157 N.H. 233, 949 A.2d 162 (2008)
The defendants own property in Dover abutting property upon which the plaintiffs reside.1 On or about June 29, 2006, Mr. Belhumeur was injured as a result of being attacked by wild bees that the defendants had allowed to nest in a tree on their premises.2 Mr. Belhumeur was on his own property when the incident occurred.3 The plaintiffs' amended writ of summons alleged that the defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of the bees' existence and aggressive behavior.4
The first count of the writ alleged that the defendants breached a duty to use ordinary, reasonable and due care to protect the plaintiffs from unreasonable risk of injury while on the plaintiffs' residential premises.5 The second count alleged that the defendants allowing wild bees on the premises actively, substantially and unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs' leasehold and constituted a private nuisance.6
The defendants moved for summary judgment contending that they are not liable for either hazards occurring naturally on their property that injure someone on another property or injuries caused by wild animals.7 The Superior Court granted the motion.8
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in finding no common law duty on the part of the defendants to abate the wild bees. They also argue that the trial court erred in failing to find that Mr. Zilm created a duty by affirmatively undertaking to remove the tree and bees, and then failing to act reasonably by abandoning the effort.9 Mr. Belhumeur informed Mr. Zilm in 2008 that the bees were trespassing onto Mr. Belhumeur's leasehold property and constituted a danger. Mr. Zilm acknowledged the problem and agreed to remove the tree but never made any attempts to follow through with the tree removal.10 At Mr. Zilm's instruction, Mr. Belhumeur obtained proposals from two contractors for the removal of the tree.11
Whether the defendants owed a common law duty to abate the wild bees?12
The established common law rule is that a landowner is under no affirmative duty to remedy conditions of purely natural origin upon his land even though they are dangerous or inconvenient to his neighbors.13 To create a legal nuisance, the act of man must have contributed to its existence.14 With respect to negligence claims, the doctrine of animals ferae naturae provides that a landowner cannot be held liable for the acts of indigenous wild animals occurring on his or her property unless the landowner has actually reduced the wild animals to possession or control, or introduced a non-indigenous animal into the area.15 When charged with determining whether a duty exists, we encounter the broader question of whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct. The decision to impose liability ultimately rests on a judicial determination that the social importance of protecting the plaintiff’s interest outweighs the importance of immunizing the defendant from extended liability.16
No. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had allowed wild bees to nest in a tree on their premises.17 Mr. Belhumeur was injured on his own property when attacked by the bees on or about June 29, 2006.18 The plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants contributed to the existence of the bees or their nest on the property. Accordingly the bees must be considered a condition of purely natural origin.19 The defendants did not possess or harbor the wild bees.20
Requiring the defendants to abate all harm potentially posed to neighbors by indigenous animals naturally located upon the property would impose an enormous and unwarranted burden.21 The interest in protecting the plaintiffs from injury caused by wild bees is outweighed by the importance of immunizing the defendants from extended liability.22
The trial court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' negligence and nuisance claims because no common law duty existed to abate the wild bees.23
Whether Mr. Zilm created a duty by affirmatively undertaking to remove the tree and bees and then failing to act reasonably by abandoning the effort?24
A party who does not otherwise have a duty but who voluntarily renders services for another may be held to a duty of reasonable care in acting.25 However, a mere promise to render a service coupled with neither performance nor reliance imposes no tort obligation upon the promisor.26 An actor may abandon his services at any time unless by giving the aid he has put the other in a worse position than he was in before.27 The fact that an actor starts to aid another does not necessarily require him to continue his services.28
No. Mr. Belhumeur informed Mr. Zilm in 2008 that the bees were trespassing onto Mr. Belhumeur's leasehold property and constituted a danger. Mr. Zilm acknowledged the problem and agreed to remove the tree but never made any attempts to follow through with the tree removal. At Mr. Zilm's instruction Mr. Belhumeur obtained proposals from two contractors for the removal of the tree. Mr. Zilm's acknowledgement of the problem and agreement to remove the tree would not without more subject him to liability should he fail to carry out that agreement.29
Obtaining estimates for the tree's removal was not enough of an affirmative undertaking to create a duty to actually remove it.30 Mr. Zilm's obtaining estimates to remove the tree did nothing to increase the risk of danger to Mr. Belhumeur or put him in any worse position than he was in before.31 Therefore securing the proposals did not create a duty and Mr. Zilm was free to abandon the effort.32
The defendants cannot be liable in negligence for failing to protect the plaintiffs from the wild animals where the defendants made no affirmative undertaking to protect the plaintiffs from the wild animals that created a duty.33