261 Neb. 636, 624 N.W.2d 604 (2001)
On December 31, 1993, Teena Brandon, Lisa Lambert, and Phillip Devine were found murdered in Lambert’s rural Humboldt farmhouse in Richardson County, Nebraska.1 Brandon’s mother, JoAnn Brandon, brought an action against Richardson County and Sheriff Charles B. Laux for negligence, wrongful death, and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with Brandon’s murder and the events leading up to her death.2
Brandon had been sexually abused as a child and in her late teens developed gender identity disorder.3 In November 1993, Brandon came to Richardson County after leaving Lincoln due to legal troubles and presented herself as a man named Charles Brayman.4 Brandon met Lana Tisdel and became acquainted with John Lotter and Thomas Nissen.5 On December 15, 1993, Brandon was booked into the Richardson County jail on forgery charges.6 On December 24, at a party at Nissen’s home, Lotter and Nissen pulled Brandon’s pants down in Tisdel’s presence.7 Later that morning, they beat Brandon, drove her to a remote location, and sexually assaulted her.8
On December 25, 1993, Brandon arrived at Gutierres’ home with visible injuries, was transported to the hospital for a rape examination, and provided a written statement to the Falls City Police Department.9 Laux and Deputy Tom Olberding then conducted a tape-recorded interview with Brandon.10 During the interview, Laux used crude language such as “they got ready to poke you,” expressed disbelief about details of the assaults, asked prurient questions about Brandon’s physical responses, and questioned Brandon about her gender identity disorder.11 Olberding left the room at one point because he did not like the way the interview was going.12
Lotter and Nissen had threatened Brandon’s life if she reported the rapes, and Laux was informed of these threats by Gutierres and by Brandon’s sister.13 Brandon agreed to file complaints and testify against Lotter and Nissen.14 The sheriff’s office took no steps to protect Brandon.15 On December 28, Nissen gave a statement admitting he had pulled Brandon’s pants down but denying the sexual assaults.16 On December 29, Brandon came to the courthouse but left without entering when she saw Lotter and Nissen outside and did not return for a scheduled second interview.17
On December 31, 1993, Lotter and Nissen murdered Brandon, Lambert, and Devine.18 JoAnn filed a claim under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. After a demurrer was sustained and reversed on appeal in Brandon I, JoAnn filed a third amended petition.19 A bench trial was held in September 1999.20 The district court found the county negligent, awarded economic damages of $6,223.20 and noneconomic damages of $80,000 reduced by 85 percent for the intentional torts of Lotter and Nissen and by 1 percent for Brandon’s negligence, denied the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and awarded nominal damages for loss of society.21 JoAnn appealed and the county cross-appealed.22
Whether the district court erred in allocating 85 percent of the noneconomic damages to the intentional torts of Lotter and Nissen?23
Nebraska’s comparative negligence statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,185.10, limits allocation of noneconomic damages to each defendant’s percentage of negligence and does not authorize allocation to intentional tort-feasors because negligent and intentional torts differ in degree, kind, and societal condemnation.24
Yes. The statute expressly ties allocation to a defendant’s percentage of negligence.25 The plain language excludes intentional acts.26 The district court allocated 85 percent of the $80,000 noneconomic award to the intentional murders committed by Lotter and Nissen even though the county’s liability rested solely on its negligent failure to protect Brandon after she agreed to assist prosecution.27 Because the intervening intentional tort is precisely the harm the county had a duty to prevent, allowing such allocation would undermine the incentive for political subdivisions to discharge their protective duties.28
The court therefore reversed the allocation and directed that the county remain responsible for the full amount of noneconomic damages attributable to its negligence.29
The district court erred in allocating 85 percent of the noneconomic damages to the intentional torts of Lotter and Nissen.30
Whether Laux’s conduct during the December 25, 1993, interview was extreme and outrageous?31
To satisfy the second element of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendant’s conduct must be so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.32 The conduct must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.33 This is judged objectively on all facts including the parties’ relationship and the plaintiff’s known susceptibility to distress.34
Yes. Laux, a law enforcement officer in a position of authority, conducted the interview hours after Brandon had been beaten and raped, knowing she was visibly injured, emotionally traumatized, and terrified because Lotter and Nissen had threatened her life.35 Despite this knowledge, Laux repeatedly used crude and dehumanizing language such as “they got ready to poke you,” “sinking it in your vagina,” and “was he fingering you,” expressed repeated disbelief in Brandon’s account, asked prurient questions about her physical responses, and probed her gender identity disorder even after Olberding told Brandon she need not answer.36 These undisputed facts, captured on tape, establish conduct that is extreme and outrageous as a matter of law.37
Laux’s conduct during the December 25, 1993, interview was extreme and outrageous.38
Whether JoAnn proved that Brandon suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Laux’s conduct?39
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof that the plaintiff actually suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it.40 The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct itself constitutes important evidence on this element.41
No. Although the extreme and outrageous character of Laux’s conduct supplies significant evidence that Brandon suffered severe distress, the district court never considered that evidence because it erroneously concluded the conduct was not outrageous.4243 The record contains additional testimony from JoAnn that Brandon appeared “emotionally dead” after the interview and from psychologist Scalora that the interrogation poured “vinegar on an open wound,” yet the trial court’s legal error prevented a proper factual determination.44 The issue must therefore be remanded for the district court to decide, on the full record including the outrageousness finding, whether Brandon in fact suffered severe emotional distress and whether Laux’s conduct proximately caused it.45
The record does not yet establish whether Brandon suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Laux’s conduct; the issue is remanded for further findings.46
Whether the district court erred in awarding nominal damages for loss of society, comfort, and companionship?
In a wrongful-death action, once a parent-child relationship is proved to exist, the parent is entitled to damages for loss of the child’s society, comfort, and companionship because the relationship possesses intrinsic value.47 An award of zero damages that bears no reasonable relationship to the evidence is inadequate as a matter of law.48
Yes. JoAnn proved a close parent-child relationship: Brandon called or visited regularly, spent every Christmas with the family, left roses at the door, and planned to return to Lincoln to rebuild her life with her mother.49 The district court’s award of “nominal damages,” interpreted as zero, bears no reasonable relationship to this evidence and shocks the conscience.50 The court therefore reversed the zero award and remanded for a proper determination of damages that recognizes the intrinsic value of the relationship.51
The district court erred in awarding nominal damages for loss of society, comfort, and companionship.52
Whether the district court erred in finding Brandon contributorily negligent?
Yes. The county offered no evidence that Brandon’s failure to keep the sheriff’s office informed of her whereabouts or to return for the second interview on December 29 concurred with the county’s complete inaction or proximately caused her death.55 The county had no plan to protect Brandon regardless of her location, and the record shows Brandon left the courthouse because Lotter and Nissen were present.56 Because no evidence supports any element of contributory negligence, the district court’s one-percent reduction was clearly wrong.57
The district court erred in finding Brandon contributorily negligent.58
Whether the county had a duty to protect Brandon and was negligent in failing to discharge that duty?59
Although law enforcement generally owes no duty to protect individual citizens from criminal acts, a special relationship arises when a victim agrees to aid law enforcement in the performance of its duties.60 This creates an affirmative duty to protect the victim from the danger posed by the very persons the victim has agreed to help prosecute.61
Yes. Brandon reported the rapes, agreed to file complaints, and offered to testify against Lotter and Nissen, thereby creating the special relationship recognized in Brandon I.62 The county never offered protection, never investigated Brandon’s location, never arranged protective custody, and never contacted social services despite knowing Lotter and Nissen had threatened Brandon’s life and remained at large.63 This total failure to act was a proximate cause of Brandon’s murder because the county’s inaction left her vulnerable to the precise threat it had a duty to prevent.64
The county had a duty to protect Brandon and was negligent in failing to discharge that duty.65