Also known as:UCC § 2-614 · U.C.C. 2-614 · UCC 2-614 · Uniform Commercial Code § 2-614 · substituted performance
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A statutory rule requiring tender and acceptance of a commercially reasonable substitute when the agreed manner of delivery or payment becomes commercially impracticable without fault of either party.
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How its tested
Common Examples
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River Closure Forces Rail Switch
Frontier Sustainability agreed to deliver scrap plastic by barge to Highland Environmental's dedicated riverside dock. A chemical spill closed the river and condemned the dock. Frontier tendered rail delivery to a nearby industrial yard that was commercially available and used for similar shipments. Highland refused the tender and Frontier sued for breach.
Gate Failure Blocks Specialized Hauler
Midnight Champions contracted to deliver turf via a specialized hauler through a retractable gate that later failed permanently. The sole hauler exited the market. Midnight tendered flatbed delivery to the stadium parking lot. Global Sports refused the tender citing extra handling risks to the delicate turf.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.415 F. Supp. 429 (1975)
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. and Gulf Oil Corporation maintained a business relationship spanning several decades involving the sale and purchase of aviation fuel. On June 27, 1972, following months of arm's length negotiation, the parties executed a contract under which Gulf agreed to supply Eastern's requirements of jet fuel at specified cities in the Eastern system through January 31, 1977. The agreement was Gulf's standard form aviation fuel contract and incorporated a price escalation clause tied to the average of the posted prices for West Texas sour crude oil 30.0-30.9 gravity as listed for Gulf, Shell, and Pan American in Platt's Oilgram Crude Oil Supplement.
The contract price mechanism operated against the backdrop of U.S. government price controls in effect from 1972 through the fall of 1973. In late 1973 the Arab oil embargo occurred. OPEC unilaterally increased the price of their crude to the world market some 400% between September, 1973, and January 15, 1974. This triggered implementation of two-tier price controls under which old oil remained frozen at controlled levels while new and released oil prices rose from approximately $5 to $11 per barrel. Platt's continued publishing only the controlled old oil postings for West Texas Sour, and Eastern paid contract prices that rose from 11 cents to 15 cents per gallon.
On March 8, 1974, Gulf demanded that Eastern accept a price increase or face cutoff of jet fuel supplies within fifteen days. Eastern filed its complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging breach and seeking preliminary and permanent mandatory injunctions. By agreement of the parties a preliminary injunction preserving the status quo was entered on March 20, 1974, requiring Gulf to continue performance and Eastern to pay according to contract terms pending final disposition.
Gulf answered and asserted that the contract lacked mutuality, was not a binding requirements contract, and was commercially impracticable. At trial the parties presented evidence concerning Eastern's fuel liftings at Gulf stations, which varied daily, weekly, and monthly due to weather, schedules, aircraft loads, and fuel freighting practices that Gulf had accepted without objection over thirty years of dealing. Gulf introduced evidence of its increased crude oil costs, including intra-company transfer prices that incorporated profits from its overseas and domestic production subsidiaries, while the record showed Gulf recorded net profits after taxes of approximately $800 million in 1973 and more than $1.065 billion in 1974.
Birch Land agreed to receive payment for corn seed through a designated foreign bank. New regulations forced routing through a central bank offering worse rates and longer delays. Birch notified Star Rural it would withhold shipment unless an equivalent channel was arranged. Star insisted the regulated bank was the only legal option.
Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co.801 F.2d 1001 (1986)
In 1979 Nexxus Products Company, a California corporation that formulates and markets hair care products, negotiated with Best Barber & Beauty Supply Company, Inc., a Texas corporation in the business of distributing beauty and hair care products to retail stores, barber shops and beauty salons throughout Texas.
Between March and July 1979 Mark Reichek, Best’s president, negotiated with Stephen Redding, Nexxus’ vice-president, over a possible distribution agreement between Best and Nexxus. This resulted in an August 2, 1979 distributorship agreement executed in the form of a July 24, 1979 letter from Reichek to Redding under which Best would serve as the exclusive distributor of Nexxus hair care products to barbers and hair stylists throughout most of Texas except El Paso.
The July 24, 1979 letter set forth pricing terms, Nexxus’s agreement to underwrite training and seminars, payment by letter of credit, and termination provisions allowing cancellation only on the anniversary date with 120 days’ prior notice and requiring Nexxus to buy back inventory at cost if it terminated the relationship.
In July 1981 Sally Beauty Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alberto-Culver Company, acquired Best in a stock purchase transaction and merged Best into Sally Beauty, which succeeded to Best’s rights and interests in all contracts; Alberto-Culver is a major manufacturer of hair care products and a direct competitor of Nexxus.
Shortly after the merger Stephen Redding met with Michael Renzulli, president of Sally Beauty, and wrote a letter stating that Nexxus would not allow Sally Beauty to distribute its products because Sally Beauty was wholly owned by a direct competitor.
In August 1983 Sally Beauty commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Northern District of Illinois, claiming that Nexxus had violated the federal antitrust laws and breached the distribution agreement. Nexxus moved for summary judgment on the breach claim. The district court granted the motion on January 31, 1985. The remaining claims were dismissed by stipulation in May 1985, and final judgment was entered on the breach of contract claim.
Transatlantic Financing agreed to ship goods via a specific sea route. An unforeseen closure made the route unavailable. The carrier offered an alternate commercially reasonable route at no extra cost. The buyer refused the substitute and claimed breach.
Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
Transatlantic Financing Corporation, the operator of the SS CHRISTOS, entered into a voyage charter with the United States on October 2, 1956, for the carriage of a full cargo of wheat from a United States Gulf port to a safe port in Iran. The charter specified the points of origin and destination but did not indicate the route to be taken.
On July 26, 1956, the Government of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company. During the ensuing international crisis, on October 27, 1956, the SS CHRISTOS sailed from Galveston on a course that would have taken her through the Suez Canal. Israel invaded Egypt on October 29, 1956, followed by invasions of the Suez Canal Zone by Great Britain and France on October 31, 1956. On November 2, 1956, the Egyptian Government closed the Suez Canal to traffic by obstructing it with sunken vessels.
After the closure, Transatlantic's representative contacted an employee of the United States Department of Agriculture on or about November 7, 1956, to request instructions on the cargo and to seek additional compensation for a voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. The ship changed course and arrived in Bandar Shapur, Iran, on December 30, 1956. Transatlantic later filed a libel against the United States in the District Court seeking recovery of the costs attributable to the diversion around the Cape of Good Hope.
The District Court dismissed the libel, and Transatlantic appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
When does UCC § 2-614 require acceptance of substitute delivery?
The section applies when agreed berthing, loading, or unloading facilities fail or an agreed carrier becomes unavailable without fault of either party. A commercially reasonable substitute must then be tendered and accepted. The substitute is evaluated from the perspective of both parties and industry norms.
Supporting sources
How does § 2-614(2) differ from the delivery rule in (1)?
Subsection (2) addresses failure of the agreed payment method due to governmental regulation. The seller may withhold delivery unless the buyer supplies a commercially substantial equivalent. Delivery already taken discharges the buyer unless the regulation is discriminatory or predatory.
Supporting sources
Does a buyer have to accept any available substitute under § 2-614?
No. The substitute must be commercially reasonable. Courts examine added costs, risks, handling requirements, and whether the change preserves the essential benefits the parties expected from the original method.
Supporting sources
363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
…was made.” To the extent this limits relief to “unforeseen” circumstances, comment 1, see the discussion below, and compare Uniform Commercial Code § 2-614(1). There may be a point beyond which agreement cannot go, UniformCommercialCode § 2-615, comment 8, presumably the point at which the obligation would be “manifestly unreasonable,” §…
ContractsPerformance, breach, and discharge · Discharge of duties (including accord and satisfaction, substituted contract, novation, rescission, and release)UBEFoundational