Also known as: special damages
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
Compensatory damages awarded for a specific harm other than one for which general damages are presumed. These damages must be pleaded and proved with particularity because they do not ordinarily flow from the tortious conduct.
Damages recoverable by a landlord or incoming tenant from a holdover tenant for losses caused by the improper possession after lease termination. Recovery requires that the losses were reasonably foreseeable to the tenant at the time of holding over and could not reasonably have been avoided by the injured party.
Compensatory damages awarded for a specific harm other than one for which general damages are presumed. These damages must be pleaded and proved with particularity because they do not ordinarily flow from the tortious conduct.
Damages recoverable by a landlord or incoming tenant from a holdover tenant for losses caused by the improper possession after lease termination. Recovery requires that the losses were reasonably foreseeable to the tenant at the time of holding over and could not reasonably have been avoided by the injured party.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Silverline Industries published a false report that Sentinel Security was going out of business. Sentinel lost several large contracts as a direct result. Sentinel pleads and proves the specific lost contracts as special damages rather than relying on presumed general damages to reputation.
Sapphire Holdings published private financial details about Sophia Singh without consent. Singh lost a major employment opportunity that was traceable to the disclosure. Singh recovers the lost opportunity as special damage caused by the privacy invasion.
A magazine article falsely accused Seth Shapiro of professional misconduct. Shapiro proved no actual pecuniary loss from the publication. The court denies recovery of presumed general damages and requires proof of special damages to support the claim.
In 1968, Chicago police officer Richard Nuccio shot and killed a youth named Nelson. State authorities prosecuted Nuccio and obtained a conviction for second-degree murder. The Nelson family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a Chicago attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against Nuccio. Respondent Robert Welch, Inc., publishes American Opinion, a monthly magazine expressing the views of the John Birch Society. In March 1969, the magazine published an article titled "FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police." The article accused Gertz of participating in a Communist conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement, described him as a "Leninist" and "Communist-fronter," and claimed he had been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, which it portrayed as a Communist organization involved in planning attacks on Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention. The article contained numerous inaccuracies, including the false implication that Gertz had a criminal record. Gertz had served as an officer of the National Lawyers Guild approximately fifteen years earlier but had no involvement in planning the 1968 demonstrations. He had never been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy or the Intercollegiate Socialist Society. The managing editor of American Opinion made no effort to verify the charges against Gertz before publication and appended an editorial introduction stating that the author had conducted extensive research. Gertz filed a diversity action for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The district court ruled that the statements constituted libel per se under Illinois law. After a trial, the jury awarded Gertz $50,000 in compensatory damages. The district court later entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, applying the New York Times standard. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the application of constitutional standards to defamation of a private individual.
Dun & Bradstreet published a false credit report about Southland Foods. The company lost a specific loan commitment as a direct result. Southland Foods recovers the lost financing as special damages rather than presumed general damages to reputation.
In July 1976, Dun & Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency that provides subscribers with confidential financial and related information about businesses under subscription agreements prohibiting further disclosure, sent a report to five subscribers stating that Greenmoss Builders, Inc., a construction contractor, had filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. The report was false and grossly misrepresented respondent's assets and liabilities because the petition had actually been filed by one of Greenmoss's former employees. On the same day, Greenmoss's president learned of the report while discussing the possibility of future financing with the company's bank, immediately called Dun & Bradstreet's regional office to explain the error, requested a correction, and asked for the names of the firms that had received the report so he could assure them of the company's solvency. Dun & Bradstreet promised to investigate but refused to divulge the names. After confirming the report was inaccurate, it issued a corrective notice on or about August 3, 1976, to the five subscribers stating that a former employee had filed for bankruptcy and that Greenmoss continued in business as usual. Greenmoss expressed dissatisfaction with the notice and again requested the subscriber names, which Dun & Bradstreet again refused to provide. Greenmoss then brought a defamation action in Vermont state court alleging injury to its reputation and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. At trial, evidence established that the error had been caused by a 17-year-old high school student paid to review Vermont bankruptcy pleadings who inadvertently attributed the petition to Greenmoss, and that Dun & Bradstreet did not attempt to verify the information with the company before reporting it despite routine practice to do so. The jury awarded Greenmoss $50,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The trial court granted Dun & Bradstreet's motion for a new trial due to dissatisfaction with its charge to the jury. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of a new trial. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
A police department circulated a flyer labeling Serena Soto as an active shoplifter. Soto lost a job offer when the prospective employer saw the flyer. Soto must prove the specific lost employment as special damages to recover for the resulting harm.
In June 1971 Edward Charles Davis was arrested in Louisville, Kentucky, on a shoplifting charge while employed as a photographer at a retail store. The charge was arraigned in September 1971. Davis pleaded not guilty. The charge was filed away with leave to reinstate. It was ultimately dismissed in December 1972 after the events at issue. In late 1972 Louisville Police Chief Paul and Jefferson County Police Chief McDaniel combined their departments' efforts. They distributed a five-page flyer containing mug shots and names to approximately 800 merchants in the Louisville metropolitan area. The flyer was headed "NOVEMBER 1972 CITY OF LOUISVILLE JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS ACTIVE SHOPLIFTERS" and listed Davis among the individuals shown. The persons depicted had been arrested during 1971 and 1972. Davis's photograph and name appeared on page two. The flyer stated it was distributed so merchants could inform security personnel to watch for the subjects. At the time the flyer circulated, Davis was employed as a photographer by the Louisville Courier-Journal and Times. The flyer came to the attention of Davis's supervisor. The supervisor called him in to discuss the matter. The supervisor informed Davis he would not be fired but warned him not to find himself in a similar situation again. Davis then filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. He alleged that the police chiefs' distribution of the flyer deprived him of liberty without due process of law and violated his right to privacy. The District Court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that the distribution implicated a liberty interest and required prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the constitutional questions presented.
3 common questions
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g) requires that any item of special damage be specifically stated in the pleading. This rule applies when the damages do not ordinarily flow from the tort and must be proved with particularity rather than presumed.
Supporting sources
General damages compensate harms that normally result from the tort and need not be specifically alleged. Special damages compensate other harms that must be pleaded and proved because they are not presumed to flow from the conduct.
Supporting sources
Yes. A plaintiff who establishes invasion of privacy may recover special damages that are a legal cause of the invasion, in addition to harm to privacy interests and proved mental distress.
Supporting sources
HarborLine Hotels had leased a beachfront building from Olivia Park for a week-long seaside festival and was fully booked. Miguel Cruz refused to vacate after his lease expired, forcing a delay in turnover. HarborLine incurred lost room revenue and reputational harm that it could not avoid because nearby hotels were sold out. The incoming tenant recovers the festival losses as special damages caused by the holdover.
2 common questions
The landlord or incoming tenant may recover special damages caused by the holdover if the tenant could reasonably have foreseen the losses at the time of holding over and the injured party could not reasonably have avoided them, unless equitable considerations justify relief.
Supporting sources
Yes. The rule permits an incoming tenant whose possession is blocked by the holdover to recover special damages that meet the foreseeability and avoidability requirements, without requiring the claim to be brought through the landlord.
Supporting sources
…for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner failed to allege special damages. But the court ruled that statements contained in the article constituted libel per se under Illinois law and that consequently petitioner need not plead special damages. After answering…