526 U.S. 40, 50 n.8 (1999)
Pennsylvania enacted its Workers' Compensation Act in 1915.1 The Act established a no-fault liability system for work-related injuries.2 Employers subject to the Act must obtain workers' compensation insurance from a private insurer, through the State Workmen's Insurance Fund, or by self-insuring.3 Once an employer becomes liable for an employee's work-related injury, the employer or its insurer must pay for all reasonable and necessary medical treatment within thirty days of receiving a bill.4
In 1993, Pennsylvania amended the Act to create a utilization review procedure.5 Under this procedure, an insurer that disputes the reasonableness or necessity of treatment may request review by filing a one-page form with the Workers' Compensation Bureau.6 Upon proper filing, the insurer may withhold payment for the disputed services.7 The Bureau forwards the request to a randomly selected utilization review organization consisting of health care providers with the same or similar specialty.8
Reviewers must examine the treating provider's medical records and must give the provider an opportunity to discuss the treatment under review.9 UROs are instructed to complete their review and render a determination within 30 days of a completed request.10 Any doubt as to the reasonableness and necessity of a given procedure must be resolved in favor of the employee.11
Ten individual employees and two organizations representing employees sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.12 They alleged that the withholding of medical benefits without predeprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard deprived them of property in violation of due process.13 The defendants included Pennsylvania officials who administer the Act, the director of the State Workmen's Insurance Fund, the School District of Philadelphia, and several private insurance companies.14
The District Court dismissed the private insurers as non-state actors and later dismissed the remaining defendants on due process grounds.15 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the insurers' decisions constitute state action and that due process requires an opportunity for employees to submit their views before suspension.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998.17
Whether decisions by private insurers to withhold payment for disputed medical treatment under Pennsylvania's workers' compensation utilization review procedures constitute state action under the Fourteenth Amendment?18
The plaintiff must establish that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.19 The party charged with the deprivation must fairly be said to be a state actor.20 The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State.21 A sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action is required.22 The nexus exists only if the State has exercised coercive power or provided significant encouragement so that the choice must be deemed that of the State.23 Action taken by private entities with mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.24
No. The private insurers' decision to withhold payment is not fairly attributable to the State.2526 The State authorizes but does not require insurers to withhold payments for disputed medical treatment.27 The decision turns on judgments made by private parties without standards established by the State. The Bureau's participation is limited to processing the form for technical compliance and forwarding the matter to the URO.28
This limited role does not constitute significant state involvement.29 The insurers are not performing a traditionally exclusive public function.30 The State has no obligation to provide the benefits itself.31 Historical practice shows that insurers could withhold payment before the workers' compensation law was adopted.32
Therefore, there is no sufficiently close nexus between the State and the insurers' actions.33
Decisions by private insurers to withhold payment for disputed medical treatment under Pennsylvania's workers' compensation utilization review procedures do not constitute state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens maintained that the question whether the insurance company is a state actor is not relevant to whether the state procedures are fair.35 The relevant state actors are the state-appointed decisionmakers who implement the exclusive procedure created by the State.36 He would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent it required changes to the original procedure to provide notice and an opportunity to submit evidence.37
He finds no constitutional defect in the procedures now in place.38 It is not unfair for a State to allow a private party to withhold payment of a state-created entitlement pending resolution of a dispute over its amount.39
Whether employees possess a protected property interest in payment for workers' compensation medical benefits before a determination that the particular treatment is reasonable and necessary?40
The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in property or liberty.41 Only after finding the deprivation of a protected interest does the court look to see if the State's procedures comport with due process.42 An individual's entitlement to benefits must have been established before the question of predeprivation notice and a hearing arises.43 Under Pennsylvania law, an employee is not entitled to payment for all medical treatment once the employer's initial liability is established.44 The law expressly limits an employee's entitlement to reasonable and necessary medical treatment.45 Disputes over the reasonableness and necessity of particular treatment must be resolved before an employer's obligation to pay and an employee's entitlement to benefits arise.46
No. Respondents have established their initial eligibility for medical treatment but have not made good on their claim that the particular medical treatment they received was reasonable and necessary.4748 Consequently, they do not have a property interest in having their providers paid for treatment that has yet to be found reasonable and necessary.49 The Due Process Clause does not require insurers to pay for patently unreasonable, unnecessary, and even fraudulent medical care without any right under state law to seek reimbursement from providers.50 The employees must clear two hurdles for their property interest to attach.51
First, they must prove that an employer is liable for a work-related injury.52 Second, they must establish that the particular medical treatment at issue is reasonable and necessary.53 Only then does the employee's interest parallel that of the beneficiary of welfare assistance or the recipient of disability benefits.54
Employees do not possess a protected property interest in payment for workers' compensation medical benefits before a determination that the particular treatment is reasonable and necessary.55
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer joined Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion and its judgment.56 He agreed with Part III insofar as it rejects respondents’ facial attack on the statute.57 He also pointed out that respondents do not contend that they have a property interest in their claims for payment, as distinct from the payments themselves.58
He would add that there may be individual circumstances in which the receipt of earlier payments leads an injured person reasonably to expect their continuation, in which case that person may well possess a constitutionally protected property interest.59 It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.60
Justice Ginsburg joined Part III of the Court’s opinion on the understanding that the Court rejects specifically respondents’ demands for constant payment of each medical bill within thirty days pending determination of the necessity or reasonableness of the medical treatment.61 She would not reach the state action issue because the property interest question disposes of the entire case.62 When a case presents two constitutional questions, one of which disposes of the entire case and the other of which does not, resolution of the case-dispositive question should suffice.63
She agrees with Justice Stevens that although Pennsylvania's original procedure was deficient, the dispute resolution process now in place meets the constitutional requirement.64