487 U.S. 250 (1988)
In 1982, after a 20-month investigation conducted before two successive grand juries, eight defendants, including petitioners William A. Kilpatrick, Declan J. O'Donnell, Sheila C. Lerner, and The Bank of Nova Scotia, were indicted on 27 counts in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.1 The first 26 counts charged all defendants with conspiracy and some of them with mail and tax fraud, while count 27 charged Kilpatrick with obstruction of justice.2
The district court initially dismissed the first 26 counts for failure to charge a crime, improper pleading, and, as to charges against the bank, for failure to allege the requisite knowledge and criminal intent.3 Kilpatrick was tried and convicted on the obstruction of justice count.4 The government appealed the dismissal of the first 26 counts.5
Before oral argument on the appeal, the court of appeals granted a defense motion to remand the case to the district court for a hearing on whether prosecutorial misconduct and irregularities in the grand jury proceedings were additional grounds for dismissal.6 United States District Judge Fred M. Winner first presided over the post-trial motions and granted a new trial to Kilpatrick on the obstruction of justice count.7 The cases were later reassigned to United States District Judge John L. Kane, Jr., to complete the post-trial proceedings.8
After 10 days of hearings, Judge Kane dismissed all 27 counts of the indictment.9 The district court held that dismissal was required for violations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 and, under the totality of the circumstances, for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, knowing presentation of misinformation to the grand jury, and mistreatment of witnesses.10
The government appealed once again, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the order of dismissal.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Whether a district court may invoke its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct in a grand jury investigation, where the misconduct does not prejudice the defendants?12
A federal court may not invoke its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury proceedings unless the misconduct prejudiced the defendants.13 Dismissal is appropriate only if the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict or if there is grave doubt that the decision was free from such influence.14
No. The district court dismissed the indictment after 10 days of hearings finding violations of Rule 6, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and other misconduct during the 20-month grand jury investigation involving eight defendants including The Bank of Nova Scotia.15 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed because the accumulation of misconduct did not significantly infringe on the grand jury's ability to exercise independent judgment.16 Applying the rule to the established facts, the isolated episodes of misconduct over a 20-month investigation with dozens of witnesses and thousands of documents did not substantially influence the grand jury's decision to indict, and the record supports no grave doubt on that point.17 The Supreme Court therefore held that the district court lacked authority to dismiss without a prejudice finding under Rule 52(a).18
The district court lacked authority to dismiss the indictment absent a finding that the prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced the defendants.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment.20 He agreed that every United States court has an inherent supervisory authority over the proceedings conducted before it, which assuredly includes the power to decline to proceed on the basis of an indictment obtained in violation of the law.21 He also agreed that the Court has authority to review lower courts’ exercise of this supervisory authority insofar as it affects the judgments brought before the Court.22
He saw no basis for any direct authority to supervise lower courts.23 He likewise saw no basis for any court’s supervisory powers to discipline prosecutors, except insofar as concerns their performance before the court and their qualifications to be members of the court’s bar. He joined the opinion of the Court because he understood the supervisory power at issue here to be of the first sort.24
Justice Marshall dissented.25 He could not concur in the Court's decision to apply harmless-error analysis to violations of Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.26 He argued that the approach converts Congress' command regarding the proper conduct of grand jury proceedings to a mere form of words, without practical effect.27
Because of the strict protection of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, instances of prosecutorial misconduct rarely come to light.28 In his view any case-by-case analysis to determine whether the defendant was actually prejudiced is simply too speculative to afford defendants meaningful protection.29 Rule 6 violations can be deterred and redressed effectively only by a per se rule of dismissal.30