sound recording

In 1976, Universal City Studios, Inc., and Walt Disney Productions, owners of copyrights in motion pictures and other audiovisual works, commenced a copyright infringement action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against Sony Corporation of America and related entities that manufacture and sell Betamax video tape recorders. The Betamax consists of a tuner that receives signals from the public airwaves, a recorder that places those signals on magnetic tape, and an adapter that converts the signals for playback on a television set. It includes a timer for unattended recording, a pause button to omit commercials, and a fast-forward control. Surveys of several hundred Betamax owners conducted by both parties in 1978 showed that the primary use for most owners was time-shifting, recording a program for single later viewing and then erasing it. Sony's survey indicated that over 80 percent of interviewees watched at least as much regular television as before owning a Betamax. Seven point three percent of use was to record sports events whose professional leagues had no objection to home recording, and representatives of religious and educational broadcasters also testified they had no objection. After a lengthy trial, the District Court in 1979 denied all relief to the respondents, finding that time-shifting was fair use, that Sony had no direct involvement with any infringing activity, and that the Betamax was a staple article of commerce capable of substantial noninfringing uses. The court noted Sony's instruction booklet warned that unauthorized recording of copyrighted material may violate copyright laws. The Ninth Circuit in 1981 reversed the District Court's judgment on the copyright claim, holding petitioners liable for contributory infringement without setting aside any findings of fact, and remanded for consideration of damages or a continuing royalty. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1982, ordered reargument in 1983, and issued its decision in January 1984.

On November 28, 1997, Oxnard, California police officers Maria Peña and Andrew Salinas stopped respondent Oliverio Martinez on a bicycle while investigating suspected narcotics activity in a residential area. After Martinez complied with orders to dismount and place his hands behind his head, Salinas conducted a patdown and discovered a knife in Martinez's waistband. An altercation followed in which Salinas yelled that Martinez had taken his gun. Peña then shot Martinez multiple times, leaving him permanently blinded and paralyzed from the waist down. Petitioner Ben Chavez, a patrol supervisor, arrived minutes later with paramedics and accompanied Martinez to the hospital. At the hospital, Chavez questioned Martinez in the emergency room for approximately ten minutes spread over a forty-five-minute period while medical personnel treated his injuries. Martinez initially responded with statements such as "I don't know," "I am dying," and "I am choking," but later admitted taking the officer's gun and using heroin regularly. Martinez also stated at one point, "I am not telling you anything until they treat me," yet Chavez continued the interview. No Miranda warnings were given at any time during the questioning, and a tape recording of the exchange was made. Martinez was never charged with any crime, and none of his statements were ever used against him in a criminal prosecution. He subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Chavez. He alleged that the questioning violated his Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself and his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from coercive questioning. The District Court granted summary judgment to Martinez on Chavez's qualified immunity defense with respect to both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity, holding that Chavez's conduct violated Martinez's clearly established constitutional rights. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's decision.

The petitioners, Elkins and Clark, were indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon for intercepting and divulging telephone communications and conspiracy to do so under 47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 605 and 18 U.S.C. § 371. State law enforcement officers received information that Clark possessed obscene motion pictures and sound recordings. They procured a search warrant based on an affidavit reciting that "upon information and belief" Clark possessed such materials. The officers searched his home, found no obscene pictures, but seized wiretap paraphernalia and a recording machine. The state officers placed the seized articles in a local bank safe-deposit box. The Multnomah County District Court and later the Circuit Court for Multnomah County held the search warrant invalid and ordered suppression of the evidence. The state grand jury indictment was dismissed. Federal officers then obtained the articles from the bank box pursuant to a federal search warrant. Before trial in federal court the petitioners moved to suppress the tape and wire recordings and recording machine. The district judge assumed without deciding that the articles had been obtained as the result of an unreasonable search and seizure. He denied the motion because there was no evidence that any agent of the United States had any knowledge or information or suspicion that the search was being contemplated or was made by the state officers until they read about it in the newspaper. The articles were admitted in evidence at trial and the petitioners were convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. That court held it unnecessary to determine whether the original state search and seizure had been lawful because there had been no participation by federal officers. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether evidence obtained by state officers in an unreasonable search and seizure without federal involvement is admissible in a federal criminal trial over timely objection.

In 1998 Congress enacted the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration of all federal copyrights by twenty years. For works created by identified natural persons the new term runs from creation until seventy years after the author's death. For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire the term is ninety-five years from publication or one hundred twenty years from creation, whichever expires first. The statute applied these extended terms both to copyrights already in existence and to works created after its effective date. Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaration that the extension of existing copyrights exceeded Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and violated the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings the district court entered judgment for the Attorney General. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. A majority of the panel upheld the statute against both challenges, while Judge Sentelle dissented in part on the Copyright Clause issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress's power under the Copyright Clause and whether the extension violates the First Amendment.