405 U.S. 134 (1972)
Under Texas law in 1970, a candidate had to pay a filing fee to have his name placed on the ballot in a primary election.1 Appellee Pate met all qualifications to be a candidate in the May 2, 1970, Democratic primary for County Commissioner of Precinct Four for El Paso County except that he was unable to pay the $1,424.60 assessment.2 Appellee Wischkaemper sought to be placed on the Democratic primary ballot as a candidate for County Judge in Tarrant County but was unable to pay the $6,300 assessment.3 Appellee Carter wished to be a Democratic candidate for Commissioner of the General Land Office but his application was not accompanied by the required $1,000 filing fee.4
After being denied places on the Democratic primary ballots in their respective counties, these appellees instituted separate actions in the District Court challenging the validity of the Texas filing-fee system.5 Their actions were consolidated and a three-judge District Court was convened.6 Appellee Jenkins was permitted to intervene as a voter on his claimed desire to vote for Wischkaemper, and appellee Guzman and others were permitted to intervene as voters desiring to cast their ballots for Pate.7 On April 3, 1970, the District Court ordered that Wischkaemper and Pate be permitted to participate in the primary conducted on May 2, 1970, without prepayment of filing fees.8
Following a hearing on the merits, the three-judge court declared the Texas filing-fee scheme unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement at 321 F. Supp. 1358.9 A direct appeal was taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1253, and probable jurisdiction was noted at 403 U.S. 904.10
Under the Texas statute, payment of the filing fee is an absolute prerequisite to a candidate’s participation in a primary election.11 There is no alternative procedure by which a potential candidate who is unable to pay the fee can get on the primary ballot by way of petitioning voters.12 Write-in votes are not permitted in primary elections for public office.13 Candidates for most district, county, and precinct offices must pay their filing fee to the county executive committee of the political party conducting the primary, which estimates the total cost of the primary and apportions it among the various candidates.14 In counties with populations of one million or more, candidates for offices of two-year terms can be assessed up to 10% of their aggregate annual salary, and candidates for offices of four-year terms can be assessed up to 15% of their aggregate annual salary.15 In smaller counties there are no such percentage limitations, resulting in fees such as $8,900 for district judge candidates in Tarrant County.16
Whether a state law that prevents potential candidates for public office from seeking the nomination of their party due to their inability to pay a portion of the cost of conducting the primary election is state action that unlawfully discriminates against the candidates so excluded or the voters who wish to support them?17
When a state filing-fee system has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise and this impact is related to the resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate, the laws must be closely scrutinized and found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives to pass constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause.18
Yes. The Texas filing-fee scheme as applied to appellees Pate, Wischkaemper, and Carter, who were unable to pay assessments of $1,424.60, $6,300, and $1,000 respectively, creates barriers to candidate access to the primary ballot that limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose.19 This limitation falls more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community whose favorites may be unable to pay the large costs required by the Texas system.20
The Texas filing-fee system unlawfully discriminates against candidates and voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.21
Whether the filing-fee system should be sustained if it can be shown to have some rational basis, or whether it must withstand a more rigid standard of review?22
Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise related to the resources of the voters, the laws must be closely scrutinized rather than sustained upon a mere showing of rational basis.23
Yes. The very size of the fees imposed under the Texas system gives it a patently exclusionary character.24 Many potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and affluent backers are in every practical sense precluded from seeking the nomination of their chosen party no matter how qualified they might be and no matter how broad or enthusiastic their popular support.25 The effect falls with unequal weight on voters according to their economic status.26
The filing-fee system must withstand a more rigid standard of review.27
Whether the filing fees are necessary both to regulate the ballot in primary elections and to provide a means for financing such elections so as to justify the exclusion of candidates unable to pay?28
No. Although the filing fees tend to limit the number of candidates and relieve the state treasury of the cost of conducting primary elections, the system is extraordinarily ill-fitted to the goal of weeding out spurious candidates since it excludes those unable rather than unwilling to pay.31 The state has not demonstrated that apportioning costs among candidates is the only feasible means or that it is necessary to avoid new claims of discrimination in distinguishing between political parties.32
The filing-fee system is not justified by the state's interests in regulating the ballot and financing primaries.33