a crime has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle?62
A wrongful presence at the scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the search.63 A car thief would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car no matter the degree of possession and control.64 One who obtains a vehicle through subterfuge may be no better situated than a car thief.65
No. The established facts do not establish that Byrd intentionally used Reed as a strawman in a fraudulent scheme based on his criminal record.66 The Government did not raise this argument in the District Court or Court of Appeals.67 The question whether such conduct defeats the expectation of privacy is left for remand.68
The Court leaves for remand the question whether one who intentionally uses a third party to procure a rental car by a fraudulent scheme for the purpose of committing a crime has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. One who obtains a vehicle through subterfuge may be no better situated than a car thief.
Whether probable cause justified the search of the rental car?69
Even if a driver has a right to object to the search of a rental car, the automobile exception permits a warrantless search if probable cause exists to believe the car contains evidence of a crime.70
No. The established facts show that the District Court and Third Circuit resolved the case solely on the ground that Byrd lacked standing.71 They did not reach whether the troopers had probable cause after Byrd admitted to having a marijuana cigarette in the car.72 That question is left for remand along with the order of addressing the issues.73
Whether probable cause justified the search of the rental car is left for remand.74