Also known as:spousal immunities · interspousal immunity · marital immunity
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
1
in criminal procedure
An evidentiary privilege that bars compulsion of one spouse to give adverse testimony against the other in a criminal proceeding. The privilege applies only while a valid marriage exists and may reach events occurring before the marriage. In federal court the privilege belongs solely to the witness spouse, who may elect to testify or refuse, while the defendant spouse holds no power to block willing testimony except as to confidential marital communications.
2
Sense 1
1
in criminal procedure
An evidentiary privilege that bars compulsion of one spouse to give adverse testimony against the other in a criminal proceeding. The privilege applies only while a valid marriage exists and may reach events occurring before the marriage. In federal court the privilege belongs solely to the witness spouse, who may elect to testify or refuse, while the defendant spouse holds no power to block willing testimony except as to confidential marital communications.
See Our Sources· 2 primary sources
Cases
Sense 2
2
in tort law
A common-law doctrine that prevents one spouse from maintaining a tort action against the other for personal injuries. The doctrine rests on the historical unity of husband and wife and on policies favoring marital harmony. Most jurisdictions have abolished or severely limited the immunity, allowing interspousal tort suits in at least some circumstances.
A common-law doctrine that prevents one spouse from maintaining a tort action against the other for personal injuries. The doctrine rests on the historical unity of husband and wife and on policies favoring marital harmony. Most jurisdictions have abolished or severely limited the immunity, allowing interspousal tort suits in at least some circumstances.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Common Law
Examples2
Federal Witness Spouse Election
Federal prosecutors subpoena Luis to testify against his husband Daniel in an insider-trading prosecution. Luis states he feels morally obligated to cooperate. Daniel objects and asserts spousal immunity. The court overrules the objection because the privilege belongs only to Luis, who may choose to testify even over Daniel's objection.
State Party Spouse Control
In a state prosecution Owen faces trafficking charges. The state calls his husband Liam to testify about conversations during their still-valid marriage. Liam wants to testify, but Owen objects. Because the state follows the majority rule vesting the privilege in the party spouse, Owen may invoke spousal immunity to prevent Liam from testifying at all.
4 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
Who holds the spousal immunity privilege against adverse testimony in federal criminal cases?
The privilege belongs solely to the witness spouse. That spouse may choose to testify against the defendant spouse or refuse to do so. The defendant spouse cannot invoke the privilege to block willing testimony.
Supporting sources
Does spousal immunity in state court allow the defendant spouse to prevent testimony even when the witness spouse wants to cooperate?
Yes. Under the majority state rule the privilege is held by the party spouse, who may block the witness spouse from testifying regardless of the witness spouse's wishes.
Supporting sources
Can spousal immunity be asserted regarding events that occurred before the marriage?
Yes. The privilege may be invoked as to matters occurring before the marriage provided a valid marriage exists at the time testimony is sought.
Supporting sources
Does a pending divorce terminate the spousal immunity privilege?
No. The privilege continues as long as the parties remain legally married. Separation or the filing of divorce proceedings does not end the marriage or the availability of the privilege.
Supporting sources
3
Oklahoma Tort Suit Allowed
A plaintiff injured in an automobile accident sues her husband in Oklahoma state court. The defendant moves to dismiss on the ground that Texas interspousal immunity bars the claim. The court denies the motion because Oklahoma has abolished spousal immunity and permits one spouse to maintain a tort action against the other.
White v. White618 P.2d 921 (Okla.1980)
In this personal injury action, plaintiff Marilyn S. White alleged that she was a passenger in a truck driven by defendant Robert W. White. They were traveling south on Interstate 35 near the city of Louisville, Texas, when the defendant lost control of his truck, overturning it and causing injury to her body.
The petition alleged that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by negligent acts of the defendant. He failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles properly on the highway. He followed the vehicle in front of him too closely in violation of specific Texas statutes which were pleaded and attached. Robert White drove his vehicle into a space between the divided roadway and failed to keep his vehicle only upon the righthand roadway in violation of another specific Texas statute which was pleaded. He drove his vehicle at a speed that was greater than reasonable and prudent under the circumstances in violation of another specific Texas statute which was also pleaded and attached.
The plaintiff pleaded that as a result of said negligent actions she suffered broken bones and other injuries to the body resulting in permanent disability, medical expenses, and lost income with her damages totaling some $200,000.00.
The petition further alleged that at the time of the accident the defendants Robert W. White and Edward White were engaged in a joint venture or partnership operating a long-haul truck tractor-trailer. The plaintiff was employed by the defendants to help operate the truck. At the time of the accident she was within the scope of her employment. The defendants failed to carry Workmen’s Compensation Insurance, and that she has elected to proceed in the District Court.
Attached to the petition and made a part thereof was the Motor Carrier Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability Certificate of Insurance. The Corporation Commission of Oklahoma certified that Employers Casualty Corporation had issued to Edward White of Fort Cobb, Oklahoma an insurance policy covering the obligations imposed upon the insured by the Oklahoma Motor Vehicle provisions. Employers Casualty Corporation is not a party to this appeal because the cause against it was dismissed without prejudice by the plaintiff.
In response to the petition the defendants Robert W. White and Edward White filed special demurrers. They demurred to the petition on the grounds that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue and that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. In arguing that the demurrers should be sustained both Robert and Edward White argued that the plaintiff Marilyn S. White lacks the capacity to sue because she is the wife of Robert W. White and under the laws of Texas one spouse may not bring a personal injury action against the other. This fact does not appear on the face of the petition. The defendants also argued that in fact the plaintiff was not their employee but was a co-employer. They relied upon facts which do not appear upon the face of the petition.
The trial court sustained the demurrers to the petition and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed, and the matter came before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma for review.
An employee terminated after reporting suspected criminal activity sues her former employer for wrongful discharge. The employer argues that related family-law principles should bar the claim. The court rejects the argument, noting that California long ago abolished spousal immunity for torts and no longer shields intra-family conduct from civil liability on unity grounds.
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373
Interactive Data Corporation hired John Foley in June 1976 as an assistant product manager at a starting salary of $18,500. As a condition of employment Foley signed a confidential and proprietary information agreement. The company's president told Foley that if he performed his job well he would have a long and rewarding employment with the firm.
Over the next six years and nine months Foley received steady salary increases, promotions, bonuses, awards, and superior performance evaluations, rising to branch manager of the Los Angeles office with an annual salary of $56,164 plus a merit bonus. In January 1983 Foley learned that his new supervisor, Robert Kuhne, was under investigation by the FBI for embezzlement from his former employer, Bank of America. Foley reported the information to Vice President Richard Earnest because he was worried about working for Kuhne in a supervisory position.
Earnest told Foley not to discuss rumors and to forget what he had heard. In early March 1983 Kuhne informed Foley that the company had decided to replace him for performance reasons and offered a transfer to another division. Foley was later told he could continue as branch manager if he agreed to a performance plan, but when Kuhne met with him the next day Kuhne instead gave Foley the choice of resigning or being fired. Foley was discharged on March 13, 1983.
Foley filed suit against Interactive Data Corporation alleging three causes of action: tortious discharge in violation of public policy, breach of an implied-in-fact contract to terminate only for good cause, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court sustained the company's demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted review.
Choice of Law on Immunity
A Wisconsin domiciliary injured by her husband in Illinois brings a tort suit in Wisconsin. The defendant invokes Illinois law recognizing spousal immunity. The court applies Wisconsin law, which has abandoned the doctrine, and permits the action to proceed.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Haumschild, and her husband were domiciled in Wisconsin at all relevant times. Wisconsin is both the state of the forum and of the domicile while California is the state where the alleged wrong was committed. While the couple was traveling in California, Mrs. Haumschild sustained personal injuries in an automobile accident that was allegedly caused by her husband's negligence.
She subsequently commenced an action in Wisconsin circuit court against her husband and Continental Casualty Company, his insurer, seeking damages for those injuries. The defendants asserted that California law barred a wife from suing her husband in tort and therefore precluded recovery. The circuit court rendered judgment against the plaintiff on that ground.
The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The appeal was argued before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on March 2, 1959. On April 10, 1959, the court reversed the judgment in an opinion authored by Justice Currie, with Justice Fairchild filing a separate concurrence joined by Justice Brown.
Has the common-law doctrine of spousal immunity from tort liability been abolished in most states?
Yes. Most jurisdictions have abolished or severely limited the doctrine, allowing one spouse to sue the other in tort in at least some circumstances.
Supporting sources
47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373
…for loss of consortium ( Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 389-404); and abrogated the rule of interspousal immunity for negligent torts. ( Klein v. Klein (1962) 58 Cal.2d 692, 697-699 [26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70].) Every one of these landmark decisions required a difficult choice among competing…