A transfer of property or rights effected by the deliberate act of the owner or holder rather than by operation of law or judicial process. The transfer must be supported by the transferor's intent and is often contrasted with involuntary transfers such as foreclosure sales or executions. Courts examine such transfers for voluntariness.
See Our Sources
How its tested
Common Examples
3
Deed in Lieu Avoids Foreclosure
Vito Villarreal fell behind on mortgage payments to Voss Shipping. To avoid foreclosure proceedings, Vito executed and delivered a deed transferring the property directly to Voss Shipping. The mortgage was discharged upon the transfer, and no junior liens attached because the transaction was treated as satisfying the debt in full.
Payments Fail Gift Test
Violet Vang paid the Church of Scientology for auditing sessions and claimed the amounts as charitable deductions. The payments were held not to qualify because they were exchanged for services rather than made by deliberate owner act without compulsion, so they did not meet the definition of a voluntary transfer.
Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue490 U.S. 680, 698, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2148, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989)
In the 1950s, L. Ron Hubbard founded Scientology. It is propagated today by a mother church in California and by numerous branch churches around the world. The mother church instructs laity, trains and ordains ministers, and creates new congregations. Branch churches known as franchises or missions provide auditing and training sessions at the local level under the supervision of the mother church.
Auditing involves a one-to-one encounter between a participant known as a preclear and a Church official known as an auditor. An electronic device called the E-meter helps the auditor identify the preclear's areas of spiritual difficulty by measuring skin responses during question-and-answer sessions. The preclear gains spiritual awareness by progressing through sequential levels of auditing provided in short blocks of time known as intensives. The Church also offers members doctrinal courses known as training. Participants in these sessions study the tenets of Scientology and seek to attain the qualifications necessary to serve as auditors. Training courses like auditing sessions are provided in sequential levels.
The Church charges a fixed donation also known as a price or fixed contribution for participants to gain access to auditing and training sessions. These charges are set forth in schedules and prices vary with a session's length and level of sophistication. In 1972 for example the general rates for auditing ranged from $625 for a 12 1/2-hour auditing intensive the shortest available to $4,250 for a 100-hour intensive the longest available. Specialized types of auditing required higher fixed donations such as a 12 1/2-hour Integrity Processing auditing intensive that cost $750 and a 12 1/2-hour Expanded Dianetics auditing intensive that cost $950. This system of mandatory fixed charges is based on a central tenet of Scientology known as the doctrine of exchange according to which any time a person receives something he must pay something back.
The Church promotes these sessions not only through newspaper magazine and radio advertisements but also through free lectures free personality tests and leaflets. The Church also encourages and indeed rewards with a 5% discount advance payment for these sessions. The Church often refunds unused portions of prepaid auditing or training fees less an administrative charge. Petitioners Robert L. Hernandez Katherine Jean Graham Richard M. Hermann and David Forbes Maynard each made payments to a branch church for auditing or training sessions. They sought to deduct these payments on their federal income tax returns as charitable contributions under section 170. Hernandez was denied a deduction of $7,338 and was assessed a tax deficiency of $2,245 for 1981. Graham was denied a deduction of $1,682 and was assessed a tax deficiency of $316.24 for 1972. Hermann was denied a tax deduction of $3,922 and was assessed a tax deficiency of $803 for 1975. Maynard was denied a deduction of $5,000 including a carryover of $2,385 for contributions made in 1976 and was assessed a tax deficiency of $643 for 1977. The Commissioner disallowed these deductions finding that the payments were not charitable contributions within the meaning of section 170.
Before trial the Commissioner stipulated that the branch churches of Scientology are religious organizations entitled to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions under sections 170(c)(2) and 501(c)(3) of the Code. This stipulation isolated as the sole statutory issue whether payments for auditing or training sessions constitute contributions or gifts under section 170. The Tax Court consolidated for trial the cases of Graham Hermann and Maynard. Hernandez agreed to be bound by the findings in the consolidated Graham trial reserving his right to a separate appeal. The Tax Court held a 3-day bench trial during which the taxpayers and others testified and submitted documentary exhibits describing the terms under which the Church promotes and provides auditing and training sessions. Based on this record the court upheld the Commissioner's decision. The Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit in Hernandez's case and for the Ninth Circuit in Graham Hermann and Maynard's case affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict concerning the validity of charitable deductions for auditing and training payments.
Vista Manufacturing employees' children lived in a racially segregated district. The district adopted a voluntary transfer program allowing students to attend schools outside their neighborhood to increase integration. Families chose the transfers without compulsion, and the program operated alongside other race-conscious measures.
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1551 U.S. 701, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2007)
In the late 1990s the Seattle School District No. 1 adopted a student assignment plan for its ten regular public high schools. Incoming ninth graders ranked preferences among schools. The district applied a series of tiebreakers when schools were oversubscribed. The second tiebreaker classified students as white or nonwhite.
It selected students whose race would bring an integration-positive school within ten percentage points of the district-wide balance of 41 percent white and 59 percent nonwhite. The plan affected assignments at five oversubscribed schools in the 2000-2001 school year. Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools filed suit in the Western District of Washington in July 2000 alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
Jefferson County Public Schools had been under a 1975 federal desegregation decree. The decree was dissolved in 2000 after a finding of unitary status. The district adopted a voluntary assignment plan in 2001. The plan required all nonmagnet schools to maintain black enrollment between 15 and 50 percent. The plan grouped elementary schools into clusters.
It assigned kindergartners and new students within clusters according to space and racial guidelines. It denied transfer requests that would push a school outside the guidelines. Approximately 34 percent of the district's 97,000 students were black. When Crystal Meredith moved into the district in August 2002 she sought to enroll her son Joshua in kindergarten at Bloom Elementary one mile from their home.
The district denied the intercluster transfer from Young Elementary because it would adversely affect desegregation compliance at Young which was then 46.8 percent black. Meredith filed suit in the Western District of Kentucky alleging an Equal Protection violation. The Seattle District Court granted summary judgment to the district in 2001. The Ninth Circuit en banc affirmed the federal constitutional ruling in 2005. The District Court found that Jefferson County had asserted a compelling interest in maintaining racially diverse schools, and that the assignment plan was in all relevant respects narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion relying upon the reasoning of the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases in 2006.
How does a voluntary transfer differ from an involuntary transfer in property law?
A voluntary transfer occurs when the owner deliberately conveys property or rights, such as through a deed in lieu of foreclosure. An involuntary transfer arises by operation of law, such as a foreclosure sale or execution levy. The distinction determines whether junior liens are extinguished and whether the transaction requires scrutiny for duress.
Supporting sources
What facts show that a transfer of money qualifies as a voluntary part payment reviving a time-barred debt?
A check bearing the notation interest on the antecedent balance together with an accompanying note acknowledging responsibility satisfies the requirement. The notation and delivery constitute a voluntary transfer of money as interest on the debt under the Restatement rule. Courts examine whether other facts indicate a different intention, such as hedging language about the statute of limitations.
Supporting sources
Does a voluntary transfer of a partnership economic interest automatically dissolve the partnership?
No. A partner may freely assign only the transferable economic interest consisting of rights to profits and distributions. The assignment does not cause dissociation of the partner or dissolution of the partnership unless a separate statutory ground exists. The assignee receives only the assigned distributions once the partnership has notice.
Supporting sources
551 U.S. 701, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2007)
…required by those cases often included race-conscious practices, such as mandatory busing and race-based restrictions on voluntary transfers. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Ed. v. Penick , 443 U. S. 449, 455, n. 3 (1979); Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs of Mobile Cty. , 402 U. S. 33, 37–38 (1971); Green v. School Bd. of New Kent…