temporal proximity

In December 2006, an anonymous tipster contacted the South Salt Lake City police department's drug-tip line to report narcotics activity at a particular residence, specifying that the activity involved a white male and providing a physical description of the man and his car. Detective Douglas Fackrell was assigned to investigate the tip and conducted intermittent surveillance of the home over the course of about a week. During this period, Fackrell observed visitors who would frequently enter the residence and leave after short periods of time, a pattern consistent with drug dealing in his experience. One of the visitors was Edward Strieff. Officer Fackrell observed Strieff exit the house and walk toward a nearby convenience store. In the store's parking lot, Fackrell detained Strieff without reasonable suspicion, identified himself as a police officer, and asked what Strieff was doing at the residence. As part of the stop, Fackrell requested Strieff's identification, and Strieff produced his Utah identification card. Fackrell relayed the information to a police dispatcher, who reported that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Fackrell arrested Strieff pursuant to the warrant. When Fackrell searched Strieff incident to the arrest, he discovered a baggie of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The State of Utah charged Strieff with unlawful possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was obtained by exploitation of an unlawful investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion. The Utah Supreme Court reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The United States prosecuted Jerri C. Lewis for bank robbery after FBI Special Agent Michael E. Degnan identified her from photographs taken during a robbery on October 9, 1986. Degnan recognized Lewis from his prior work as case agent in an earlier bank robbery prosecution that resulted in her conviction, and Lewis was arrested on October 20, 1986. On October 21, 1986, Degnan and Special Agent Fujita visited the prison ward of San Francisco General Hospital to interview Lewis, where they learned from the hall nurse that she had just returned from surgery to remove an abscess on her left shoulder caused by narcotics injection. The agents spoke with her for approximately two minutes, during which Degnan asked whether she was going to come clean and Lewis replied that she would, and when asked how many robberies they would discuss she responded that the number was three; the agents then told her they would return the next day. The agents returned on October 22, 1986, and the hall nurse informed them that Lewis was alert and not under any medication that would affect her ability to be interviewed. Lewis appeared alert, looked much better than the day before, and stated she was feeling okay. Agent Fujita gave her a copy of the FO 395 Advice of Rights and Waiver Form, read it to her, and she signed it to indicate waiver of counsel while acknowledging that no promises, threats, pressure, or coercion had been used against her. During the interview Lewis admitted committing three robberies and commented on photographs of the crimes shown to her. Lewis moved to suppress both statements, arguing in her memorandum that the October 21 statement was involuntary because she was a heroin addict suffering from drug withdrawal and was questioned hours after awakening from general anesthesia, and that the October 22 statement was obtained through exploitation of the prior admission. At the December 18, 1986 hearing on the motion, the district court stated that the first statement was not knowing and voluntary before hearing argument from counsel, relying on the judge's personal experience coming out of general anesthesia, even though the factual issues had been submitted on declarations filed by each party and the court stated it was resolving controverted facts in favor of the government while discounting the defendant's claims. The government appealed the suppression order. The appeal was submitted on the declarations, with the district court having accepted as true the facts set forth in Degnan's declaration and having rejected all contradictory statements in Lewis's declaration as untrue.

In 2001 Boston police officers received a tip that a Kmart employee was engaging in suspicious activity involving repeated short trips in a blue sedan. Officers set up surveillance in the parking lot, observed the described sequence of events, detained the employee upon his return, and discovered four clear plastic bags containing a substance resembling cocaine. The officers then arrested the two men in the car, one of whom was petitioner Luis Melendez-Diaz. The officers placed all three suspects in a police cruiser. During the short drive to the police station the officers observed their passengers fidgeting and making furtive movements in the back of the car. After depositing the men at the station they searched the police cruiser and found a plastic bag containing nineteen smaller bags hidden in the partition between the front and back seats. The officers submitted the seized substances to the State Laboratory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, which was required by law to conduct chemical analysis upon police request. Analysts at the laboratory performed the tests on November 28, 2001, and prepared three certificates of analysis that reported the weight of the bags and stated that the substance was found to contain cocaine. Each certificate was sworn before a notary public by the analysts, as required under Massachusetts law, and reprinted the statutory provision making the certificates prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and net weight of the narcotic analyzed. Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing cocaine and trafficking in cocaine in an amount between 14 and 28 grams. At trial the prosecution introduced the bags seized from the codefendant and from the cruiser along with the three certificates. Petitioner objected to admission of the certificates, asserting that Crawford v. Washington required the analysts to testify in person. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the certificates pursuant to the state statute. The jury found Melendez-Diaz guilty. He appealed, contending that admission of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions, relying on a prior decision of the Supreme Judicial Court that had held forensic analysts are not subject to confrontation. The Supreme Judicial Court denied review, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In December 1981, the home of Mr. and Mrs. Gilbert Gross in Salem, Oregon, was burglarized, with art objects and furnishings valued at $150,000 missing. A witness implicated 18-year-old Michael James Elstad, a neighbor and friend of the Grosses' teenage son. Officers Burke and McAllister arrived at Elstad's home with an arrest warrant. Elstad's mother led them to his bedroom where he lay on his bed. The officers asked him to get dressed and accompany them to the living room. Officer Burke asked Elstad if he knew why they were there and if he knew the Gross family. Burke then stated he felt Elstad was involved in the burglary, and Elstad responded, "Yes, I was there." The officers arrested Elstad and transported him to the Polk County Sheriff's office. Approximately one hour later, the officers joined Elstad in an interrogation room. Detective McAllister advised Elstad of his Miranda rights from a printed card. Elstad indicated he understood his rights and wished to speak with the officers. He then provided a full statement explaining that he had known the Gross family was out of town, had been paid to lead acquaintances to the residence, and showed them how to enter through a defective sliding glass door. The statement was typed, reviewed, corrected, initialed, and signed by Elstad and the officers. Elstad added a sentence about receiving a bag of grass. Elstad was charged with first-degree burglary. He waived his right to a jury trial. Before trial, he moved to suppress both his oral statement at home and his signed confession at the station. The trial court suppressed the initial statement but admitted the written confession, finding it was given freely, voluntarily, and knowingly after a valid waiver. Elstad was convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment plus $18,000 in restitution. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. The court held that the second statement was inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree because the connection between the inadmissible first statement and the written confession was not sufficiently attenuated. The Oregon Supreme Court declined review. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the question whether the Self-Incrimination Clause requires suppression of a confession made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission.