Also known as: stratagems · artifice · deceit
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A trick or deception employed to obtain an advantage. The device typically involves misrepresentation or concealment that induces reliance by another party.
Skylar Sullivan, a used-car wholesaler, tells Sarah Sullivan that a bank has already approved a floor-plan credit line naming her company as owner of record. In reality the bank sent only a conditional email. Sarah signs over title certificates in reliance on the statement. The stratagem supplies the knowing misrepresentation that turns the transaction into false pretenses.
Simon Stern, project manager for CleanSoil, tells Sasha Stone at BuildCo that an engineering report confirms the foundation can support new construction. Stern knows no such report exists and relies only on an informal comment. Stone signs the subcontract in reliance. The stratagem constitutes the fraudulent misrepresentation that renders the agreement voidable.
Sean Steele and Simone Sanders negotiate a marital settlement. Sean conceals substantial offshore accounts from Simone. She signs the agreement without knowledge of the assets. The stratagem of nondisclosure supplies the fraud that permits the court to set the agreement aside.
Sterling Dynamics sells equipment to Skyline Construction after assuring the buyer that an independent report verifies load capacity. No report exists. Skyline later discovers the defect and sues for damages. The stratagem produces the pecuniary loss recoverable under the deceit measure.
Police officers question a suspect by falsely claiming they already possess conclusive evidence of guilt. They employ repeated stratagems to break resistance and obtain a confession. The tactics place the suspect in a psychological state where the story becomes an elaboration of the officers' assertions.
In March 1963 Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home in Phoenix and taken to the police station where he was identified by the complaining witness. He was then questioned by two officers in Interrogation Room No. 2 for two hours. The officers did not advise him of any right to counsel. Miranda signed a typed confession that was introduced at his trial for kidnapping and rape. On October 14 1960 Michael Vignera was arrested in connection with a Brooklyn robbery. He was taken first to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan and later to the 66th Detective Squad. A detective questioned him for several hours without any advice concerning counsel. Vignera made an oral admission. He was then questioned by an assistant district attorney whose transcribed statement was also introduced at his trial for first-degree robbery. On March 20 1963 Carl Calvin Westover was arrested by Kansas City police as a suspect in two local robberies. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Westover was then turned over to FBI agents who questioned him for two to two-and-a-half hours about California robberies and obtained signed confessions. At the time the FBI agents began questioning Westover he had been in custody for over fourteen hours. On January 31 1963 Roy Allen Stewart was arrested at his home in connection with a series of purse-snatch robberies. During the next five days police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions without any advice of rights. On the ninth session Stewart confessed. Transcripts of the interrogations were introduced at his trial for kidnapping rape and murder. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction. The New York courts affirmed Vignera's conviction. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Westover's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed Stewart's conviction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the four cases and consolidated them for argument.
View caseA taxpayer sues to enjoin federal expenditures claimed to violate the Establishment Clause. The government argues the plaintiff lacks standing because no direct injury is shown. The stratagem of asserting a generalized grievance fails when the plaintiff demonstrates a logical link between the spending and a specific constitutional limitation.
Congress enacted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. That statute authorized federal grants under Titles I and II to state and local educational agencies. Seven individuals who paid federal income taxes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. They sued the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Commissioner of Education in their official capacities. The complaint alleged that federal funds appropriated under the Act were being disbursed with the consent and approval of the defendants. Those funds were being used to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools and to purchase textbooks and instructional materials for use in such schools. The complaint attacked the specific criterion of 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(2) that to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements in which such children can participate. The plaintiffs alleged that these expenditures constituted compulsory taxation for religious purposes in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. They requested a declaratory judgment that the expenditures were unauthorized or alternatively that the Act was unconstitutional to that extent together with an injunction restraining approval of further expenditures for the challenged purposes. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. A three-judge district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.
View caseA stratagem involves a knowing misrepresentation or concealment intended to induce reliance. Ordinary negotiation statements may be puffery or opinions that do not rise to the level of actionable deceit.
A lawyer engages in misconduct by employing a stratagem that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The violation occurs even when the conduct is accomplished through the acts of another.
A stratagem produces liability in deceit only when the recipient justifiably relies on the misrepresentation and suffers a pecuniary loss caused by that reliance. The measure includes the difference between the value received and the price paid plus consequential losses.
A stratagem of fraud, deceit, or nondisclosure permits a court to set aside the agreement. Even without misconduct, an agreement may be set aside if it is unfair and the challenging spouse lacked full financial disclosure.
A stratagem that procures apparent consent through misrepresentation renders the taking trespassory. Consent induced by deceit about a present fact is legally ineffective.
…the efficacy of these characteristics in this manner: "In the preceding paragraphs emphasis has been placed on kindness and stratagems. The investigator will, however, encounter many situations where the sheer weight of his personality will be the deciding factor. Where emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no…