Also known as: sole-use
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
2 senses
A payment directive under which a family allowance from a decedent's estate is disbursed exclusively to the surviving spouse when no minor or dependent children exist. The directive permits the allowance to reach the spouse directly rather than through a shared distribution to children.
A payment directive under which a family allowance from a decedent's estate is disbursed exclusively to the surviving spouse when no minor or dependent children exist. The directive permits the allowance to reach the spouse directly rather than through a shared distribution to children.
A grant of exclusive possession of identified premises that transfers a leasehold interest rather than a mere license. The grant is evidenced by control over a defined space together with restrictions on relocation by the provider.
A grant of exclusive possession of identified premises that transfers a leasehold interest rather than a mere license. The grant is evidenced by control over a defined space together with restrictions on relocation by the provider.
Each sense below has its own examples, sources, and questions.
After her husband died, Samantha Stone petitioned the probate court for a family allowance. The estate lacked sufficient assets to pay all claims. The court directed payment of the allowance as a lump sum to Samantha alone because no minor children survived the decedent. The payment satisfied the statute's requirement that the allowance serve the surviving spouse's maintenance during administration.
1 common questions
The allowance becomes payable solely to the surviving spouse when the decedent leaves no minor or dependent children. The statute directs the payment to the spouse for the spouse's own maintenance and for any children who may exist, but the sole-use clause applies once no qualifying children remain.
Supporting sources
Carter Coal Company mined bituminous coal on its own property. The company consumed the entire output in its steel furnaces without selling any portion to outside buyers. Regulators later challenged the company's reporting of that output under a federal excise provision. The court treated the coal as produced for the producer's sole use and therefore subject to the statutory scheme.
Congress enacted the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, which imposed an excise tax of fifteen percent on the sale price of bituminous coal at the mine or its fair market value in the case of captive coal, payable monthly by producers. Section 2 of the Act establishes in the Department of the Interior a National Bituminous Coal Commission. The Commission is directed to formulate a Bituminous Coal Code containing detailed price-fixing provisions to be administered by twenty-three district boards. The labor provisions require collective bargaining, minimum wages, maximum hours, and other conditions. Producers who filed acceptance of the code and complied with it became entitled to a drawback credit of ninety percent of the tax. On August 31, 1935, the day after the Act took effect, stockholder Carter filed suit in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against the Carter Coal Company, its officers, Commissioner of Internal Revenue Helvering, and other federal officials, seeking to enjoin the company from accepting the code or paying the tax and to restrain federal officials from enforcing the Act. In the same court, a parallel stockholder suit sought a mandatory injunction compelling the company to accept and operate under the code. Two suits were filed in federal district court in Kentucky: one by producers to enjoin collection of the tax and one by a stockholder to compel the company to accept the code. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia found that the production of bituminous coal is a local activity, that substantially all of the Carter Coal Company's output was sold f.o.b. mine and shipped in interstate commerce, and that interstate and intrastate distribution were inextricably connected. That court concluded the labor provisions were unconstitutional and separable from the price-fixing provisions, which it upheld, and denied most of the requested relief while granting a permanent injunction against collection of taxes accrued during the suit. The Kentucky district court upheld the Act in its entirety. Appeals were taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and to the Sixth Circuit. Petitions for writs of certiorari were granted by the Supreme Court before those appellate courts heard the cases, owing to the importance of the questions and the need for speedy final determination.
View case2 common questions
No. Courts examine whether the provider transferred the right to exclusive possession of identified premises. A clause granting sole use of a lockable suite together with a promise not to relocate the occupant without consent establishes that transfer regardless of the contract's title or service-oriented language.
Supporting sources
The restriction creates a limited estate that ends if the condition is breached. A lease allowing industrial processing on part of the tract violates the sole-use limitation and renders any retained future interest in the grantor possessory.
Supporting sources
…of it be confined wholly to the limits of the state. It also applies to "captive coal" — that is to say, coal produced for the sole use of the producer. It is very clear that the "excise tax" is not imposed for revenue but exacted as a penalty to compel compliance with the regulatory provisions of the act. The whole…