Also known as: serious provocations · adequate provocation
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
Conduct that would arouse a sudden and intense passion in the mind of an ordinary person. Recognized categories include a serious battery inflicted on the defendant or a close relative, a threat of deadly force, and discovery of a spouse engaged in sexual relations with another person.
Samantha Stone watched as her neighbor punched her younger brother in the face during an argument at a family gathering. Samantha immediately seized a nearby tool and struck the neighbor fatally. The battery on her brother qualifies as serious provocation that can support reduction to voluntary manslaughter.
Sarah Sullivan returned home early and found her spouse in bed with another person. She seized a nearby object and killed the intruder in the ensuing struggle. The discovery supplies the serious provocation needed to mitigate an otherwise murderous killing.
Sasha Stone attended a meeting where her supervisor grabbed her by the collar, shook her, and slapped her across the face. Sasha immediately struck back with a concealed object and killed the supervisor. The physical attack constitutes serious provocation that can reduce the charge.
Stella Shapiro argued with a coworker who suddenly reached into a bag during a heated exchange. Believing a weapon was being drawn, Stella struck first with a heavy object and caused death. The apparent threat revives the passion required for serious provocation.
Sydney Santos saw her employer punch her younger sister after a workplace dispute. Sydney responded at once with a nearby tool and killed the employer. The serious battery on a close relative meets the standard for adequate provocation.
Seth Shapiro learned of his spouse's affair through messages received hours after an initial confrontation. He later located and killed the other person. The original discovery no longer supplies fresh serious provocation once time has passed.
The appellant was convicted by a jury on two counts of an indictment charging him with bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). He was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. Count One charged that Austin, by force and violence and by intimidation, took from the person and presence of a bank teller approximately $10,000.00. Count Two charged that in committing the offense he assaulted the teller and put her in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, to-wit, a pistol. The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the lesser offense proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is included in the offense proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), so that a defendant may not be convicted and punished for both. The statute defines the basic robbery offense in subsection (a) and provides an enhanced penalty in subsection (d) for committing any offense defined in subsections (a), (b), and (c) by assaulting a person or putting a life in jeopardy with a dangerous weapon or device. The Government argued that the two counts state separate and distinct offenses for which the defendant may be convicted and punished. It relied on the principle that a single transaction may give rise to a violation of more than one statute as in Blockburger v. United States and Gore v. United States. The court noted that the question is one of legislative intent. The court cited Prince v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that a defendant could not be validly sentenced on both a count charging entry into a bank with intent to rob and a count charging robbery. The Government sought to distinguish Prince on the ground that the two offenses there involved were proscribed by separate subsections of the statute, while here both offenses are embraced within a single subsection, namely (d). The court rejected this distinction. The plain meaning of the language in (d) is that the use of a dangerous weapon must occur in the course of the commission of one of the offenses defined in the earlier subsections. Subsection (d) does not define a separate and distinct offense but provides for an increased penalty. This interpretation was confirmed by the legislative history of the statute. The original bank robbery statute was enacted in 1934. It contained what is now subsection (a) and a subsection (b) which is now (d). House reports from 1934 and 1935 treated the use of a dangerous weapon as an aggravation of the offense of taking by force and violence or by intimidation. The statute was amended in 1948 to its present form. The Reviser's Note stated that the section consolidates the earlier statutes without change of substance. The court concluded that Congress at no time intended to provide for cumulative penalties for the single offense of bank robbery. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to vacate the conviction and sentence on Count One of the indictment.
View caseSerious provocation includes a serious battery on the defendant or a close relative and discovery of a spouse in the act of adultery. Mere words or past wrongs do not suffice.
Discovery of a spouse engaged in sexual relations supplies serious provocation only if the killing occurs before a reasonable cooling-off period has elapsed and the defendant in fact did not cool off.
Yes. A serious battery inflicted on a close relative such as a sibling qualifies as adequate provocation because the common law recognizes harm to family members as inflaming passion equally to harm directed at the defendant.
Even when serious provocation exists, the defendant must have killed before a reasonable person would have cooled and must in fact not have cooled. Time spent completing other tasks or deliberate searching for the victim shows cooling has occurred.
…of passion—whether produced by rage, resentment, anger, terror or fear—is reduced from murder to manslaughter only if there was adequate provocation, such as might naturally induce a reasonable man in the passion of the moment to lose self-control and commit the act on impulse and without reflection. See Bishop v. United States , 71…