A category of copyrightable subject matter consisting of works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds. The definition excludes sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the material objects such as disks or tapes in which the sounds are embodied.
2
in civil procedure
Sense 1
1
in copyright law
A category of copyrightable subject matter consisting of works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds. The definition excludes sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the material objects such as disks or tapes in which the sounds are embodied.
Examples5
Rap Parody Qualifies as Fair Use
Acuff-Rose Music sues 2 Live Crew for releasing a rap version of its copyrighted song. The group concedes it copied the original but claims fair use. The Supreme Court holds that the parody is transformative and weighs the fair use factors in the group's favor even though the new work is commercial.
Sense 2
2
in civil procedure
A form of electronically stored information or document consisting of audio data stored in any medium. A party may request production of such material in discovery when it is within the responding party's possession, custody, or control, and the responding party must translate the data into a reasonably usable form if necessary.
Examples1
Bank Must Translate Legacy Audio Files
Customers of MetroBank sue over overdraft fees and request call center audio recordings stored in fragmented legacy systems. MetroBank admits possession but claims the backups are difficult to access and need not be restored. The court orders production because the recordings qualify as electronically stored information that must be translated into a reasonably usable form by the responding party.
A form of electronically stored information or document consisting of audio data stored in any medium. A party may request production of such material in discovery when it is within the responding party's possession, custody, or control, and the responding party must translate the data into a reasonably usable form if necessary.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.510 U.S. 569, 578-585 (1994)
In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote a rock ballad called "Oh, Pretty Woman" and assigned their rights in it to respondent Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
Acuff-Rose registered the song for copyright protection.
Petitioners Luther R. Campbell, Christopher Wongwon, Mark Ross, and David Hobbs, collectively known as 2 Live Crew, wrote a song in 1989 entitled "Pretty Woman," which Campbell described in an affidavit as intended through comical lyrics to satirize the original work. On July 5, 1989, 2 Live Crew's manager informed Acuff-Rose that the group had written a parody of the song, that they would afford all credit for ownership and authorship to Acuff-Rose, Dees, and Orbison, and that they were willing to pay a fee for the use. Enclosed with the letter were a copy of the lyrics and a recording of 2 Live Crew's song. Acuff-Rose's agent refused permission.
In June or July 1989, 2 Live Crew released records, cassette tapes, and compact discs of "Pretty Woman" in a collection of songs entitled "As Clean As They Wanna Be." The albums and compact discs identify the authors of "Pretty Woman" as Orbison and Dees and its publisher as Acuff-Rose. Almost a year later, after nearly a quarter of a million copies of the recording had been sold, Acuff-Rose sued 2 Live Crew and its record company, Luke Skyywalker Records, for copyright infringement.
The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether 2 Live Crew's commercial parody could be a fair use.
Universal City Studios sues Sony for selling Betamax VCRs that consumers use to record copyrighted television programs. The Court finds that substantial noninfringing uses exist, including time-shifting of broadcasts for later private viewing. Sony therefore is not liable for contributory infringement.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.464 U.S. 417, 435 & n.17 (1984)
In 1976, Universal City Studios, Inc., and Walt Disney Productions, owners of copyrights in motion pictures and other audiovisual works, commenced a copyright infringement action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against Sony Corporation of America and related entities that manufacture and sell Betamax video tape recorders.
The Betamax consists of a tuner that receives signals from the public airwaves, a recorder that places those signals on magnetic tape, and an adapter that converts the signals for playback on a television set. It includes a timer for unattended recording, a pause button to omit commercials, and a fast-forward control. Surveys of several hundred Betamax owners conducted by both parties in 1978 showed that the primary use for most owners was time-shifting, recording a program for single later viewing and then erasing it. Sony's survey indicated that over 80 percent of interviewees watched at least as much regular television as before owning a Betamax.
Seven point three percent of use was to record sports events whose professional leagues had no objection to home recording, and representatives of religious and educational broadcasters also testified they had no objection. After a lengthy trial, the District Court in 1979 denied all relief to the respondents, finding that time-shifting was fair use, that Sony had no direct involvement with any infringing activity, and that the Betamax was a staple article of commerce capable of substantial noninfringing uses. The court noted Sony's instruction booklet warned that unauthorized recording of copyrighted material may violate copyright laws.
The Ninth Circuit in 1981 reversed the District Court's judgment on the copyright claim, holding petitioners liable for contributory infringement without setting aside any findings of fact, and remanded for consideration of damages or a continuing royalty. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1982, ordered reargument in 1983, and issued its decision in January 1984.
Eldred challenges the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act that adds twenty years to existing copyrights, including those in sound recordings. The Supreme Court holds that Congress acted within its authority under the Copyright Clause and that the extension does not violate the First Amendment.
Eldred v. Ashcroft537 U.S. 186
In 1998 Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of all federal copyrights by twenty years. For works created by identified natural persons the new term runs from creation until seventy years after the author's death. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire the term is ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation, whichever expires first. The statute applied these extended terms both to copyrights already in existence and to works created after its effective date.
Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the extension of existing copyrights exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and violated the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings the district court entered judgment for the Attorney General.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. A majority of the panel upheld the statute against both challenges, while Judge Sentelle dissented in part on the Copyright Clause issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and whether the extension violates the First Amendment.
Columbia Pictures sues Feltner for unauthorized airing of its television programs. Columbia elects statutory damages. The Supreme Court holds that the Seventh Amendment entitles Feltner to a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages even though the statute does not expressly provide for jury trial.
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.523 U.S. 340 (1998)
In 1990 petitioner C. Elvin Feltner, through his company Krypton International Corporation, acquired three television stations in the southeastern United States. Respondent Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., had licensed several television series including “Who’s the Boss,” “Silver Spoons,” “Hart to Hart,” and “T. J. Hooker” to these stations.
The stations became delinquent in royalty payments to Columbia. Negotiations to restructure the stations’ debt proved unavailing, and Columbia terminated the license agreements in October 1991. Despite the termination the stations continued broadcasting the programs.
Columbia sued Feltner, Krypton, the stations, Krypton subsidiaries, and certain Krypton officers in federal district court alleging copyright infringement among other claims. Columbia sought a permanent injunction, impoundment of all copies of the programs, actual damages or alternatively statutory damages, and costs and attorney’s fees.
On Columbia’s motion the district court entered partial summary judgment as to liability on the copyright infringement claims. Columbia exercised its option under Section 504(c) to recover statutory damages in lieu of actual damages.
Feltner requested a jury trial on statutory damages but the district court denied the request and held a bench trial. After two days of trial the judge found 440 separate acts of infringement, determined that the infringement was willful, and fixed statutory damages at $20,000 per act for a total award of $8,800,000 plus costs and attorney’s fees.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all relevant respects. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Kirtsaeng imports and resells lawfully made foreign editions of textbooks. John Wiley & Sons sues for copyright infringement. The Supreme Court holds that the first sale doctrine applies to copies made abroad with the copyright owner's authorization, exhausting the distribution right upon the first sale.
Kirtsaeng d/b/a Bluechristine99 v. John Wiley & Sons Inc.568 U.S. 519 (2013)
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., an academic textbook publisher, often assigns to its wholly owned foreign subsidiary Wiley Asia rights to publish, print, and sell foreign editions of Wiley's English language textbooks abroad. Each copy states that it is authorized for sale only in particular regions outside the United States and may not be exported without permission.
Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, moved to the United States in 1997 to study mathematics at Cornell University on a Thai government scholarship. While studying, Kirtsaeng asked friends and family in Thailand to purchase copies of these foreign edition textbooks at low prices in Thai book shops and to mail them to him.
Kirtsaeng sold the imported books in the United States, reimbursed his family and friends for their purchases, and retained the profit after successfully completing his undergraduate and doctoral programs. In 2008 Wiley filed a federal lawsuit against Kirtsaeng alleging that his unauthorized importation and resale of the books infringed Wiley's exclusive right to distribute copies under 17 U.S.C. §106(3) and the import prohibition in §602(a)(1).
The District Court rejected Kirtsaeng's assertion of the first sale defense. The jury found that Kirtsaeng had willfully infringed eight of Wiley's copyrighted titles and assessed statutory damages of $600,000. A split panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment that the first sale doctrine does not apply to copies of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad. The Supreme Court granted Kirtsaeng's petition for certiorari to consider the question in light of differing views among the Circuits.
What elements must a work satisfy to qualify as a sound recording under copyright law?
The work must result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds. It must not consist of sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work. The sounds may be embodied in any material object such as a disk or tape.
Does the first sale doctrine apply to lawfully made sound recordings imported from abroad?
Yes. The first sale doctrine exhausts the distribution right when the copyright owner authorized the first sale of copies made abroad, allowing resale in the United States without further permission.
2 common questions
Students Frequently Ask...
How does Rule 34 treat sound recordings during discovery?
Sound recordings are expressly included within the definition of documents or electronically stored information that may be requested. The responding party must produce them in a reasonably usable form if the data requires translation from the medium in which it is stored.
When may a party avoid producing sound recordings stored in legacy systems?
A party may not avoid production merely because the recordings reside in fragmented or inconvenient formats. The responding party must translate the data into a reasonably usable form unless it makes a specific, supported showing of undue burden or disproportionality.
464 U.S. 417, 435 & n.17 (1984)
…not duplicate. Ante , at 430, n. 11. That amendment, however, was addressed to the specific problem of commercial piracy of sound recordings. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 Amendment). The House Report on the 1971 Amendment, in a section entitled "Home Recording," contains the following statement: "In approving the…