Also known as: traditionally exclusively reserved to the states · traditional state functions · traditional governmental functions
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A category of powers whose exercise by a private party constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. The category is limited to functions that only the government has historically performed.
Travis Tate challenged federal wage rules applied to his state transit employer. He argued that operating transit was a traditional governmental function beyond federal reach. The court rejected the claim, noting that the exclusivity test for state action is distinct from Tenth Amendment analysis.
Tiffany Torres challenged a private litigant's use of peremptory strikes in a civil trial. She argued that jury selection is a traditional government function. The court held that even if jury selection is traditional, it has never been exclusively reserved to the State, so no state action occurred.
Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a black construction worker, was injured in a jobsite accident at Fort Polk, Louisiana, a federal enclave, when a Leesville Concrete Company employee permitted one of the company's trucks to roll backward and pin him against some construction equipment. Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Company for negligence in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana and invoked his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. During voir dire, Leesville used two of its three peremptory challenges authorized by statute to remove black persons from the prospective jury. Edmonson, who is himself black, requested that the District Court require Leesville to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the two jurors, but the District Court denied the request on the ground that Batson does not apply in civil proceedings. As empaneled, the jury included 11 white persons and 1 black person. The jury rendered a verdict for Edmonson, assessing his total damages at $90,000, but attributed 80% of the fault to Edmonson's contributory negligence and awarded him the sum of $18,000. Edmonson appealed, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Batson applies to private litigants in civil trials. The full court then ordered rehearing en banc and affirmed the judgment of the District Court, holding that a private litigant in a civil case can exercise peremptory challenges without accountability for alleged racial classifications. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue.
View caseTara Tran sued a private electric company after it terminated her service without a hearing. She asserted that providing essential utility service qualified as a public function. The court ruled that utility service is not a power traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.
Catherine Jackson, a resident of York, Pennsylvania, received electric service from Metropolitan Edison Co., a privately owned Pennsylvania corporation that held a certificate of public convenience from the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission authorizing it to deliver electricity in the York area. The company operated under an agreement and a general tariff filed with the Commission that reserved the right to discontinue service on reasonable notice for nonpayment of bills. Until September 1970 Jackson maintained an account in her own name; after that account was terminated for asserted delinquency, a new account was opened in the name of James Dodson, another occupant of the residence, and service resumed. In August 1971 Dodson left the residence and no further payments were made. On October 6, 1971, Metropolitan employees visited the home to inquire about Dodson's address. The next day another employee informed Jackson that the meter had been tampered with and she disclaimed knowledge of the tampering while requesting that the account be transferred to the name of her twelve-year-old son, Robert Jackson. Four days later, on October 11, 1971, without additional notice, Metropolitan employees disconnected service to the residence. Jackson filed suit against Metropolitan in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She sought damages and an injunction requiring continued service until she received notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay any amounts found due, alleging that the termination without those procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted Metropolitan's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the termination did not constitute state action. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.
View caseThomas Thompson challenged a private creditor's use of a state attachment procedure to seize his property. He claimed the procedure delegated a traditional sovereign power. The court found that the attachment mechanism was not a power traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.
In 1977, petitioner Lugar, the lessee-operator of a truckstop in Virginia, became indebted to respondent Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., his petroleum supplier. When Lugar fell behind in payments, Edmondson filed suit on the debt in Virginia state court and, ancillary to that action, petitioned for prejudgment attachment of Lugar's property under Virginia Code § 8.01-533. Acting on an ex parte petition alleging that Lugar was disposing of property to defeat creditors, the state court clerk issued a writ of attachment that the county sheriff executed, sequestering Lugar's property. A state trial judge later conducted a hearing on the attachment and ordered it dismissed because Edmondson had failed to establish the statutory grounds alleged in the petition. Lugar then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against Edmondson and its president. His complaint alleged that respondents had acted jointly with the State to deprive him of his property without due process of law, challenging both the constitutionality of the Virginia attachment statute and its application to him. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that respondents' actions did not constitute state action as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. It held that a private party acts under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 only when there is a usurpation or corruption of official power by the private litigant or a surrender of judicial power to the private litigant in such a way that the independence of the enforcing officer has been compromised to a significant degree. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' construction of the under-color-of-state-law requirement.
View caseTrevor Tate, a state transit employee, argued that federal wage rules could not reach his employer because operating transit was a traditional governmental function. The court rejected the claim, noting that the exclusivity test for state action is distinct from Tenth Amendment analysis.
The original Fair Labor Standards Act passed in 1938 specifically excluded the States and their political sub-divisions from its coverage. Amendments in 1961 extended coverage to employees of enterprises engaged in commerce, and 1966 amendments removed the exemption for employees of state hospitals, institutions, and schools. The Supreme Court upheld the 1966 amendments in Maryland v. Wirtz in 1968. In 1974, Congress amended the Act to include a public agency within the definition of employer and to deem employees of public agencies as engaged in commerce. These amendments applied the Act's requirements to almost all public employees of the States and their subdivisions, subject only to the general exemption for executive, administrative, or professional personnel and certain officeholders. Appellants consisting of the National League of Cities, numerous States, and municipalities challenged these amendments. The appellants alleged in their complaint that compliance would impose significant additional costs, including $938,000 per year for the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for police and fire protection, $2.5 million annually for Arizona, and between $8 million and $16 million for California. They further claimed that the overtime provisions would force reductions in training programs, such as shortening the California Highway Patrol academy from 2,080 to 960 hours, and curtail affirmative action and internship programs in cities like Inglewood and Clovis. A three-judge district court was convened and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, stating that it was bound by Maryland v. Wirtz despite finding the contentions substantial. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, heard initial argument in 1975, reargued the case in March 1976, and issued its decision on June 24, 1976.
View caseTheo Thomas challenged federal mining rules applied to a state-operated facility. He contended the activity was a traditional state function beyond federal reach. The court held that the relevant inquiry was whether the function was traditionally exclusively reserved to the State, which mining regulation was not.
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 establishes a nationwide program to regulate surface coal mining operations. Title II creates the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement within the Department of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior, acting through that office, bears primary responsibility for promulgating regulations and enforcing the Act's provisions. The Act implements a two-stage regulatory scheme consisting of an interim phase and a permanent phase. In the interim phase, which began after the Secretary published regulations on December 13, 1977, mine operators must comply with selected federal performance standards. These standards govern land restoration, topsoil segregation, hydrologic balance, and related matters. States may issue permits subject to those standards, but the federal government retains independent enforcement authority. On October 23, 1978, the Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., an association of coal producers operating in Virginia, together with 63 of its member companies and four individual landowners, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the interim regulatory program's performance standards and enforcement provisions of the Act. The Commonwealth of Virginia and the town of Wise intervened as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' challenge focused primarily on the interim regulatory program's performance standards. They alleged that those provisions violated the Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court conducted a thirteen-day trial on the request for a permanent injunction. In a 1980 opinion and order, the District Court rejected the plaintiffs' Commerce Clause, equal protection, and substantive due process challenges. It held that the steep-slope provisions of the Act violated the Tenth Amendment by displacing the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions. The court also ruled that various provisions effected an uncompensated taking of private property. It found due process violations in certain enforcement mechanisms and permanently enjoined the Secretary from enforcing the invalidated provisions. In No. 79-1538 the Secretary appealed the portions of the judgment declaring provisions unconstitutional and enjoining their enforcement. In No. 79-1596 the plaintiffs cross-appealed the rejection of their Commerce Clause challenge. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals in 1980 and consolidated the cases.
View caseThe plaintiff must demonstrate that the private party exercised a power traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. Courts have identified only a narrow set of such powers, including conducting elections and operating a company town.
No. The function must also have been exclusively reserved to the State. Many services such as utilities and parks have been performed by both public and private actors, so they fall outside the test.
The Tenth Amendment test once asked whether an activity was a traditional governmental function, but that approach was rejected as unworkable. The state-action phrase requires exclusivity as well as tradition and remains good law for determining when private conduct is state action.