6 N.H. 481, 26 Am.Dec. 713
The case arose when the plaintiff, Britton, entered into a special contract with the defendant, Turner, to perform labor for a term of one year in return for the sum of one hundred and twenty dollars.1 Britton began performance of the contract but voluntarily abandoned it after completing nine and a half months of labor without finishing the full term.2
Britton then instituted this action in the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. He proceeded under a count in quantum meruit to recover a reasonable sum for the service he had actually performed rather than seeking recovery on the contract itself.3 The jury that heard the case found that the value of the labor performed to the defendant was ninety-five dollars.4
The defendant defended the action on the ground that the plaintiff had not completed the contract.5 Upon review, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered the jury's verdict, which awarded pro rata compensation for the time the plaintiff had worked in the defendant's service.6
Whether a party who has voluntarily failed to complete a special contract for labor is entitled to recover a reasonable sum for the service actually performed under a count in quantum meruit?7
Where a party undertakes to pay upon a special contract for the performance of labor, he is not to be charged upon such special agreement until the money is earned according to the terms of it, and where the parties have made an express contract the law will not imply and raise a contract different from that which the parties have entered into, except upon some farther transaction between the parties.8 In case of a failure to perform such special contract, by the default of the party contracting to do the service, if the money is not due by the terms of the special agreement he is not entitled to recover for his labor, or for the materials furnished, unless the other party receives what has been done, or furnished, and upon the whole case derives a benefit from it.9 But if, where a contract is made of such a character, a party actually receives labor, or materials, and thereby derives a benefit and advantage, over and above the damage which has resulted from the breach of the contract by the other party, the labor actually done, and the value received, furnish a new consideration, and the law thereupon raises a promise to pay to the extent of the reasonable worth of such excess.10
Yes. The facts establish that the plaintiff commenced performance under a one-year labor contract but voluntarily ceased after nine and a half months.11 The jury determined that the defendant derived a benefit valued at ninety-five dollars from the labor actually performed.12 The defendant raised only the breach itself as a defense and presented no evidence that he sustained any damage from the incomplete performance or sought any deduction on that basis.13
The court therefore correctly instructed the jury that recovery could be had for the reasonable worth of the services rendered.14 This application prevents the defendant from retaining nearly five sixths of a year's labor value while suffering no proven injury, a result the court viewed as disproportionate and unjust under prior technical rules.15 The court further reasoned that the general understanding of the community is that the hired laborer shall be entitled to compensation for the service actually performed though he do not continue the entire term contracted for. Such contracts must be presumed to be made with reference to that understanding unless an express stipulation shows the contrary.16 By recognizing a new implied promise arising from the excess benefit received, the rule balances the interests of both parties and resolves the entire controversy in a single action.17
The plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the verdict.18