546 U.S. 500 (2006)
From May 2000 through February 10, 2001, Jenifer Arbaugh worked as a bartender and waitress at the Moonlight Cafe, a New Orleans restaurant owned and operated by Y&H Corporation.1 Arbaugh alleged that Yalcin Hatipoglu, one of the company’s owners, sexually harassed her and precipitated her constructive discharge.2 In November 2001, Arbaugh filed suit against Y&H in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana asserting claims under Title VII and Louisiana law.3
Arbaugh’s pleadings alleged that her federal claim arose under Title VII and that the Federal District Court had jurisdiction over this claim under §1331 plus supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims under §1367.4 Y&H’s responsive pleadings admitted Arbaugh’s jurisdictional allegations but denied her contentions on the merits.5 The pretrial order submitted and signed by the parties, and later subscribed by the presiding judge, reiterated that the court was vested with jurisdiction over Arbaugh’s Title VII claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and had supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367.6 The order listed as an uncontested material fact that Plaintiff was employed as a waitress/bartender at the Moonlight for Defendants from May 2000 through February 10, 2001 when she terminated her employment with the company.7
The parties consented to trial before a Magistrate Judge.8 After a two-day trial, the jury found that Arbaugh had been sexually harassed and constructively discharged in violation of Title VII and Louisiana antidiscrimination law.9 The verdict awarded Arbaugh $5,000 in backpay, $5,000 in compensatory damages, and $30,000 in punitive damages.10 The trial court entered judgment for Arbaugh on November 5, 2002.11
Two weeks later, Y&H filed a motion under Federal Rule 12(h)(3) to dismiss Arbaugh’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.12 As sole ground for the motion, Y&H alleged for the first time in the proceedings that it did not employ fifteen or more employees during the relevant period and thus is not an employer for Title VII purposes.13 Discovery ensued on the employee count, which turned on the employment status of Y&H’s eight drivers engaged to make deliveries for the restaurant and the company’s four owners.14
After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the trial court concluded that neither the delivery drivers nor the owner-managers nor their shareholder spouses qualified as employees for Title VII purposes.15 Based on that determination, the trial court vacated its prior judgment in favor of Arbaugh, dismissed her Title VII claim with prejudice, and her state-law claims without prejudice.16 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicting opinions in Courts of Appeals on the question whether Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement is jurisdictional or simply an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief.18
Whether the numerical qualification contained in Title VII’s definition of employer affects federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction?19
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.20
No. Nothing in Title VII’s text indicates that Congress intended courts, on their own motion, to assure that the employee-numerosity requirement is met. The established facts show that Y&H first raised the issue in a post-trial motion under Rule 12(h)(3), after the jury had returned a verdict awarding Arbaugh $40,000 and the court had entered judgment. The pretrial order had confirmed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and supplemental jurisdiction under §1367, and the employee count was never listed as a contested issue.21
The numerical qualification contained in Title VII’s definition of employer does not affect federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction.22
Whether Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite?23
Title VII’s numerical threshold does not circumscribe federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the employee-numerosity requirement relates to the substantive adequacy of a Title VII claim for relief, and therefore could not be raised defensively late in the lawsuit.24
Yes. Applying the rule to the established facts, Arbaugh invoked federal-question jurisdiction under §1331 by pleading a claim arising under Title VII, and the 15-employee fact is a prerequisite to the application of Title VII but not to the court's power to hear the case. Y&H's post-trial motion came too late because the requirement is a claim element, not jurisdictional, so the objection to the complaint's failure to state a claim could not be asserted after trial.25
Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite.26