Also known as: sexual orientations
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A person's predisposition or inclination toward a particular type of sexual activity or behavior, including heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality. This characteristic functions as a protected attribute in rules that prohibit judges and lawyers from manifesting bias, prejudice, or harassment and in constitutional analysis that invalidates laws reflecting animus toward the group.
During a damages hearing, defense counsel made repeated jokes about plaintiff Santiago Sanchez's sexual orientation while questioning emotional distress. The trial judge overruled objections and allowed the line of questioning to continue without any warning to counsel. The conduct violated the judge's duty to prevent harassment based on sexual orientation in judicial proceedings.
Attorney Samuel Soto repeatedly referred to opposing counsel's sexual orientation in settlement negotiations and discovery disputes. The lawyer knew the comments demeaned the other attorney on the basis of that characteristic. The conduct subjected the lawyer to professional discipline under rules governing harassment in the practice of law.
In a housing discrimination trial, plaintiff's counsel made repeated comments about defendant Simon Stern's sexual orientation while examining witnesses. The presiding judge directed counsel to stop and warned that further remarks would result in sanctions. The judge fulfilled the obligation to prevent lawyers from manifesting bias based on sexual orientation against parties.
Judge Skylar Sullivan maintained active membership in a private club that excluded individuals based on sexual orientation. The judge continued to attend events and use club facilities after learning of the exclusionary policy. The membership violated the prohibition on judges belonging to organizations that practice invidious discrimination on that basis.
State police arrested Simone Sanders and a same-sex partner for private consensual conduct under a statute that criminalized the acts only when performed by persons of the same sex. The couple challenged the law as violating liberty interests protected by due process. The statute failed because it imposed criminal liability solely on the basis of sexual orientation without any legitimate governmental interest.
In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered an apartment where one of the petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, resided. The officers observed Lawrence and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two petitioners were arrested, held in custody overnight, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace. The complaints described their crime as "deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man)." Texas Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003) provides that a person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex. The statute defines deviate sexual intercourse as any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person, or the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object. The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected. The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the petitioners' federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion indicates that the Court of Appeals considered our decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider three questions. The petitioners were adults at the time of the alleged offense. Their conduct was in private and consensual.
Samantha Stone and her same-sex partner sought a marriage license from a state clerk who refused on the ground that the state constitution limited marriage to opposite-sex couples. The couple sued, claiming denial of equal protection and due process. The refusal was invalidated because the state could not exclude couples from the fundamental right to marry on the basis of sexual orientation.
The petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners were deceased. They lived in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Those states defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman under their constitutions and statutes. The petitioners filed suits in federal district courts in their home states. They sought marriage licenses or recognition of marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. James Obergefell and John Arthur traveled from Ohio to Maryland to marry aboard a medical transport plane because Arthur suffered from ALS; Obergefell later sought to be listed as surviving spouse on Arthur's death certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, Michigan nurses, adopted three children but could not both serve as legal parents under state adoption rules. Army Reserve Sergeant Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York before DeKoe's deployment to Afghanistan and later settled in Tennessee. Each district court ruled in the petitioners' favor. The respondents appealed. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed the district court judgments. The petitioners sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Same-sex couples had begun establishing families after substantial cultural and political developments in the late twentieth century. Earlier litigation had addressed the legal status of gays and lesbians, including challenges that reached the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas.
Yes. Such an amendment singles out one class defined by sexual orientation and disables that class alone from seeking ordinary legal protections that remain available to other groups. Even under rational basis review, the measure fails because its breadth reflects impermissible animus rather than any legitimate governmental purpose.
…treats the same conduct differently based solely on the participants. Those harmed by this law are people who have a same-sex sexual orientation and thus are more likely to engage in behavior prohibited by § 21.06. The Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct—and only that…
…involves an unconstitutional intrusion into his privacy and his right of intimate association does not depend in any way on his sexual orientation. Second, I disagree with the Court's refusal to consider whether § 16-6-2 runs afoul of the Eighth or Ninth Amendments or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ante ,…
…cities in Colorado, including Aspen, Boulder, and Denver, which prohibited discrimination against persons based upon their sexual orientation in areas such as housing, employment, education, public accommodations, health and welfare services, and other transactions and activities. Id. , at C-3 to C-4. Amendment 2, which was…
…and enjoys the benefits of parenthood, should be responsible for the support of those children—regardless of her gender or sexual orientation.” We conclude, therefore, that Elisa is a presumed mother of the twins under section 7611, subdivision (d), because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her…
…are created each year. When users sign up, they must create a profile by answering a series of questions about their sex, sexual orientation
A judge may allow reference only when the factor is relevant to an issue in the proceeding and the reference remains legitimate rather than demeaning. Repeated joking comments or innuendo that harass a party exceed this allowance and require judicial intervention under the conduct rules.
Yes when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the statements amount to harassment or discrimination on that basis in conduct related to the practice of law. Legitimate advocacy tied to record evidence may be permitted, but repeated derogatory references that appeal to bias cross the line.
The Court has applied rational basis review but with searching examination when the law reflects animus toward the group or imposes broad political disabilities. Laws that single out the class and bar access to protections fail even this deferential standard when they lack a rational relationship to any legitimate interest.