Also known as: FRCP 23 · Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 · Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 · class action rule
Written by attorneys — see sources below.
A procedural rule that authorizes and governs the maintenance of class actions in federal civil litigation when specified prerequisites are met. The rule requires satisfaction of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation before a class may proceed. It further delineates the circumstances under which a class action may be maintained for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or damages.
Chad and the Sky Coalition sued the State of Ohio on behalf of all current and future state prisoners challenging a department-wide policy barring hardback books. The plaintiffs sought an injunction invalidating the policy and moved to certify a class under Rule 23. The court certified the class because the single policy applied uniformly and injunctive relief would benefit the entire class without individualized determinations.
Deborah sued Grove Coverage in federal court on behalf of thousands of policyholders alleging systematic underpayment of interest on late claim checks. State law barred class actions for such interest claims. The court applied Rule 23 to decide certification because the federal rule governs the procedural mechanism and displaces the conflicting state statute under the Rules Enabling Act.
Exxon Mobil faced claims from multiple plaintiffs in a diversity action. Some plaintiffs sought to join as class members under Rule 23. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the class members' claims because Section 1367 confers jurisdiction over claims by Rule 23 plaintiffs without the restrictions that apply to indispensable parties.
In 1991, about 10,000 Exxon dealers filed a class-action suit against the Exxon Corporation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. They alleged an intentional and systematic scheme by which they were overcharged for fuel purchased from Exxon. The plaintiffs invoked the District Court's diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Each dealer's claim was for slightly less than the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum. After a unanimous jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the District Court certified the case for interlocutory review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction over class members who did not meet the jurisdictional minimum. In a separate action, a 9-year-old girl sued Star-Kist in a diversity action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. She sought damages for unusually severe injuries she received when she sliced her finger on a tuna can. Her family joined in the suit seeking damages for emotional distress and medical expenses. The District Court granted summary judgment to Star-Kist, finding that none of the plaintiffs met the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the District Court's extension of supplemental jurisdiction to the class members who did not meet the amount requirement. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that the injured girl, but not her family members, had made allegations of damages in the requisite amount. It further held that section 1367 authorizes supplemental jurisdiction only when the district court has original jurisdiction over the action. In a diversity case, original jurisdiction is lacking if one plaintiff fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals. The cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court.
A plaintiff filed a diversity action in federal court and invoked Rule 23 for class certification. The defendant argued that a conflicting state procedural rule should control. The court applied the federal rule because it regulates practice and procedure and is valid under the Rules Enabling Act even when state law differs.
On February 6, 1963, petitioner, a citizen of Ohio, filed her complaint in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, claiming damages in excess of $10,000 for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident in South Carolina, allegedly caused by the negligence of one Louise Plumer Osgood, a Massachusetts citizen deceased at the time of the filing of the complaint. Respondent, Mrs. Osgood's executor and also a Massachusetts citizen, was named as defendant. On February 8, service was made by leaving copies of the summons and the complaint with respondent's wife at his residence, concededly in compliance with Rule 4 (d) (1). Respondent filed his answer on February 26, alleging, inter alia, that the action could not be maintained because it had been brought contrary to and in violation of the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 197, Section 9. On October 17, 1963, the District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decision below.
View caseA plaintiff filed a class action challenging a state durational residency requirement for divorce. The plaintiff's individual claim became moot after she satisfied the residency period. The court held that the class action could proceed because the controversy remained live for unnamed class members who continued to face the requirement.
Carol Sosna married Michael Sosna on September 5, 1964, in Michigan. They lived together in New York between October 1967 and August 1971, after which they separated but continued to reside there. In August 1972 Sosna moved to Iowa with her three children. The following month she petitioned the District Court of Jackson County, Iowa, for dissolution of her marriage. Michael Sosna was personally served when he visited Iowa and made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction. The Iowa court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction under Iowa Code § 598.6 because Sosna had not resided in the state for one year preceding the filing. Instead of appealing, Sosna filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on constitutional grounds. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. While the federal action was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court decided In re Marriage of Williams, 217 N.W.2d 202 (1974), and upheld the statute's constitutionality. The three-judge court upheld the residency requirement. This Court noted probable jurisdiction. During the appeal Sosna obtained a divorce in New York, though custody and support issues remained unresolved from the Iowa proceeding. She returned to Iowa to prosecute the appeal. Sosna sought class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to represent Iowa residents who had lived in the state less than one year and wished to initiate divorce actions but were barred by the residency requirement. The parties stipulated that numerous people were similarly situated, joinder was impracticable, her claims were representative, and she would adequately protect class interests. The district court approved the stipulation in a pretrial order.
The United States sued an employer and union alleging racial discrimination in hiring and seniority systems. The government sought class-wide relief for affected minority workers. The court addressed the scope of the class remedy under Rule 23 while noting that the action could bind class members consistent with due process protections.
The United States brought an action in a Tennessee federal court against T. I. M. E.-D. C., Inc., a common carrier of motor freight with nationwide operations. The complaint charged discriminatory hiring, assignment, and promotion policies against Negroes at its Nashville terminal. Almost three years later, the Government filed a second action in a Texas federal court against the company. It alleged a pattern and practice of employment discrimination against Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons throughout the company's transportation system. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters was joined as a defendant. The two actions were consolidated for trial in the Northern District of Texas. The central claim in both lawsuits was that the company had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against minorities in hiring so-called line drivers. Those Negroes and Spanish-surnamed persons who had been hired were given lower paying, less desirable jobs as servicemen or local city drivers. They were thereafter discriminated against with respect to promotions and transfers. The complaint also challenged the seniority system established by the collective-bargaining agreements between the employer and the union. The Government sought a general injunctive remedy and specific make-whole relief for all individual discriminatees. The cases went to trial. The District Court found that the Government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that T. I. M. E.-D. C. and its predecessor companies were engaged in a plan and practice of discrimination in violation of Title VII. The court further found that the seniority system contained in the collective-bargaining contracts between the company and the union violated Title VII because it operated to impede the free transfer of minority groups into and within the company. With respect to individual relief the court accepted the Government's basic contention that the affected class of discriminatees included all Negro and Spanish-surnamed incumbent employees who had been hired to fill city operations or serviceman jobs at every terminal that had a line-driver operation. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the basic conclusions of the District Court. It held, however, that the relief ordered by the District Court was inadequate. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court to hold the evidentiary hearings necessary to apply its remedial principles. The Supreme Court granted both the company's and the union's petitions for certiorari.
Rule 23 governs when it directly conflicts with state law because the federal rule addresses only the procedural mechanism for aggregating claims. The Rules Enabling Act validates Rule 23 because it does not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right created by state law. Courts therefore apply the federal standard to decide certification even if state law would bar the class action.
Supporting sources
…when Cohen arose can appreciate the strong state policy reflected in the statute. I think it wholly legitimate to view Federal Rule 23 as not purporting to deal with the problem. But even had the Federal Rules purported to do so, and in so doing provided a substantially less effective deterrent to strike suits, I think the…
…than the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum under §1332. The dealers sought to have their claims certified as a class action
…See id. , at 457–459. Some scholars have criticized the trend. See generally id. , at 457–465; Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B. U. L. Rev. 615, 633–653 (2017); Morley, De Facto Class
…claims were representative of the class, and that she would fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. See Rule 23
…supra . This question was not presented in either petition for certiorari and therefore is not properly before us. This Court's Rule 23 (1) (c). Our disposition of the claim that is presented, however, will permit the trial court to reconsider any part of the balance it struck in dealing with this issue. : The…
The defendant must have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class so that final injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate for the class as a whole. A uniform policy that affects every class member in the same way satisfies this requirement. Individualized monetary claims are generally incompatible with certification under this subdivision.
Supporting sources
No. Rule 23(a)(2) requires only that there be one or more questions of law or fact common to the class. A single common question suffices even if individual damages or other circumstances differ among members. Variations that do not defeat the existence of a common question do not prevent certification.
Supporting sources
Section 1367 confers supplemental jurisdiction over claims by Rule 23 class members. The statute withholds supplemental jurisdiction only over claims by plaintiffs joined under Rule 19 or intervening under Rule 24 in diversity cases. Class members certified under Rule 23 therefore fall within the grant of supplemental jurisdiction.
Supporting sources