Also known as: voluntary searches · consent search
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A search conducted pursuant to the voluntary consent of a person with authority over the premises or effects searched. Voluntariness is assessed under the totality of the circumstances, and the government need not prove that the consenter knew of the right to refuse consent.
Victor Vargas agreed without limitation when officers asked to search his car for drugs. Officers opened a sealed sample case in the trunk and found illegal pills. The search remained within the scope of the consent because a reasonable officer could understand the broad agreement to reach containers where drugs might be hidden.
Violet Vang was awakened at 2 a.m. in her dorm room and asked for permission to search her desk and laptop. She replied affirmatively and watched the search proceed. The consent was voluntary under all the circumstances even though officers never advised her of a right to refuse.
Virgil Volpe lived with his roommate and gave officers permission to search their shared apartment. Officers found evidence in a jointly used closet. The consent was effective against the absent roommate because the consenter possessed common authority over the premises.
In February 1971, William Matlock was indicted for robbing a federally insured bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113. A week later he filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from a home in Pardeeville, Wisconsin, where he had been living. Suppression hearings followed in the District Court. On November 12, 1970, Matlock was arrested in the yard in front of the home leased by Mr. and Mrs. Marshall. Living in the home were Mrs. Marshall, several of her children including her daughter Gayle Graff, Graff's three-year-old son, and Matlock. Three arresting officers went to the door, were admitted by Graff, told her they were looking for money and a gun, and asked if they could search the house. Graff consented voluntarily to the search of the house, including the east bedroom on the second floor which she said was jointly occupied by Matlock and herself. The east bedroom was searched and $4,995 in cash was found in a diaper bag in the only closet in the room. Graff made statements to the officers that she and Matlock occupied the east bedroom together, shared the dresser, and had slept together regularly in the room including the early morning of November 12. Other evidence showed Matlock and Graff had lived together in a one-bedroom apartment in Florida from April to August 1970, lived at the Marshall home from August to November 12, 1970, were seen going up or down stairs together, and that the east bedroom contained evidence it was lived in by a man and a woman. At the suppression hearings the District Court excluded as inadmissible hearsay Graff's out-of-court statements about joint occupancy as well as statements by both Graff and Matlock that they were husband and wife. The court concluded the remaining evidence was insufficient to prove to a reasonable certainty that Graff and Matlock were living together in the east bedroom at the time of the search. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court judgment in all respects. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseVeronica Varela refused officers entry to the marital home while her husband was present. Officers nevertheless searched after obtaining the husband's consent. The search was invalid because one co-occupant present and objecting can override the other's consent.
In late May 2001, respondent Scott Randolph and his wife Janet separated when Janet left their marital residence in Americus, Georgia, and went to stay with her parents in Canada, taking their son and some belongings. In July 2001, Janet returned to the Americus house with the child. On the morning of July 6, 2001, Janet complained to the police that after a domestic dispute her husband had taken their son away, and when officers reached the house she told them that her husband was a cocaine user whose habit had caused financial troubles. Shortly after the police arrived, Scott Randolph returned and explained that he had removed the child to a neighbor's house out of concern that his wife might take the boy out of the country again; he denied cocaine use, and countered that it was in fact his wife who abused drugs and alcohol. One of the officers asked Scott Randolph for permission to search the house, which he unequivocally refused. The sergeant then turned to Janet Randolph for consent to search, which she readily gave. She led the officer upstairs to a bedroom that she identified as Scott's, where the sergeant noticed a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue he suspected was cocaine. Sergeant Murray left to get an evidence bag and called the district attorney's office, which instructed him to stop the search and apply for a warrant. When he returned, Janet Randolph withdrew her consent. The police took the straw to the police station along with the Randolphs. After obtaining a search warrant, they returned and seized further evidence of drug use, leading to Scott Randolph's indictment for possession of cocaine. He moved to suppress the evidence as the product of a warrantless search unauthorized by his wife's consent over his express refusal. The trial court denied the motion. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseViktor Voronin consented to a search of his garage after officers explained they would return if a triggering condition occurred. The consent remained voluntary when the condition materialized and officers conducted the search. The agreement was effective because it was given freely under the totality of the circumstances.
Respondent Jeffrey Grubbs purchased a videotape containing child pornography from a Web site operated by an undercover postal inspector. Officers from the Postal Inspection Service arranged a controlled delivery of a package containing the videotape to Grubbs’ residence in the Eastern District of California. A postal inspector submitted a search warrant application to a Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of California, accompanied by an affidavit describing the proposed operation in detail. The affidavit stated that execution of the search warrant would not occur unless and until the parcel had been received by a person or persons and had been physically taken into the residence. The affidavit referred to two attachments describing Grubbs’ residence and the items officers would seize. Those attachments but not the body of the affidavit were incorporated into the requested warrant. The Magistrate Judge issued the warrant as requested. Two days later an undercover postal inspector delivered the package. Grubbs’ wife signed for it and took the unopened package inside. The inspectors detained Grubbs as he left his home a few minutes later, then entered the house and commenced the search. Roughly 30 minutes into the search Grubbs was provided with a copy of the warrant that included both attachments but not the supporting affidavit. He consented to interrogation by the postal inspectors and admitted ordering the videotape. He was placed under arrest, and the officers seized the videotape and other items. A grand jury for the Eastern District of California indicted Grubbs on one count of receiving a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his residence, arguing as relevant here that the warrant was invalid because it failed to list the triggering condition. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied the motion. Grubbs pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
View caseVincent Valdez allowed officers to search his vehicle while they were investigating related offenses. He gave the consent without coercion and observed the search. The resulting evidence was admissible because the consent was voluntary even though officers were already pursuing other charges.
In January 1981, police officers in Belfast, Maine responded to a fire call at the Belfast Dodge automobile dealership and discovered a burning stolen Chevrolet dump truck along with evidence of several automobile thefts inside a building leased to Brian Moulton and his codefendant Gary Colson. On April 7, 1981, a Waldo County grand jury indicted Moulton and Colson on four counts of theft by receiving stolen goods. Moulton and Colson, represented by retained counsel, pleaded not guilty on April 9 and were released on bail. On November 4, 1982, Colson telephoned Police Chief Robert Keating to report anonymous threatening calls and expressed a desire to discuss the pending charges. After consulting his lawyer, Colson met with police on November 9 and 10, provided full confessions of his and Moulton's participation in the thefts and additional crimes including burglary and arson, and agreed to testify against Moulton and cooperate in the prosecution in exchange for no further charges. The police placed a recording device on Colson's telephone with instructions to record calls from Moulton or threats. Colson recorded three telephone conversations with Moulton on November 22, December 2, and December 14, 1982, in which the men discussed the pending charges and arranged to meet on December 26 to plan their defense. On December 26, Colson wore a body wire transmitter to the meeting as arranged with the police, and the two discussed defense strategy including false alibis, during which Moulton made numerous incriminating statements about the thefts that were later admitted at trial. Moulton moved to suppress the recorded statements before trial. The trial court denied the motion after finding the recordings were made to investigate threats and protect Colson. Moulton was convicted of burglary and theft following a bench trial. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reversed the convictions on the ground that the statements were obtained in violation of Moulton's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari.
View caseNo. Knowledge of the right to refuse is only one factor in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. The government need not prove that the person actually knew of the right to refuse.
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Yes. The scope of consent is measured by objective reasonableness. When a person gives unqualified consent to search a vehicle for drugs, a reasonable officer may understand the consent to extend to closed containers where drugs could be concealed.
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No. When one co-occupant is present and objects, that objection overrides the consent of the other co-occupant and renders the search unreasonable as to the objecting party.
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Yes. A signed written consent form provides objective evidence that the person understood the authorization being given and agreed freely, though it is not required for validity.
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…other occupant to remove is by no means insignificant"); cf. Schneckloth , 412 U. S., at 243 (evidence obtained pursuant to a consent search "may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense"). But society can often have the benefit of these interests without relying on a theory of consent…