A doctrine in property law that permits successive periods of adverse possession or prescriptive use to be combined to satisfy the statutory period. The doctrine applies when privity exists between the successive users, such as through a transfer of the dominant estate or business assets that carries the claim of right. It prevents forfeiture of established uses by recognizing practical continuity rather than requiring each user to begin a new period.
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Cases
How its tested
Common Examples
6
Stock Acquisition Continues Trench Use
Blue Logic installed and maintained an unpermitted fiber-optic trench on Anne's lot starting in 1998. In 2008 Bay Software acquired Blue Logic by stock purchase and retained the same employees who continued identical maintenance and use of the trench without interruption. The combined periods exceeded twenty years before Anne objected. Bay Software may tack Blue Logic's prior use because the stock acquisition transferred all business assets and rights, establishing the required privity.
Farm Sale Transfers Irrigation Lines
Stanley installed and used irrigation lines across Conrad's field without permission beginning in 1985 and continued openly for twenty years. In 2005 Stanley sold the farm to Fair Greenhouse under a contract that expressly included the irrigation system and associated rights. Fair Greenhouse continued the identical use for fifteen more years. Fair Greenhouse may tack Stanley's period because the conveyance of the system and rights created privity between the successive users.
Access Agreement Fails to Interrupt Use
Zenith Drug used Bridge Life Sciences' private road for deliveries for twelve years. Seven years ago Bridge Life Sciences filed a trespass suit and the parties signed a six-month access agreement that expired without renewal. Zenith Drug immediately resumed the same daily use for five more years without further objection. Zenith Drug may tack the pre-agreement years because the temporary agreement did not produce a permanent cessation or alter the adverse character of the use.
Unenforced Judgment Does Not Break Continuity
Highland Therapeutics drove medical vans daily over Fair Clinical's service road for fifteen years. Seven years ago Fair Clinical obtained a judgment declaring the use a trespass but never enforced it or blocked the road. Highland continued the identical daily use without interruption. Highland may tack the post-judgment years because the unenforced judgment did not cause an actual cessation or change the essential attitude of adverse use.
Single Towing Incident Creates Interruption
Red Coverage employees parked daily in Union Protection's driveway for more than fifteen years. Union Protection posted no-parking signs and towed one vehicle on a single weekend. Red Coverage employees resumed daily parking thereafter without further interference. Red Coverage cannot tack the pre-towing period because the successful self-help measure caused a cessation of the use without legal proceedings.
Seasonal Cabin Use Supports Tacking
The Kuntos and their predecessors occupied a summer cabin on land later claimed by the Howards under a mistaken boundary for successive periods totaling more than the statutory term. Each family used the property consistently with its seasonal nature and transferred possession through deeds that included the occupied land. The Howards may tack the prior periods because the successive possessors acted under a good-faith claim of right and maintained privity through the chain of title transfers.
Howard v. Kunto2 Wash. App. 348, 469 P.2d 990
Land surveying errors led to a mismatch between deed descriptions and actual occupations on the shore of Hood Canal in Mason County. As long ago as 1932, McCall resided in the house now occupied by the Kuntos under a deed describing a 50-foot-wide parcel that was adjacent to the lot where the house stood. Several property owners to the west of defendants were similarly situated.
Since 1946, several conveyances occurred using the same legal description accompanied by transfer of possession to succeeding occupants. The Kuntos' immediate predecessors, the Millers, had a survey performed to build a dock which indicated conformity between deed and occupation, leading to placement of boundary stakes and construction of improvements.
The Kuntos took possession of the disputed property under a deed from the Millers in 1959. In 1960, the Howards, who held land east of the Kuntos, undertook a survey to convey an undivided one-half interest to the Yearlys. The survey revealed that the Howards were record owners of land occupied by the Moyers and the Moyers held record title to land occupied by the Kuntos.
In April 1960, Howard obtained a conveyance from Moyer of the land upon which the Kunto house stood in exchange for conveying the land upon which the Moyer house stood. Until that conveyance, neither Moyer nor predecessors asserted any right to the property possessed by Kunto and predecessors. Plaintiffs instituted this action to quiet title on August 19, 1960, when defendants had been in occupancy of the disputed property less than a year.
The trial court denied the Kuntos' claim of adverse possession, finding a lack of continuity of possession or estate to permit tacking and that defendants' possession was not continuous because it involved only summer occupancy. Defendants appealed from the decree quieting title in the plaintiffs.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
What relationship between successive users satisfies the privity requirement for tacking?
Privity exists when a transfer of the dominant estate or business assets carries the claim of right, such as a stock purchase that includes all rights used in operations or a deed that expressly conveys an irrigation system and associated rights. The later user must succeed to the precise adverse claim asserted by the earlier user so that the periods combine without resetting the clock.
Supporting sources
Does an unprosecuted trespass suit or temporary access agreement interrupt continuity for tacking purposes?
An unadjudicated suit or strictly temporary agreement that expires without renewal does not interrupt continuity when the use resumes immediately in the same manner and the servient owner takes no further enforcement steps. The rule requires either pursuit of legal proceedings to judgment or an actual cessation of the use to break the required attitude of adversity.
Supporting sources
When does a judgment declaring the use trespassory prevent tacking of later periods?
A final judgment on the merits that determines the use lacks legal justification interrupts the period even if the servient owner never enforces the resulting injunction or records the judgment. The adjudication itself satisfies the rule by establishing that the use is no longer adverse in the required sense.
Supporting sources
Does a single successful self-help measure such as towing interrupt the prescriptive period?
A single towing that actually causes a cessation of the use, even if temporary, interrupts continuity when accomplished without legal proceedings. The rule focuses on whether the servient owner caused a stoppage through self-help rather than on the number of incidents or whether the use later resumes.
Supporting sources
Real PropertyRights in real property · Easements, profits, and licensesUBEFoundational