277 Ill. App. 519 (1934)
In September 1927 more than five hundred white owners of property in the Chicago area bounded by Cottage Grove Avenue on the east, South Park Avenue on the west, 60th Street on the north, and 63rd Street on the south executed a restrictive agreement covering 583 parcels.1 The agreement was recorded on February 1, 1928, and provided that the described parcels would remain subject to its terms until January 1, 1948.2
Hannah Studdert, owner of parcel 498, signed the agreement; title to that parcel passed by mesne conveyances to the appellee.3 Ben Piser, owner of parcel 472, also signed; that parcel later passed by mesne conveyances to appellant Isaac Kleiman, who gave a first mortgage on the property to appellant Sam Kleiman.4
On October 18, 1932, appellants Isaac Kleiman and Sam Kleiman leased an apartment in parcel 472 to appellant James L. Hall, a person of the negro race as defined in the agreement.5 All defendants had notice of the agreement when the lease was executed.6
The appellee filed a bill in the superior court of Cook County seeking to enjoin the lease and requesting a mandatory injunction requiring removal of the tenant.7 The parties submitted the cause on an agreed statement of facts dated May 10, 1933, which recited that three other properties within the restricted area then had negro tenants.8
The superior court entered a decree granting the relief prayed.9 Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which transferred the case to the Appellate Court of Illinois on the ground that no freehold was involved.10
After the transfer, the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that only two of the four appellants had signed the appeal bond.11
Whether the joint appeal should be dismissed because only two of the four appellants signed the appeal bond?12
No. The facts show that in September 1927 more than five hundred white owners executed the restrictive agreement for the described Chicago area.15
The agreement was recorded in February 1928 and was to run until 1948.16 It prohibited leasing or selling to persons of the negro race except as servants.17
Hannah Studdert signed for parcel 498 which passed to the appellee.18 Ben Piser signed for parcel 472 which passed to Isaac Kleiman subject to a mortgage held by Sam Kleiman.19 On October 18, 1932 the Kleimans leased to James L. Hall a negro as defined in the agreement with full notice to all parties.20
The appellee filed her bill in the superior court of Cook County seeking to enjoin the lease and for a mandatory injunction.21 The cause was submitted on an agreed statement of facts dated May 10, 1933 which noted three other properties with negro tenants.22 The superior court granted the decree and the Supreme Court transferred the appeal to the Appellate Court for lack of a freehold.23
After transfer the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal because only two of the four appellants signed the appeal bond.24 However her prior conduct waived the objection.25 The appellee filed a general appearance in the Supreme Court of Illinois and submitted a lengthy brief on the merits without suggesting any question of jurisdiction or the appeal bond.26 After the cause was transferred to the Appellate Court, the appellee again entered a general appearance and filed a motion for a rule on the appellants to pay the docketing fee, thereby adopting her prior brief and waiving the objection that only two of the four appellants signed the appeal bond.27 The conduct of the appellee demonstrates a clear intention to have the appeal considered on the merits rather than dismissed on procedural grounds.28
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied and the court proceeds to consider the appeal on its merits.29
Whether conditions in the restricted area had changed so substantially since the 1927 agreement that the restrictive covenant was no longer operative?30
Equity will refuse to enforce a restrictive covenant where the property has so changed in character and environment that enforcement would be inequitable and a hardship.31 The change must be radical.32 The materiality of violations is determined by the circumstances of each case.33 Violations indicate an abandonment of the original general plan when they make enforcement inequitable because of the changed condition of the property under restriction.34
No. The restrictive agreement covered 583 parcels signed by over 500 owners across nine blocks east to west and three blocks north to south in Chicago.3536
At the time of the bill, there were only three violations involving negro tenants in the area, with actions pending or denied against two of them, and no evidence of any other change in the character of the neighborhood since the agreement took effect.37
The three violations do not indicate an abandonment of the original plan to maintain the area for white occupancy.38 The character and condition of the adjoining property have not been so changed as to render the restriction inapplicable according to the intent and spirit of the contract.39 The appellants' contention that the conditions had changed so substantially is without merit under the rule followed in O’Neill v. Wolf and the cases cited therein.40
The restrictive covenant remains operative and the decree granting the injunction is proper on this ground.41
Whether the complainant waived any right to injunctive relief by failing to act within a reasonable time against earlier violations?42
A complainant waives the right to enforce a restrictive covenant by laches or acquiescence when she knowingly permits other grantees to violate the restrictions in a manner that abrogates the purpose of the restriction and alters the general scheme.43 Isolated violations without proof of long-standing acquiescence do not constitute such waiver.44
No. The agreed statement of facts shows only three properties with negro tenants at the time the bill was filed.4546
The record does not establish that these violations had existed for a considerable period of time or that the appellee sat by and allowed the neighborhood to change without protest.47 The appellee promptly filed her bill upon the lease to James L. Hall.48
The prior violations were met with attempts to enforce the agreement through injunction proceedings in at least two instances.
The argument that the complainant waived her right by not acting within a reasonable time is not supported by the authorities.49 The violations do not create such a change in the character of the neighborhood as to warrant a presumption of abandonment of the agreement.50
The complainant did not waive her right to injunctive relief, and the decree is affirmed.51