unities of interest and possession

Raymond Johnson and plaintiff Hazel Tenhet owned a parcel of property as joint tenants. The deed was executed by Jettie N. Johnson to them as joint tenants. The property consisted of a dwelling house and lot. Its value did not exceed three thousand five hundred dollars at the time of Johnson's death in 1971. Assertedly without plaintiff's knowledge or consent, Johnson leased the property to defendant Boswell. The lease was for a period of ten years at a rental of one hundred fifty dollars per year. It included a provision granting the lessee an option to purchase. Johnson died some three months after execution of the lease. Plaintiff sought to establish her sole right to possession of the property as the surviving joint tenant. After an unsuccessful demand upon defendant to vacate the premises, plaintiff brought this action to have the lease declared invalid. The third amended complaint contained five causes of action. The trial court granted a motion to strike the fourth and fifth causes of action. It sustained demurrers to the second and third causes without leave to amend. But the court made no express ruling on the first cause of action seeking declaratory relief and damages. The trial court sustained demurrers to the complaint and entered a judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appealed from the ensuing judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of California.

Mr. and Mrs. Riddle purchased a parcel of real estate, taking title as joint tenants. Several months before her death, Mrs. Riddle retained an attorney to plan her estate. After reviewing pertinent documents, he advised her that the property was held in joint tenancy and that, upon her death, the property would pass to her husband. Distressed upon learning this, she requested that the joint tenancy be terminated so that she could dispose of her interest by will. As a result, the attorney prepared a grant deed whereby Mrs. Riddle granted to herself an undivided one-half interest in the subject property. The document also provided that “The purpose of this Grant Deed is to terminate those joint tenancies formerly existing between the Grantor, Frances P. Riddle, and Jack C. Riddle, her husband. ...” He also prepared a will disposing of Mrs. Riddle’s interest in the property. Both the grant deed and will were executed on December 8, 1975. Mrs. Riddle died 20 days later. The trial court refused to sanction her plan to sever the joint tenancy and quieted title to the property in her husband. The executrix of the will of Frances Riddle appeals from that judgment.

Roy and Emogene Johnson purchased a home in Van Meter, Iowa, in 1963. They were married and took title to the home as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. They continued to live in their Van Meter home for over thirty-five years, where they raised a family and established the property as their homestead. In the fall of 1998 Emogene suffered a severe stroke. The prognosis for her recovery was bleak, and she required intensive medical attention. Roy and the children felt Emogene would not live long, and they assumed Roy would survive her. Because of these circumstances, the family decided Emogene should transfer title in her automobile to Roy, as well as her interest in the homestead. On November 24, 1998, Emogene purportedly executed a power of attorney in her hospital room. This document designated her daughters, Janice Johnson and Beverly Johnson Algoe, as attorneys-in-fact. The power of attorney authorized Janice and Beverly to sell Emogene’s property, but not her homestead. On December 21, 1998, Janice and Beverly transferred the title for Emogene’s car to Roy. On that same day a quitclaim deed was drafted to convey Emogene and Roy’s interest in their homestead solely to Roy. Roy signed the deed on December 21, and his signature was notarized. On January 4, 1999, Emogene purportedly executed another power of attorney. This power of attorney specified the legal description of the homestead and authorized Janice to convey or encumber Emogene’s interest in the homestead. Then on January 6, 1999, Janice signed the quitclaim deed on behalf of Emogene, as indicated by the notary’s seal. The deed was recorded the same day. Roy suddenly passed away on December 17, 1999, survived by his ailing wife Emogene and the three children, Janice, Beverly, and William. Roy left a will that gave all of his property to his three children in equal shares, although he did not specifically disinherit Emogene. Janice was named executor of Roy’s estate in his will, but Beverly took her place after Janice’s death in June of 2004. Beverly filed the final report in Roy’s estate in June of 2005. Emogene remained the surviving spouse and elected to take against the will. She also objected to the final report filed by Beverly. Emogene claimed the transfers of her car and her interest in the homestead were illegal because she was incompetent when the powers of attorney were executed. The district court found Emogene was clearly incompetent at the time she signed the powers of attorney, which invalidated the transfer of her interest in the property to Roy under the deed. Emogene appealed the district court ruling concerning the title to the homestead. Emogene died in March of 2007, during the pendency of this appeal. As a result, Emogene’s son and executor of her estate, William Johnson, is the named appellant.