Also known as: substantially justified · substantially justify
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A factual and legal basis for a discovery certification or other litigation position that is reasonable under the circumstances and sufficient to avoid sanctions. The standard requires an inquiry into available information that supports the position taken rather than a reflexive or unsupported assertion.
Sofia Stern's counsel signed responses claiming all requested GPS logs were irretrievably lost after a system upgrade. The client had received an offer from its regular IT vendor to attempt recovery, yet counsel neither contacted the vendor nor disclosed the offer. The court found the certification lacked substantial justification and imposed sanctions requiring payment of the opposing party's expenses.
State B required all applicants for bar admission to maintain a permanent residence within the state for at least one year before applying. Sasha Stone, a licensed attorney residing in State A, challenged the rule as violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The court held that the residency requirement lacked substantial justification and could not stand.
State C denied reciprocal admission to out-of-state lawyers unless they maintained an in-state office. Sophia Singh, a practitioner in State D, sought admission without relocating. The court ruled that the office requirement infringed the right to pursue the common calling of law practice and lacked substantial justification under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
A state statute prohibited physicians from prescribing medication to hasten death for terminally ill patients. Stella Shapiro, a physician, argued the ban lacked substantial justification when applied to competent patients who had made informed end-of-life decisions. The court upheld the statute after finding the state's interests provided the required justification.
Washington has prohibited assisting suicide since its territorial days. In 1854, the first Territorial Legislature outlawed assisting another in the commission of self-murder. The current statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060, provides that a person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt suicide, and classifies it as a class C felony punishable by up to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979, states that the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a patient's direction shall not constitute a suicide, but the state has consistently rejected efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide, including a 1991 ballot initiative defeated by voters. The respondents in this case are four physicians who practice in Washington and treat terminally ill patients, three terminally ill patients who sought to end their lives with physician assistance and have since died, and Compassion in Dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people considering physician-assisted suicide. The physicians declared that they would assist their patients in ending their lives if not for the assisted-suicide ban. Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. In January 1994, the respondents filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. They sought a declaration that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060 is unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court held that the statute was unconstitutional. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision, but the full court sitting en banc reversed the panel and affirmed the District Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
A union sought to enforce an arbitration award against a textile manufacturer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Scott Summers, counsel for the manufacturer, resisted enforcement on grounds that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The court enforced the award after determining that the resistance lacked substantial justification.
In 1953 the Textile Workers Union of America entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Lincoln Mills of Alabama. The agreement was to run for one year and from year to year thereafter unless terminated on specified notices. It contained a no-strike clause and established a multi-step grievance procedure whose final step, available to either party, was arbitration. Several grievances concerning work loads and work assignments arose under the agreement. The union processed the grievances through every step of the contractual procedure, after which the employer denied them. The union then requested arbitration, but the employer refused. The union filed suit in federal district court seeking an order compelling the employer to arbitrate the grievances. The district court held that it possessed jurisdiction and directed the employer to comply with the arbitration provisions of the agreement. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote, concluding that the district court lacked authority under either federal or state law to grant the requested relief. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. After the Court of Appeals decision but before oral argument, Lincoln Mills terminated its operations, ceased all work at the mill in March 1957, and contracted to sell its mill properties. Some of the grievances sought back pay for increased workloads, and the collective bargaining agreement authorized the arbitration board to adjust compensation retroactively.
A federal court sitting in diversity had to decide whether to apply state or federal law to a contract issue. Stephen Shaw, counsel for the defendant, urged application of state law without citing controlling precedent or distinguishing federal interests. The appellate court found the argument lacked substantial justification and remanded for application of federal law.
Salve Regina College is an institution of higher education located in Newport, Rhode Island. Sharon L. Russell was admitted to the college and began her studies as a freshman in 1982. The following year, Russell sought admission to the college’s nursing department to pursue a bachelor of science degree in nursing. She was accepted by the department and began her nursing studies in the fall of 1983. Russell was five feet six inches tall and weighed in excess of 300 pounds when she was accepted in the nursing program. Her weight became a topic of commentary and concern by officials of the nursing program immediately after the 1983 school year began. Her first year in the program was marked by a series of confrontations and negotiations concerning her obesity and its effect upon her ability to complete the clinical requirements safely and satisfactorily. During her junior year, Russell signed a document that was designated as a contract. The contract conditioned her further participation in the nursing program upon weekly attendance at a weight-loss seminar and a realized average loss of two pounds per week. When she failed to meet these commitments, she was asked to withdraw from the program and did so. Russell transferred to a nursing program at another college but had to repeat her junior year in order to satisfy the transferee institution’s two-year residency requirement. She also underwent surgery for her obesity. In 1987, Russell successfully completed her nursing education and is now a registered nurse. Soon after leaving Salve Regina College, Russell filed this civil action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. She asserted claims based on intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and nonperformance by the college of its implied agreement to educate her. Subject-matter jurisdiction in the District Court was based on diversity of citizenship. The parties agree that the law of Rhode Island applies to all substantive aspects of the action. At the close of plaintiff-respondent’s case in chief, the District Court directed a verdict for the individual defendants on all three of the remaining claims and for the college on the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. The court denied the college’s motion for a directed verdict on the breach-of-contract claim. At the close of all the evidence, the college renewed its motion for a directed verdict on the contract claim. The District Court denied the motion and submitted the breach-of-contract claim to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Russell and determined that the damages were $30,513.40. Judgment was entered. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits concerning the appropriate standard of appellate review.
A certification lacks substantial justification when counsel fails to conduct a reasonable inquiry into information reasonably available to the party before signing. Blanket objections or assertions of unavailability that rest on unexamined files or ignored vendor offers violate the rule. The court must impose sanctions when the violation occurs without substantial justification.
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…own bodies, medical care, and, fundamentally, the future course of their lives," and who have concluded responsibly and with substantial justification that the brief and anguished remainders of their lives have lost virtually all value to them. Respondents fully embrace the notion that the State must be free to impose reasonable…
…in a suit against the United States to recover attorneys' fees and costs, but only if the position of the United States was not "substantially justified
…of the evidence. Here, the Court of Appeals determined that the District Court "applied the correct legal standard and offered substantial justification for its finding of a Rule 11 violation." 277 U. S. App. D. C., at 339, 875 F. 2d, at 896. Its affirmance of the District Court's liability determination is consistent with the deferential…
…mandated by Rule 11”); Pierce , 487 U. S., at 562 (“[T]he question whether the Government’s litigating position has been ‘substantially justified’ is . . . a multifarious and novel question, little susceptible, for the time being at least, of useful generalization”). Nothing about the exercise of diversity jurisdiction alters these…
…legal representation" or "meaningful access to courts," the court found, was infringed by the fee limitation — again without substantial justification
No. An attorney's long experience with a company's safety record does not substitute for examining readily accessible archives when discovery requests target prior incidents. The presence of contradictory internal reports that were never reviewed demonstrates that the certification was not formed after a reasonable inquiry.
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States may not impose discriminatory residency requirements on nonresident lawyers seeking to practice law unless the requirements rest on substantial justification. Speculative assumptions about out-of-state lawyers' competence or availability do not supply the required justification. The practice of law is a protected common calling under the Clause.
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Serving broad requests immediately after a firm trial date is set, without narrowing to already produced materials, supports an inference that the requests were interposed to harass or increase costs. The absence of any attempt to use less burdensome alternatives indicates that the certification lacked substantial justification.
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