556 U.S. 247 (2009)
Respondents are members of the Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ.1 Under the National Labor Relations Act, the Union serves as the exclusive bargaining representative of employees within the building-services industry in New York City.2 Since the 1930s, the Union has engaged in industry-wide collective bargaining with the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc., a multiemployer association for the New York City real-estate industry.3
Their agreement, the Collective Bargaining Agreement for Contractors and Building Owners, contains a section 30 provision stating that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of age or other protected characteristics and that all such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures as the sole and exclusive remedy.4
Petitioner 14 Penn Plaza LLC, a member of the RAB, owns and operates the New York City office building where respondents worked as night lobby watchmen and in similar capacities.5 Respondents were directly employed by petitioner Temco Service Industries, Inc., a maintenance service and cleaning contractor.6 In August 2003, with the Union's consent, 14 Penn Plaza engaged Spartan Security, a unionized security contractor affiliated with Temco, to provide licensed security guards for the building lobby and entrances.7 Temco then reassigned respondents to jobs as night porters and light duty cleaners in other locations within the building, which respondents contend produced a loss in income, emotional distress, and less desirable positions.8
At respondents' request, the Union filed grievances alleging that the reassignments violated the CBA's ban on workplace discrimination by discriminating on the basis of age in violation of the ADEA, along with claims that petitioners violated seniority rules and failed to equitably rotate overtime.9 After an initial arbitration hearing, the Union withdrew the age-discrimination grievances on the ground that its consent to the new security contract precluded it from objecting to the reassignments as discriminatory.10 The Union continued to arbitrate the seniority and overtime claims, which were denied after several hearings.11
In May 2004, while arbitration was ongoing, respondents filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that petitioners had violated their rights under the ADEA.12 The EEOC issued each respondent a Dismissal and Notice of Rights.13 Respondents then filed suit against petitioners in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging violations of the ADEA and state and local age-discrimination laws.14 Petitioners moved to compel arbitration pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act.15 The District Court denied the motion.16 The Second Circuit affirmed.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
Whether a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is enforceable as a matter of federal law?19
Under the National Labor Relations Act, the union as exclusive bargaining representative possesses authority to negotiate terms and conditions of employment that include arbitration provisions for statutory discrimination claims.20 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act contains no text or legislative history demonstrating congressional intent to preclude such arbitration agreements.21
Yes. The Union and the RAB negotiated the CBA in good faith over many decades and included section 30 which expressly subjects ADEA claims to the grievance and arbitration procedures as the sole and exclusive remedy.22 Respondents are members of the Union and worked at the building owned by 14 Penn Plaza while employed by Temco.23 After the Union consented to the new security contract, the reassignments occurred and grievances were filed alleging age discrimination under the ADEA along with seniority and overtime claims.24 The ADEA does not remove this class of grievances from the NLRA's broad authority.25 Gilmer established that arbitration of ADEA claims is permissible.26 Nothing in the statute evinces an intention to preclude waiver of a judicial forum.27 The freely negotiated contractual term therefore qualifies as a condition of employment that courts must honor.28
The facts establish that the CBA arbitration clause meets the clear and unmistakable standard.29 Respondents requested the Union to file grievances that included the ADEA claims.30 After the initial hearing, the Union withdrew only the age discrimination grievances while continuing with the other claims.31 Respondents then pursued their ADEA rights through the EEOC and filed suit in the Southern District of New York.32 Petitioners moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act sections 3 and 4.33 The District Court and Second Circuit denied the motion relying on Gardner-Denver but that precedent does not control because the present CBA expressly covers statutory claims.34 The NLRA supplied the authority for the bargaining and the ADEA supplies no basis for judicial interference with the bargained-for exchange.35
The arbitration provision is enforceable as a matter of federal law.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, And Justice Breyer
Justice Souter's dissent maintains that Gardner-Denver directly controls because the ADEA like Title VII confers an individual right to a judicial forum that a union may not waive through collective bargaining.37 The dissent emphasizes that the statutory scheme provides for overlapping remedies and that arbitration under union control risks subordinating individual interests to collective ones.38 It concludes that stare decisis requires adherence to the 35-year-old holding that employees retain the right to bring ADEA claims in court notwithstanding a CBA arbitration clause.39
Justice Stevens dissents on the ground that the majority improperly substitutes a judicial policy favoring arbitration for the statutory interpretation already settled in Gardner-Denver.40 The dissent notes that Congress has not amended the ADEA and NLRA provisions.41 The earlier decisions rested on the individual nature of antidiscrimination rights rather than on any mistrust of arbitration that later cases have addressed.42
It concludes that the Court should leave any reassessment of the balance between arbitration and statutory rights to Congress.43
Whether the Gardner-Denver line of cases forbids enforcement of collective-bargaining provisions requiring arbitration of ADEA claims?44
The Gardner-Denver trilogy addressed only whether arbitration of contract-based claims under a collective-bargaining agreement that did not cover statutory claims could preclude a subsequent judicial action on statutory rights.45 Its dicta critical of arbitration has been superseded by later decisions recognizing the competence of arbitral forums.46
No. Gardner-Denver involved a CBA that did not expressly require arbitration of Title VII claims and the arbitrator therefore lacked authority to resolve the statutory claim.47 The present CBA section 30 explicitly covers claims under the ADEA and designates arbitration as the sole remedy.48 Barrentine and McDonald likewise turned on CBAs that left statutory claims unaddressed.49 Gilmer clarified that the Gardner-Denver line did not decide the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.50 The CBA here meets the explicit statement requirement of Wright and the arbitration provision is therefore enforceable.51
The facts confirm that the arbitration clause applies directly to the ADEA claims respondents asserted.52 The grievances filed at respondents' request alleged age discrimination in violation of the ADEA.53 The Union withdrew those claims after the initial hearing but the contractual language remained unchanged.54 The District Court and Second Circuit applied Gardner-Denver to bar arbitration yet that precedent does not extend to a CBA that clearly and unmistakably includes statutory claims within its arbitration mandate.55 Subsequent decisions have abandoned the earlier skepticism toward arbitration of employment discrimination claims.56
The Gardner-Denver line of cases does not forbid enforcement of the arbitration provision.57
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, And Justice Breyer
Justice Souter's dissent argues that the majority misreads Gardner-Denver as resting solely on the absence of statutory language in the CBA.58 In fact the decision rested on multiple grounds including the individual character of antidiscrimination rights and the risk that unions will subordinate those rights.59 The dissent points out that Wright itself described Gardner-Denver as imposing a seemingly absolute prohibition on union waiver of federal forum rights.60
It concludes that the precedent remains binding and that the majority's approach effectively overrules it without justification.61