Also known as: volitional test of mental incapacity · volitional tests for mental incapacity · irresistible impulse test · volitional prong
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A standard for determining criminal insanity that excuses conduct when mental illness prevents the defendant from controlling actions or conforming conduct to the requirements of law. The inability to control need not arise suddenly and may develop or persist over time.
Virgil Volpe, a benefits clerk with severe depression and psychotic episodes, believed his supervisor persecuted him. Over several months an inner pressure built until he smashed office computers and records. Under the volitional test the jury credits expert testimony that his illness left him unable to resist the pressure and acquits him even though he understood the acts were wrong.
Vivian Vaughn, a construction foreman with a documented traumatic brain injury linked to impulse dysregulation, felt an urge to strike a subcontractor grow daily over weeks. After the subcontractor again questioned instructions, Vaughn seized a pipe and swung it. The volitional test permits acquittal because the illness produced an inability to control conduct that developed gradually rather than suddenly.
Monte Durham was convicted of housebreaking by the District Court of the District of Columbia sitting without a jury. The prosecution proceeded on a charge arising from an incident on July 13, 1951, in which Durham was found in a house. Durham's history included discharge from the Navy in 1945 at age seventeen following a psychiatric examination revealing a profound personality disorder rendering him unfit for service. In 1947 he pleaded guilty to violating the National Motor Theft Act and was placed on probation for one to three years. In January 1948, as a result of a conviction in the District of Columbia Municipal Court for passing bad checks, the District Court revoked his probation and he commenced service of his Motor Theft sentence. His conduct within the first few days in jail led to a lunacy inquiry in the Municipal Court where a jury found him to be of unsound mind. Upon commitment to St. Elizabeths he was diagnosed as suffering from 'psychosis with psychopathic personality.' He experienced multiple discharges and readmissions to St. Elizabeths between 1949 and 1951, including a conditional release in June 1950 that he violated, and a further lunacy finding in 1951. Following the July 1951 housebreaking, Durham was indicted in October 1951 and adjudged of unsound mind based on psychiatrists' affidavits diagnosing psychosis with psychopathic personality. He underwent subshock insulin therapy during a six-month commitment ending in February 1953, after which Dr. Silk certified him mentally competent to stand trial and able to assist counsel. At the ensuing trial, the prosecutor expressed a plan to allow Durham to raise an insanity defense on this charge. The court accepted waivers of jury trial and additional competency proceedings despite Durham's expressed desire for further hospitalization. Testimony included that of Durham's mother regarding his post-May 1951 behavior and a psychiatrist who examined him in September 1951 and opined on his mental condition around the time of the offense. The trial court found the defense of insanity not established under the prevailing standards. The appeal reached the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
View caseNo. The test excuses a defendant whose mental illness prevents control over conduct or conformity to law even when the inability develops gradually or exists over time.
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No. Planning does not necessarily show retained control when mental illness destroys the capacity to resist the impulse. The test focuses on whether the illness eliminated the ability to conform conduct to law at the time of the act.
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The volitional test excuses inability to control conduct even when the defendant knows the act is wrong. M'Naghten requires a defect of reason that prevents knowing the nature or wrongfulness of the act.
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Yes. The test is satisfied when mental illness leaves the defendant unable to control actions or conform conduct to law. Expert evidence of that inability supports acquittal even if the defendant understood the conduct was illegal.
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…1951, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 386, 389, 190 F.2d 612, 615. : 88 U.S.App.D.C. at page 389, 190 F.2d at page 615, quoting Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law 41-42 (1925). : In its brief, the prosecution confounds the 'some evidence' test with the 'evidence sufficient to create a reasonable doubt' test,…