Also known as: Rule of Professional Conduct · Rules of Prof. Conduct · RPC · professional responsibility rules · ethics rules
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A set of binding standards adopted by courts to regulate lawyer conduct and ensure professional integrity in client representation and the justice system. These standards impose duties of communication, supervision, loyalty, and self-regulation on all lawyers regardless of practice setting.
Rajesh Rao asked his lawyer to help structure an online gambling operation that federal regulators had already declared unlawful. The lawyer realized the client expected assistance the Rules would not permit and therefore consulted with Rajesh about that limitation before proceeding further with the representation.
Roland Rhodes, a senior partner, learned that an associate under his direct supervision had filed a pleading containing a material misrepresentation. Rhodes immediately reviewed the associate's work processes and imposed additional review steps to ensure future compliance with the Rules.
Roberto Reyes, a junior associate, received a directive from his supervising partner on an arguable question of whether certain discovery responses would violate the Rules. Reyes followed the partner's reasonable resolution of that question and therefore incurred no violation himself.
Raphael Rivera received an instruction from a senior partner to withhold a key document from opposing counsel. Rivera refused to follow the instruction because the Rules bound him personally even though another person had directed the conduct.
Ryan Roberts, class counsel in a civil rights suit, negotiated a settlement that included a fee award to the firm while simultaneously securing relief for the class members. The arrangement required Roberts to ensure that the fee discussion did not create a conflict that would violate the Rules governing loyalty to the class.
On August 4, 1980, respondents, a class of children suffering from emotional and mental handicaps, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho against petitioners, the Governor and other officials of the State of Idaho responsible for their education and treatment. The complaint alleged deficiencies in both educational programs and health care services that violated the Education of the Handicapped Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and provisions of the Idaho Constitution and statutes. It sought injunctive relief along with costs and attorney’s fees. Charles Johnson of the Idaho Legal Aid Society served as next friend for the class. The organization made no fee agreements with class members because it was prohibited from representing clients able to pay. Shortly after petitioners filed their answer, the parties reached a partial settlement on the educational services claims in October 1981 under which each side would bear its own attorney’s fees and costs. Negotiations on the treatment claims broke down. This led to cross-motions for summary judgment, class certification, discovery, and preparation for a spring 1983 trial. In March 1983, one week before trial, petitioners presented respondents with a new settlement proposal. As respondents themselves characterize it, the proposal offered virtually all of the injunctive relief they had sought in their complaint. Petitioners' offer included a provision for a waiver by respondents of any claim to fees or costs. Respondents’ counsel had been instructed by the Idaho Legal Aid Society to reject any settlement offer conditioned upon a waiver of fees. Johnson ultimately determined that his ethical obligation to his clients mandated acceptance of the proposal. The parties conditioned the waiver on approval by the District Court. Johnson then filed a written motion requesting the District Court to approve the settlement except for the provision on costs and attorney's fees. He also asked to allow respondents to present a bill of costs and fees for consideration by the court. The District Court evaluated the waiver in the context of the entire settlement and rejected the ethical underpinnings of Johnson's argument. Accordingly, the District Court approved the settlement and denied the motion to submit a costs bill. When respondents appealed from the order denying attorney's fees and costs, petitioners filed a motion requesting the District Court to suspend or stay their obligation to comply with the substantive terms of the settlement. The Court of Appeals granted two emergency motions for stays requiring enforcement of the substantive terms of the consent decree pending the appeal. After ordering preliminary relief, it invalidated the fee waiver and left standing the remainder of the settlement. It then instructed the District Court to make its own determination of the fees that are reasonable and remanded for that limited purpose. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits.
View caseRegina Robinson represented parties seeking recognition of a fundamental right before the Supreme Court. Throughout the litigation Robinson maintained strict compliance with duties of candor and confidentiality under the Rules even as the case drew intense public scrutiny.
The petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners were deceased. They lived in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. Those states defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman under their constitutions and statutes. The petitioners filed suits in federal district courts in their home states. They sought marriage licenses or recognition of marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. James Obergefell and John Arthur traveled from Ohio to Maryland to marry aboard a medical transport plane because Arthur suffered from ALS; Obergefell later sought to be listed as surviving spouse on Arthur's death certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, Michigan nurses, adopted three children but could not both serve as legal parents under state adoption rules. Army Reserve Sergeant Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York before DeKoe's deployment to Afghanistan and later settled in Tennessee. Each district court ruled in the petitioners' favor. The respondents appealed. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed the district court judgments. The petitioners sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Same-sex couples had begun establishing families after substantial cultural and political developments in the late twentieth century. Earlier litigation had addressed the legal status of gays and lesbians, including challenges that reached the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick and Lawrence v. Texas.
View caseThe lawyer must consult with the client about the relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct. This consultation allows the client to make informed decisions and prevents the lawyer from assisting in conduct that would violate the Rules.
A supervising lawyer is responsible if the supervisor orders or ratifies the conduct or knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences could be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action. Direct supervisory authority also requires reasonable efforts to ensure the other lawyer conforms to the Rules.
A subordinate lawyer remains bound by the Rules even when acting at the direction of another person. The subordinate avoids a violation only when following a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.
State rules of professional conduct cannot authorize or immunize conduct that federal law makes unlawful. Federal law remains supreme, so a lawyer may still face federal enforcement even if the state rule appears to permit the activity.
…establish involuntariness; wife failed to carry burden of proof of involuntariness in that she was 34 years of age, worked as a professional, had independent counsel, and understood the agreement, and the “threat” not to marry without the agreement does not constitute duress but is a legitimate objective); Pick v. Pick (1993)…